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Abstract
Technology is improving day-by-day and so is the usage of mobile devices. Every activity
that would involve manual and paper transactions can now be completed in seconds using
your fingertips. On one hand, life has become fairly convenient with the help of mobile
devices, whereas on the other hand privacy of the data and the transactions occurring
in the process have been under continuous threat. Mobile devices connect to a number
of service providers for various reasons. These could include downloading data, online
purchasing or could be just used to browse information which may be irrelevant at a
later point. Access to critical and sensitive information may be available at a number
of places. In case of a mobile device, the information may be available with the service
provider. Service Provider could be in the form of any web portal. In all such scenarios,
passing the information or data from the service provider into the mobile device is a
major challenge, as the data/information cannot be sent in plain text format. The
confidentiality and integrity of the data needs to be protected and hence, the service
provider must convert the data into an encrypted format before passing it onto the mobile
device, to prevent risks from sniffing and unauthorized disclosure of data. Preserving
the location of the individual user of any mobile device has also been the concern for a
number of researchers.
Mobile devices have become an important tool in modern communication. Mobile and
other handheld devices such as ipads and tablets have over taken laptops and desktops
and hence there has been an increasing research interest in this area in recent years. This
includes improving the quality of communication and the overall end-to-end data security
in day-to-day transactions. Mobile devices continuously connect to different service
providers for day-to-day needs such as online purchases, online banking and endless
surfing for information. In addition to this devices could be connecting to the service
providers to receive or send sensitive information. At the Service Provider end, the data
would be stored with the provider and Service Provider would only hand over the data
if it confirms that the person requested it is authorized to receive the information. The
exchange of data from one end of the network to the other is a major challenge due to
malicious intruder mishandling of the data. Hence the confidentiality and integrity of
the data needs to be protected either by transforming the sensitive information into a
non-readable format or by converting into a cipher text.
Privacy has been an open problem for research as more and more information is getting
leaked on a day-to-day basis. Through this thesis, I have tried to address a number of
areas within the privacy realm where information and data access and sharing is a key
concern along side the key aspect of location privacy. I have also tried to address the
problems in the space of access control wherein I have proposed policy based languages
and extensions for ensuring appropriate access control methodologies. The main goal
and focus in this work has been to enforce the importance of location privacy in mobile
environments and to propose solutions that resolve the problems of where and when to
enforce location security. Another key goal of this work has been to create new access
control and trust based solutions to ensure the right level of access to the right receiver
of information. Through my research, I have explored the various privacy related attacks
and suggested appropriate countermeasures for the same. In addition to proposing and
showcasing solutions using policy languages for access control, I have also introduced
geospatial access control solutions to ensure that the right user is accessing or requesting
for the right information from the right location. This helps the appropriate and the
right use of the information by the right resource. Through my thesis I have also given
equal importance to the trust aspects of sharing information. I have created new trust
assessment models to show how fused information can be handled and how can trust be
imposed on the information provider and the information itself.
The main contribution of this thesis is to address the problems around protecting the
data and individual’s privacy and to propose solutions to mitigate these issues using
new and novel techniques. They can be detailed as the following:
In privacy, there is always a privacy versus utility tradeoff and in order to make use
of utility, trust in the location is essential. Through this research I have developed i)
novel attestation models and access control methodologies including Privacy Preferences
Platform (P3P) extensions, ii) Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
extensions and iii) Geospatial access control through GeoXACML. iv)I have created new
methodologies to enforce location privacy and shown where best to enforce privacy. v)I
have also shown that global attestation is very crucial for privacy and needs accurate
methods in place to attest user’s location information for access. vi) Fusing of location
information is very crucial as there could be a number of similar or conflicting informa-
tion produced about a common source and it is very important to assess and evaluate the
trust level in the information. I have proposed, developed and implemented a new trust
assessment framework. This framework looks at the incoming information and passes
it on to the rule engine in the framework to make some inferences and then the trust
assessment module computes the trust score based on forward chaining or background
chaining scheme. The framework is used to evaluate the trust on the fused information in
a streaming setup. vii) I have created new solutions to look at the similarity profiles and
create identity enforcement through profiling. I have shown methods of anonymisation
for location privacy and identity privacy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research area and questions
Ubiquitous environments are environments where one has access to devices and com-
puters with internet wherever and whenever they need it. They are the next generation
of environments, and have been discussed in a number of research papers [2], [3] and
[4]. Mobile devices, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), and other electronic devices
are used for various transactions in the ubiquitous environment and interact with each
other. Mobile devices store various sensitive data in a ubiquitous environment and
having a controlled access to these data becomes crucial for a secure ubiquitous environ-
ment. There are applications that can be installed on a mobile device for everything and
anything and devices connect to these application providers for various reasons such as
downloading data, online purchasing or could be just used to browse information which
may be irrelevant at a later stage. The importance of maintaining the privacy of the in-
formation requester and the information, is critical as all the transactions are happening
online and this could motivate the malicious users to perform malicious activities. In
case of a mobile device, the information may be available with the application provider
of the application, which the device is accessing and this could be in the form of any
web portal, database or any other equivalent form. The confidentiality and integrity of
the data needs to be protected and hence, the application provider must convert the
data into an encrypted format before passing it onto the mobile device, to prevent risks
from sniffing and unauthorised disclosure of data. Individuals trying to access sensitive
information through mobile devices are risking their personal data, identity and location
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at all times. Preserving the location of the individual user of any mobile device has been
the concern for a number of researchers and people working in the area [3], [5] and [6].
Privacy related efforts have been made in the past [3]. Research has been carried out
around privacy awareness systems that allow certain privileges to data collectors [7].
Karyda and Gritzalis in [4] listed some of the challenges in this area and the research
directions for the future. In general, a malicious user is assumed to be very clever in
manipulating communications over the open network and his manipulation techniques
are unpredictable because they are unspecified. Also because malicious user can repre-
sent a coalition of bad guys, he may simultaneously control a number of network nodes
which are geographically far apart. In anticipation of such a powerful adversary over
such a vulnerable environment, Dolev and Yao in [8] proposed a threat model which has
been widely accepted as the standard threat model for cryptographic methods.
In addition to the day-to-day needs of the devices to connect to the application providers,
devices could be connecting to the Application providers to receive or send sensitive
information. At the Application provider end, the data would be stored with the provider
and the Application provider would only hand over the data if it confirms that the
person requesting is authorised to receive the information. The exchange of data from
one end of the network to the other is a major challenge due to malicious intruder
mishandling of the data. Hence the confidentiality and integrity of the data needs
to be protected either by transforming the sensitive information into a non-readable
format or by converting into a cipher text. Some of the access control methodologies
like the standard role based access control methods existed, but the thnigs that were
used for standard desktop solutions were not the best suitable for mobile devices as
well. Mobile devices have limited bandwidth and limited computational power. Under
these restrictions, the problems of access control and information to the right resource
for right reasons needs to be addressed. Existing solutions at the time of the research
did not cater to handle the limitations on the handheld devices. The problems with
the preserving privacy are applicable to all sectors including healthcare, government,
communications and so on. Some of the key areas and questions still unanswered in the
area of preserving privacy are around preserving the location information when using
location based services. How can one preserve the identity and location information and
still get access to the information requested for ? Another open question is around the
authentictity of the location information provided, when information is released based
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on the accuracy of the location. To add to this, how can one trust the source or provider
of the information ? These questions have been barely looked at in the research area
and hence I have addressed these in detail and provided solution to it.
Here is an introduction to a very practical and realistic problem with Healthcare services
today in order to set the scene. From the Figure 1.1, one can see that there are 2 main
players in the scenario one is the permanent General Practitioner (GP) and the other is
temporary practitioner in the absence of the permanent doctor. Assuming that the trust
is established between the mobile device, the Mobile Identity Provider (IDP) and the
Health service repository, the next big question is the transfer of the information related
to health. The information needs to be passed on from the health repository on to the
GP’s handheld device. This is very crucial and is a big security issue as the data that
is to be transferred is highly sensitive information and hence needs to be received by
the right person for the right reasons. In privacy there is always a privacy versus utility
tradeoff. To make use of some kind of information, there has to be some level of trust
in the location and hence attestation of location information needs to be performed.
Access control of the data and information in the mobile environments becomes a very
big area of research. This thesis highlights the solution implemented to achieve the
access control of data and information in mobile environments.
Trust was assumed to exist in the above scenario. However it is important to understand
how trust can be assessed when information is collected from various sources and this
highlights another challenging research problem. When there is streaming information
that comes in with additional location information, fusing those location information
and deriving the right level of trust if crucial.
Another use case to show the use of location privacy in a military environment is pre-
sented here. By showing a military scenario, it is indicative that this solution is applica-
ble to mobile environments in many sectors. The scenario is as follows: Assume that one
has a number of reports that comes in from various sources reporting of an Improvised
explosive device (IED) explosion in certain location l at time t. How can one ensure the
level of trust on the information about the event occurring in that location? This needs
some kind of trust assessment framework to assess the level of trust on fusing location
information.
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Figure 1.1: HealthCare Privacy Scenario.
Here is another use case in a military scenario that shows the importance of addressing
the “where to enforce location privacy” in mobile environments. Figure 1.2 shows a
tactical network where you can see device and the core of the network and the question
I am trying to address is “where to enforce location privacy?”
Mobile environments are always prone to various security vulnerabilities. A number of
papers have been written to highlight the various threats and problems due to the large
amount of transactions occurring in the mobile environments [9], [10]. A very common
attack on the mobile environment is the man-in-the-middle attack. Every bit of data
that comes into the mobile device and goes out of the mobile device can be assumed
to be sniffed by a malicious user. The information can be assumed to be sniffed by
the man-in-the-middle and manipulated in order to retrieve the sensitive information.
Protecting the information that is being exchanged between the mobile devices is a
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Figure 1.2: A tactical network scenario – highlighting the need for some capability
other than at the core of the network.
major challenge. The attack discussed above covers a number of attacks including man-
in-the-middle, sniffing and privacy related attacks. Another attack that is described
by some of the researchers is based on the cross service attack on the mobile devices.
Mulliner et al. have described the details of the cross service attack in [11]. Cross
service attacks can occur while browsing from mobile handset sitting in a shop with
wireless connectivity. The malicious user would be monitoring the new connections to
the wireless network and using a known exploit and he gains access to the phone. [11]
describes in detail the proof-of-concept to show the attack and also talks about the way
in which the vulnerability can be exploited. With the increasing availability of mobile
devices, there is a growing demand for location-based applications. In response to such
a user demand, various location based services have been emerging recently [12], [13].
In the mobile environment, it is quite common to have a man-in-the-middle trying to sniff
at the information being passed between the mobile device and the application providers
[11]. Therefore it is crucial to have data access control mechanisms in place. It would be
interesting to highlight the importance of European data protection guidelines that have
recently undergone revisions to include the privacy of individuals data and personally
identifiable information. Some of the notable changes include explicit consent from the
user when data is being handled. More transparency about how the data is handled is
another important change that has been added. The reform also includes the mandate
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for complete accountability and responsibility of the service provider when personal data
is being processed [14].
1.2 Research objectives
Information and data from/to mobile devices can be misused and mishandled by intrud-
ers or malicious users. In order to make sure that the right individual is accessing the
data, it is very important to have appropriate access control rules and policies in place.
Hence, it was very important for this research to consider some of the key methodologies
that could be used to ensure access control of data and information.
• Consider the example from Figure 1.1 that shows a typical scenario in a health
service. Providing appropriate access control for the data is a very big issue in
the health sector on its own and it is definitely the same issue in any other areas
of infrastructure. Hence data access control is one of the main research problems
today.
• In a military environment, it is very critical to preserve the location information of
the individuals out in the field but it is equally important to get access to the data
and information that they are requesting. As with any privacy solution, there is
always a privacy Vs utility tradeoff and when in need of information there has to
be a certain level of trust of the location. The objective here is to have some level
of attestation in order to ensure the right levels of access controls for information.
• Figure 1.2 shows a military use case where privacy is very important and critical
for all the right reasons. The core of the network has lot of computational power
and bandwidth but then information needs to be received along with the location
privacy maintained, it is not the best of the places to have the solution. The
objective here is to come up with something else that can do some quick com-
putations in the limited time and can provide accurate results to the requestor
but without revealing the sensitive identity and location information. Maintaining
location privacy in a military setup is very important for any successful operation
and when certain information is very sensitive there is a tradeoff of providing the
valid location which can only be verified through location attestation.
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• When there are multiple locations being reported, it is very difficult to fuse these
information and derive a consensus from the data. The main objective with this
is to have a mechanism that could help trust decisions automatically.
• When location services are requested on the mobile devices, the location informa-
tion can be faked and can be misrepresented for meeting specific requirements.
Gathering evidences independently becomes important where each entity reports
contacts with other entities in specific locations at specific times. Some of the
reports may be not true and in order to scrutinise these, global consistency check
would be required. With a global consistency check I can ensure if a particular
entity is being dishonest about the location information.
Hence, the objectives of this thesis are to propose solutions based on attestation of
location, access control through policy extensions and geographical co-ordinates,
trust assessment through mathematical models and location privacy through edge
servers and anonymization techniques.
1.3 Research assumption
To shape the research, some assumptions were made giving some starting points and
directions to the work:
• Location is a very important factor in the mobile environments.
• Small scale mobility tracesets are human to human encounters and relatively large
scale datasets are many to many encounters but using taxicab datasets I have got
a mixture of multiple people taking the same route and hence got more data in a
larger scale both in area and time.
• By using Subjective logic, I assume that trust has beta distribution and the best
model of trust is represented in the form of a triple (b,d,u) which is belief, disbelief,
uncertainty.
• With the Geospatial access control through GeoXACML, the main goal is not to
provide mandatory access control. The main criteria is that if the user satisfies
the location constraint, information will be provided hence providing discretionary
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access control. For mandatory access control, well known solutions like Digital
Right Management (DRM) exist.
• Global attestation of location works assuming that the majority of users are honest
users and have persistent IDs like Media Access Control (MAC) address and so on.
Hence ID scheme is a requirement for this solution to work. It is also important
to have a minority count on the collusive users.
1.4 Contributions
This research is aimed to provide a solution for preserving privacy in mobile environments
and covering the aspects of how to enforce location privacy, where to enforce location
privacy and how to ensure trust when location information is fused. The overall solution
allows the ease of use of mobile devices with appropriate privacy controls in place to
ensure that the right individual, in the right place and in a controlled environment, is
accessing the data and information.
Contributions of this research work include the following:
• I have proposed and developed a solution to address the question of “How to
enforce location security” in detail.
Privacy comes with a privacy Vs utility trade-off. When a certain utility is re-
quired, it is essential to ensure a certain level of trust on the location. Through
this research I have proposed a novel method using global attestation scheme and
developed and tested it . Global attestation of location ensures the accuracy of
the location by performing global consistency checks. I have used the EigenTrust
[15] and PeerTrust [16] check methodologies to calculate global and personalised
trust matrix while confirming attestation.
• I have proposed and developed new methods of access control for maintaining
privacy.
In order to address this, I introduce P3P based access control and then extend the
P3P policies to ensure that the data access control is achieved. The dependencies
are mainly on the P3P policy server and the design and architecture ensures that
the server is configured appropriately for the level of security required.
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A solution using XACML based access control has also been introduced through
this research. With the use of policy decision point, policy enforcement point and
policy administration point, an XACML based access control solution ensures the
information and data is accessed by the right sources. I have extended XACML
and developed a new GeoXACML implementation to ensure that access control is
achieved along with the location verification.
• I have designed a novel trust assessment model to validate fused location informa-
tion.
When there is a set of location information that is provided through streamed
information, it is difficult to derive at a consensus on the location and this could
be resolved through some level of trust assessment. In this research, a new trust
assessment model using subjective logic operators was designed to derive various
outcomes.
• I have designed a novel solution to address the “Where to enforce location privacy”
problem.
This research describes the drawbacks with implementing the solution for location
privacy at the device and the core of the network. It gives a detailed analysis
of the best place to enforce location security using the edge based solution and
implementing anonymization methods for the same.
1.5 Outline
The thesis is organised in 6 chapters as follows.
Chapter 2 presents an analysis of the existing approaches dealing with privacy related
attacks, methods of preserving privacy in mobile environments, policy based access
control, location and identity based mobile security, geospatial access control and trust
in the mobile environments. The focus is mainly on the different attacks related to
privacy and then the various methods used in order to preserve location, identity, the
drawbacks with the existing solutions, along side data access control and trust in the
overall mobile security space.
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In chapter 3, I highlight the importance of access control for ensuring privacy in mobile
devices and propose a mechanism for data access control using P3P policy extension and
XACML. It details each of the policy languages and the process in which access control
can be achieved by using P3P and XACML. The chapter further describes how geospatial
access control can be achieved by creating a new implementation of GeoXACML. The
chapter also covers the details about the implementation and evaluation of each of the
methods.
In Chapter 4, I address the “How to enforce location privacy” problem. Through this
chapter, I will highlight the privacy Vs utility trade-offs and show the importance of
ensuring trust in location. I then present a new model called the global attestation
model which ensures the location accuracy through global consistency checks and trust
matrix scores.
Chapter 5 describes various aspects involved when location information is fused. The
involvement of trust in the mobile environments is discussed in detail and it covers var-
ious use cases and system highlights. These showcase the significance of using trust
assessment with opinion to ensure that the fused and conflicting information is resolved.
It details the various steps in the opinion assessment framework and introduces Sub-
jective Logic which is the method used to compute the trust. The chapter shows the
detailed architecture of the trust framework with implementation and evaluation results.
It shows how to ensure trust when encountered with fused and conflicting information.
Chapter 6 describes the “Where to enforce location privacy” problem and provides
solution to show that location privacy can best be enforced at the edge. It shows the
drawbacks in implementing location privacy on the device and at the core of the network
and highlights why it is important to enforce location privacy on the edge of the network.
Anonymization methods of performing location privacy on the edge of the network is
also described in this chapter. The chapter covers the detailed design of the architecture
used for implementation and the evaluation steps with results.
Finally, in Chapter 6, I present the conclusions. In this chapter, I highlight the contri-
butions of the research, the benefits and implications of this and some topics for future
work.
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Background and related work
2.1 Overview
This chapter presents an analysis of the existing works in the field of preserving privacy
in mobile environments. It shows the various privacy attacks and the solutions that
have been designed for preserving location privacy in mobile environment. I further
highlight the drawbacks in each of the existing solutions. This chapter also includes
review work on policy based access control for mobile, location and identity security,
trust and geospatial access control.
2.2 Background
Here you can see definitions of the key words used throughout this thesis. These defi-
nitions will help the reader better understand the usage of the words in relation to the
work in privacy.
2.2.1 Access Control
Access control is a method by which a system grants or denies the right to see cer-
tain information, do certain actions. Access control can be achieved using different
mechanisms. Access control has played an important roles since the time of computer
evolution. But with the use of smartphones the importance of access control has got
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complicated. Computers and servers have lot of bandwidth and computational power
hence can deal with lots of computations before getting access to information. In the
case of mobile device, this is slightly different. The device has limited bandwidth and
computational power, it has limited storage capability and hence using all these con-
straints access control checks have to be performed before giving access to information
on the mobile device.
2.2.2 Privacy
Privacy is a mechanism where an individual or group of people can restrict providing
information about them to the outside world. It is also a state where individuals do not
want to share personal information with public. Privacy is very important in the digital
world as information shared in the public domain can be misused.
2.2.3 Policy languages
Consumers are concerned about losing their privacy while conducting business using
computers. Studies reveal that if consumers are not comfortable with the organizational
procedure for handling their personal information, they take their business elsewhere
[17]-[18]. With the growth of Internet usage and an increase in online business, con-
sumers expect high levels of online privacy [19]. In fact consumers frequently mention
lack of trust as one of the reasons for not purchasing from the Internet [20]. From the
organization’s perspective, the need to protect consumer privacy is a growing concern
[21]. If organizations do not follow efficient privacy practices, consumers move away
from the organizations and legal consequences arise. Protecting or not protecting the
privacy of consumers can impact the business growth and revenue of the organizations.
Thus, the formalization of an organization’s promises into privacy policy is an essential
part of the organization’s customer relationship practices. Organizations express their
internal privacy practices through privacy promises as statements in the privacy policies.
Consumers are able to analyze the organization’s commitment towards protecting con-
sumers’ privacy through these privacy policies. Unfortunately, few consumers take the
time to read the complete privacy policies of all organizations with whom they interact
online. Studies have shown that the privacy policies on the Internet are long, legalistic
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and difficult to understand [22], [23]. Also system administrators find it difficult to main-
tain the internal access control information manually [24]. Researchers have attempted
to solve this problem by developing privacy policy languages that help represent the hu-
man readable privacy policies and access control into machine-readable format [25]-[26].
These privacy policy languages enable software agents to understand privacy policies
better and help users to make informed decisions. These languages also help systems to
make decision regarding an user’s access to any data in the organization. The capability
of these languages depends on various features; one important feature is expressiveness
of the language. As a result, understanding the expressiveness of the privacy policy
languages becomes essential. Different types of languages are available to represent the
human-readable policies into machine-readable format. Some languages are designed to
help the organizations to express their privacy policies in machine-readable format and
some of the languages help users to define their privacy preferences, which can be used
to make decisions for the user. Each language has its own syntax and mechanism for
implementation. There is no one standard metric available by which one would analyze
these languages.
2.2.4 Security Capsule
The security capsule is a software application for mobile devices and it contains security
services which are used to protect the sensitive information in the mobile device. It is
a key component in the communication module of the mobile device used to interact
with the identity provider and the service provider. The very existence of the security
capsule in the mobile device is through the registration process. The registration process
has two steps namely, registration with identity provider and registration with service
provider. The first step starts with the security capsule being downloaded into the
mobile device from the identity provider. The mobile user verifies the authentication
of the Identity provider for transmitting the security capsule and the integrity of the
downloaded security capsule. In the second step, the security capsule registers with the
service provider for services. The user and service provider share a unique identification.
Therefore the user registration request will be uniquely identified by the service provider.
If an identity doesn’t exist then the Identity provider generates an identity for the mobile
user. The mobile device authenticates with the identity provider and both parties share
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Figure 2.1: Security capsule within a mobile device.
a secure communication channel. The security capsule architecture and the functionality
are described in detail in [27].
Figure 2.1 shows the mobile device with the security capsule obtained through registra-
tion process and the interactions between the service providers and the mobile client.
The primary challenge in a security capsule is to provide controlled and appropriate data
access control to the right user. This is based on the real time key that is received from
the service provider. The service provider sends the data/information requested by the
mobile device in an encrypted format. The real time key is used to encrypt the data and
the mobile device requires this real time key to access the data. In order to receive the
real time key, the mobile client needs to first provide the appropriate user preferences
based on the P3P policy of the service provider. The P3P policy is published in the form
of Web Services Description Language (WSDL) in the service provider. P3P Policy of
the mobile device needs to be stored in the device itself. There has to be a specific way
in which the P3P policy is stored in the mobile client. P3P file is being stored on the
mobile device is in the form of a XML file. XACML policy file can be expressed in XML
format.
2.2.5 P3P
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) P3P1.0 Specification [28] enables web sites
to communicate their privacy practices in a standard format that can be retrieved au-
tomatically and interpreted by user agents. P3P user agents will allow users to be
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informed of site practices (in both machine and human-readable formats) and to auto-
mate decision-making based on these practices when appropriate. Thus users need not
read the privacy policies at every site they visit. Although P3P provides a technical
mechanism for ensuring that users can be informed about privacy policies before they
release personal information, it does not provide an automated mechanism for making
sure sites act according to their policies. Products implementing this specification may
provide some assistance in that regard, but that is up to specific implementations and
outside the scope of this specification. However, P3P is complementary to laws and
self-regulatory programs that can provide enforcement mechanisms. In addition, P3P
does not include mechanisms for transferring data or for securing personal data in tran-
sit or storage. P3P may be built into tools designed to facilitate data transfer. These
tools should include appropriate security safeguards. The standard P3P policy can be
described in the Extensible Markup Language (XML) format and is explained with ex-
ample [28]. It is important to note here that P3P relies mainly on trust. P3P policy has
not been implemented in a handheld device such as mobile phone, PDA, etc. This work
introduces P3P into the mobile space and hence proposes a new architecture for data
access control using P3P policy in a mobile device. Trust between the service provider
and the user’s mobile device can be established by using the Security capsule.
2.2.6 XACML
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language), was formed by the OASIS
(Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) standards
consortium. XACML is a simple, flexible way to express and enforce access control
policies in a variety of environments, using a single language. The XACML language
in effect protects content from unauthorized use in enterprise data exchanges. XACML
is mainly derived around and written in, XML, which is understood in most global
environments. OASIS, which drives the development, convergence, and adoption of e-
business standards, has ratified XACML. XACML gives an extensive and powerful set of
features to the developers. It allows an organization to create and deploy authorization
policies to match its mix of assets and business use-cases, then plug in additional policies
as the business and its standards evolve. XACML helps in resolving issues related to
security applications and there have been a number of papers published in order to prove
the same. Q Xuebing et al. [29] detailed in their paper how XACML can be used to
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solve some of the issues with mobile environment. This work introduces XACML in the
mobile environment and hence proposes a new architecture for data access control.
XACML defines three top-level policy elements: < Rulle >, < Policy > and< PolicySet >
[7]. The < Rule > element contains a Boolean expression that can be evaluated in iso-
lation, but that is not intended to be accessed in isolation by a PDP (Policy Decision
Point). So, it is not intended to form the basis of an authorization decision by itself.
It is intended to exist in isolation only within an XACML PAP (Policy Administration
Point), where it may form the basic unit of management, and be re-used in multiple
policies. The < Policy > element contains a set of < Rule > elements and a specified
procedure for combining the results of their evaluation. It is the basic unit of policy used
by the PDP, and so it is intended to form the basis of an authorization decision. The
< PolicySet > element contains a set of < Policy > or other < PolicySet > elements and
a specified procedure for combining the results of their evaluation. It is the standard
means for combining separate policies into a single combined policy.
2.2.7 Trust
There are various definitions of trust. McKnight and Chervany [30] defines trust as
follows: Trust is the extent to which one party is willing to depend on somebody, or
something, in a given situation with a feeling of relative security, even though negative
consequences are possible.
2.2.8 Fusion
Fusion is the process of integrating lot of data and information and making sense from
the information. It is also a process where it is represented in a consistent manner
and for useful representation. Combined process of information from the source of same
object or scene to obtain more complex, reliable and accurate information. Combination
of data from multiple sources and gather that information into discrete, actionable items
in order to achieve inferences, which will be more efficient and narrowly tailored than if
they were achieved by means of disparate sources.
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2.2.9 Subjective Logic
Subjective logic is a belief reasoning calculus that is compatible with, and an extension
of probabilistic logic. It can for example be used for modeling trust networks, for mod-
elling Bayesian networks, for Inteligence Analysis and logical argumentation. In general,
subjective logic is suitable for modeling and analysing situations involving uncertainty,
incomplete knowledge and different world views.
Beliefs are represented as opinions. A binomial opinion applies to a single proposition,
and a multinomial opinion applies to a whole frame of multiple propositions (state
space). Binomial opinions are equivalent to Beta probability density functions, and
multinomial opinions are equivalent to the more general Dirichlet probability density
functions. This makes subjective logic suitable for reasoning with evidence represented
as Beta or Dirichlet probability density functions.
2.2.10 Security Vs Privacy
There is a clear difference between Security and Privacy and it is important to high-
light that difference in the thesis here. Security is mainly confidentiality, integrity and
availability of the data. Security puts in the appropriate processes in place to ensure
that data is accurate and reliable. Privacy is the appropriate use of the data. The data
should be used according to the agreed purposes and hence this is the key differentiator
between privacy and security.
2.2.11 Crowdsourcing
Crowdsourcing information systems can be classified in many different ways. One of
the classifications can be the nature of collaboration: explicit or implicit. In explicit
collaboration systems (e.g.,Wikipedia or Linux), users collaborate explicitly to build
information artifacts. On the other hand, implicit collaboration systems let users col-
laborate implicitly to solve a problem for the system owners.
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2.3 Privacy related attacks and countermeasures
There has been a number of privacy related attacks that have come into existence today.
One of the attacks is a sensor sniffing attack in which it assumes that the threat model is
where the attackers are able to install malicious software onto the devices. This can be
done by exploiting the software vulnerabilities or by tricking to install untrusted code.
It is also assumed that the attacker has no physical access to the device but can receive
the sensor date through voice or data channels. More details about this can be found
in the work by L Cai et al.[31]. A number of viruses have been created to exploit the
vulnerabilities that exist on today’s mobile devices. One of the viruses, which originated
in Spain, sends text messages to random mobile phone numbers [9]. As mobile phones
become more and more intelligent the attacks against them will keep increasing. A
number of vulnerabilities have been exploited using the Bluetooth capability of mobile
devices leading to exposure of personal data [9]. Another potential attack that has been
in existence is stealing user’s personal data and downloading it without the consent of
the mobile owner [9].
As widely discussed in [32], Information sharing is key to the operational efficiency of
a coalition network. From an information provider’s perspective, successful decision-
making at the consumer using the shared data, indirectly results in utility for the
provider and offers incentive for sharing. However, the act of sharing presents risks
to strategic assets. The risk arises from the possibility that the data being shared may
reveal more information to its recipient than was intended. Policies instituted at the
producer to manage this risk often negatively affects the quality of decision-making at
the consumer by introducing additional sources of uncertainty, thereby reducing the
provider’s utility.
One of the ways in which the balancing between risk and utility is achieved is through
deliberate obfuscation of data. Obfuscation is a process through which the quality of
the shared information is degraded in a controlled manner to protect against sensitive
inferences regarding strategic assets [33]. This allows the data to retain utility while
lowering the associated risk.
A report highlighted that Google’s Android phones are vulnerable to privacy attacks
[34]. The vulnerability results from the use of unencrypted wireless networks like Wi-Fi
18
Chapter 2. Background and Related Work
to log into various Google services such as contacts, calendar and services like Picasa.
When users request a digital certificate to sign into these services without re-typing
the login information, Google’s servers relay an authentication token back to the user’s
phone. This allows the user to be able to be logged into the accounts for 2 weeks without
having to re-login. This sounds like a matter of convenience to the user but it has turned
out to be a security flaw due to the fact that the authentication token is sent out in
plain text. Malicious users can track the unsecured network and capture the authenti-
cation token thus allowing access to various services leading to a total breach of privacy.
Another news has shown that some of Europe’s biggest mobile phone companies signed
up to new privacy guidelines published by the Global System for Mobile communication
Association (GSMA) [35]. Signature based methods can be easily circumvented using
code obfuscation necessitating a new signature for each malware variant [36], forcing the
anti-malware client to regularly update its signature database. To tackle wide variety
of new malware, a comprehensive evaluation framework incorporating robust static and
dynamic methods can be proposed on Android platform. Manual analysis has become
in-feasible due to the exponential increase in the number of unknown malware samples.
2.4 Classification of preserving privacy in mobile environ-
ments
The below architecture shows the complete classification of the different techniques used
to preserve the privacy in mobile environments. It defines the problems involved as well
as the techniques proposed to overcome these shortcomings. The privacy techniques are
classified under two main headings: (1) Data privacy and (2) Contextual privacy.
Data privacy mainly involves the data that is being transmitted to and from the mo-
bile device. This data could be in the form of a message, text or information. The
data could be sensitive information or it could even be a confirmation on some booking
that was done for an online shopping. Figure 2.2 shows the privacy classifications and
within the data privacy section, it shows the 2 main areas of problems, i.e. the mobile
query and the mobile resources. The mobile query could request the service providers
for information that could be sensitive in nature. Hence this has always been a prob-
lem to understand and hence preserve the privacy of the information. In addition to
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this, the data confidentiality is guaranteed through authentication. The other area of
classification of privacy is based on the contextual privacy.
Contextual privacy can be further divided into two areas namely location privacy and
identity privacy. When mobile users request for static resources or mobile resources,
pseudo–identifiers are sent and location is anonymized. The data that is being trans-
mitted is protected against third party malicious users. Although the information can be
assumed at all times to be hijacked by malicious users, malicious users protect the data
against unauthorised access. This is achieved by using data access control mechanisms
such as P3P policy extension and XACML policies. These are described in detail in
the later sections. Location privacy mainly deals with the location of the requester. In
mobile environments, users are frequently requested for their location information when
they try to access a new online service. For example, when a user requests for nearby
restaurant information from a location-based server, the location based server needs to
know the location of the user and hence the location information is normally requested.
However, in most of the cases, the user doesn’t want to disclose the location informa-
tion to arbitrary location based service providers. This can be achieved by a number of
different mechanisms described later on. To briefly name the mechanisms here as shown
in Figure 2.2, let’s start with k-anonymity. In this method, user’s location information
is updated with pseudo-IDs and then the generalised location information is sent to the
location based service provider. Due to some groups being created that fail to provide
overall anonymity, another mechanism called s-proximity has been implemented [37].
This mechanism creates a larger number of anonymous user profiles to ensure that the
location based service provider cannot identify the location of the requester. Another
location privacy mechanism that is described in here is Casper [38]. Casper is a combina-
tion of location anonymizer and privacy aware query processor. Few other mechanisms
like the encrypted data store [39], key agreement [40], privacy tools [41], In-device spatial
cloaking assisted by cloud [42] are also part of the location privacy and are described
in detail in the future sections. Contextual privacy has another classification namely
Identity privacy. Identity privacy mainly talks about the user/mobile server requester
who issues the requests. In order to preserve the identity of the user who issues the
requests, a number of mechanisms have been explored. They are mainly user profile
pseudo-identifier conversion, privacy aware query processor and authentication based
methods. Each one of them is detailed in further sections.
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Figure 2.2: Classification of privacy preservation mechanisms in mobile environments.
2.4.1 Profile anonymization model
Preserving privacy using anonymization has been discussed in a number of research
papers [37], [43], [44], and [45]. The authors in [46] have looked at the k-anonymity in
order to generalise the location. The user of a mobile device usually requests information
for 2 main types of resources namely static resources and mobile resources. In case of
static resources, pseudo-identifiers are sent and the location is anonymized. In the case
of mobile resources, IDs are updated with pseudo-ids and then the generalised location
and profile are sent back to the requester.
Although the profile anonymization model works well using the k-anonymity, there have
been a number of attacks that can be performed on the k-anonymity model that has
led to the identification of the query issuer in the location based services. To overcome
some of the shortcomings in the current k-anonymity model the s-proximity model was
proposed. The next section discusses the advantages of the s-proximity compared to
k-anonymity model.
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2.4.2 Identity inference protection using s-proximity in location based
services
The k-anonymity model as described in the previous section tries to hide the location of
the query issuer who tried to request for location based information from the Location
Service Provider (LSP). In [37], the author shows that the k-anonymity is not enough
as it can be easily prone to attacks thus resulting in the re-identification of the query
requester. Two main attacks that have been depicted in the work are heterogeneity
attack and conformity attacks. K-anonymity can create groups that fail to provide the
overall anonymity due to lack of sufficient match among members with respect to some
sensitive user attribute. The communication between the query requester and the LSP
is as follows: Initially, the user sends a location-based query to the Location Anonymizer
(LA), which then replaces the exact location with a Cloaked Region (CR). It is then
passed on to the LSP. The attacks prove that in this process, by some combined work
by the LSP’s or an LSP can individually break down the anonymity set and prove
the identification of the specific query requester in cases where the query is specific or
not too generic. Hence, [37] proposes a solution that generalises the query and hence
makes it difficult for the LSP to identify the actual query requester. This is achieved
in the s-proximity model. The work suggests that both k-anonymity and s-proximity
are needed to anonymize the query requester’s identity in a location-based service. In
the s-proximity model, the LA is replaced by context aware LA with further modules
such as query generalization, query analyser and partitioning agent. With the detailed
implementation of these modules privacy of the user is preserved and hence the privacy
preservation is achieved in location-based environments.
2.4.3 Casper: Query processing without compromising privacy
Originally, Walid and his co-authors present a new privacy-aware query processing frame-
work, Capser*, in which mobile and stationary users can obtain snapshot and/or contin-
uous location-based services without revealing their private location information. In par-
ticular, they propose a privacy-aware query processor embedded inside a location-based
database server to deal with snapshot and continuous queries based on the knowledge of
the user’s cloaked location rather than the exact location. Their proposed privacy-aware
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query processor is completely independent of how they compute the user’s cloaked loca-
tion. In other words, any existing location anonymization algorithms that blur the user’s
private location into cloaked rectilinear areas can be employed to protect the user’s lo-
cation privacy. The new Casper: a new framework in which mobile and stationary users
can entertain location-based services without revealing their location information. The
method addresses the issue of user having to give away the location information while
requesting for any location-based services through a location based database server.
Casper involves two main components namely, location anonymizer and privacy aware
query processor. The work [38] describes in detail how exactly the two main compo-
nents perform with regard to the four novel areas of scalability, quality, efficiency and
flexibility. Casper functions mainly in the following manner. When the mobile user
sends the location information along with the query request for a particular location
based service, the location anonymizer picks it up and blurs the location information to
a spatial region along with the query and passes it to the location based database server.
The privacy aware query processor is built into the location based database server and
it looks at the request and returns a set of answers that matches the mobile users query.
The Figure 2.3 shows the mobile device making a request to the location based service
provider. This is passed through the anonymizer and into the location based database
server. The anonymizer does its task and the privacy aware query processor performs
its function and the most relevant out of the four data and query would be passed on to
the location based service providers.
2.4.4 Casper model
The authors in [38] also point out to three novel types of data and query that Casper
handles. According to them all the traditional anonymizers can only work on the public
query over public data. In [38], the authors propose three novel areas of transactions
namely, private query over public data, public query over private data and private query
over private data. A detailed analysis of the three methods is shown and the authors
assess its performance and scalability.
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Figure 2.3: Casper model.
Casper functionality with private query over public data (PrQPu), public query over
private data (PuQPr), and private query over private data (PrQPr) can be shown as:
(qpr, dpu)(qpu, dpr), (qpr, dpr)
(Mlr)→ mobile request and location
A→ Anonymisation
(Clr)→ Cloaking region
A(Mlr(Q,D))
Q,D → (qpr, dpu)(qpu, dpr), (qpr, dpr)(qpu, dpu)
A(Mlr(Q,D)) = {Clr(Q,D)}
{Clr, (Q,D)} =
{Clr(qpr, dpu)}{Clr(qpu, dpr)}
{Clr(qpr, dpr)}{Clr(qpu, dpu)}
According to the authors, by using the Casper’s novel solution, the location information
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will never be compromised. They also address another level of anonymizer called the
adaptive location anonymizer, which works, similar to the original location anonymizer
with some differences. Further details can be found in [38].
2.4.5 Encrypted data store to preserve privacy
Location based social applications (LBSA) are used considerably in today’s smartphones.
Smartphones using these applications send location information to untrusted third party
servers. In [39] the authors argue that the LBSAs should adapt an approach where
the untrusted third-party servers are treated simply as encrypted data stores, and the
application functionality be moved to the client devices. The location coordinates are
encrypted, when shared, and can be decrypted only by the users that the data is intended
for. This approach significantly improves user location privacy. The authors also argue
that this approach not only improves privacy, but also is flexible enough to support a
wide variety of location-based applications used today. Location information can be
easily accessed by the third party servers and hence can be passed on to other sources
due to various reasons as mentioned in [39]. In [39], the authors propose a design
for building LBSAs that provides a low-cost, practical, and deployable alternative to
existing design while providing strong user location privacy. The key insight behind this
design is to treat the server as a simple encrypted data store, and move the application
functionality to the client’s smartphone. All the location information shared is encrypted
and the lack of plain location information on the storage server improves user privacy.
This approach easily works on today’s smartphones because the servers running LBSAs
today provide their service by running simple operations such as certain database or
hash table lookups, performing simple computations on the location data, and sending
the results to be displayed on the clients terminals. For example, in a nearby restaurant
review application, the server takes the user location, finds restaurants that are in the
vicinity of the user’s location, queries the reviews of these restaurants, and sends the
results back to the users for display. In the proposed approach, the data storage and
lookup operations happen on encrypted data but still remain on the storage server. The
clients receive the encrypted results, decrypt and display the results to the users. The
clients only incur an additional cost of decrypting the received content, and perform
simple calculations on the decrypted data It is important to notice that the encrypted
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Figure 2.4: Encrypted data store model.
data store. This encrypted data store obfuscates the location information and this is
another way of location anonymisation that is used for location privacy.
Figure 2.4 shows that friends exchange friendship proofs and store them in their devices
and then users generate and store the transaction proofs in the server and their friends
later on retrieve this. By using lightweight cryptographic schemes such as encryption,
decryption with real time keys, the authors claim that they can easily move the func-
tionality to the smartphones and provide services while preserving privacy. The work
discusses two proofs namely, friendship proof and transaction proof.
Friendship proofs cryptographically attest the social connection (or friendship) between
two users, and similarly, transaction proofs cryptographically attest certain data gener-
ated by a user. Using these proofs, any user in the network can verify if it is a friend,
and if so decrypt the data generated. But no other user other than a friend will be able
to see the contents. Finally, the interface exposed by the storage server is narrow enough
that one can reason about the privacy guarantees, and yet they are flexible enough to
build several LBSAs. As a result, a single storage server can support many different
LBSAs.
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Figure 2.5: Location privacy with privacy tools.
2.4.6 Unified framework for location privacy
According to work [41] there are three entities that play a role in preserving location
privacy: users, applications, and privacy tools. Each entity controls the amount of shared
information and thus affects user privacy. Users and applications might intentionally
(e.g., by being cautious about sharing unnecessary information) or unintentionally (e.g.,
by sharing incorrect information) reduce the amount of information revealed. Privacy
policies influence the way applications can share information with different entities,
and they are applied to the application based on the users’ decisions. Various privacy
tools [41], also use sophisticated algorithms to guarantee users’ privacy. In order to
capture the effect of the three entities in preserving location privacy of users, in [41],
they abstract the entities and model a location-privacy preserving mechanism as a single
unit that separates actual events of the users and the adversary. The work [41] defines
a location-privacy preserving mechanism as a transformation function that modifies the
users’ actual events before they can become observable by any observer. The work
discusses the privacy tools in detail.
Privacy tools work in three architectures: (i) Distributed (user-side): They can work
in a distributed way by being implemented on individual mobile devices, where each
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device transforms its events and modifies what an observer can see about the user’s
spatio-temporal state. This can be done either with the help of information that a
device gets from other devices or exclusively with the information that the user has.
(ii) Centralised (server-side): They can work in a centralised manner by using a trusted
central server that acts as a privacy preserving proxy and modifies users’ messages
(correspond to events in our model) before being observable by an untrusted entity. (iii)
Hybrid: They can be a hybrid of both distributed and centralised architectures. The
four main functions in the location privacy preserving mechanism include hiding events,
adding dummy events, obfuscation and anonymization.
2.4.7 Authentication and key agreement for location privacy
A. Loukas et al. discussed in [40] about mobile instant locator with chatting capability
along with preserving privacy and security. Mobile instant locator with chatting (MILC)
was developed for usage within a closed community and hence worked very well in the
University scenario described in the work. The research in [40] also highlights that
with its popularity grew its demand and since it also incorporated privacy preserving
techniques it was very attractive to other communities too. MILC works towards making
the communication confidential and maintaining the privacy of the user. According to
[40] the MILC server is developed in Java. The client server communications are handled
using the RSA 1024 bit asymmetric keys. Client gets successfully authenticated with
the server and from then onwards every communication between the two ends is secured
by using a symmetric session key created at the server end. The research in [40] proves
that supporting pseudonymity and location privacy can preserve the end-user privacy.
The option of presenting or disclosing the location is left to the choice of the user. If the
user decides not to disclose the location, user’s privacy is maintained. Pseudonymity is
provided per session. When the user connects to the MILC server is offered with the
option of choosing a different pseudonym for the current session. In [40], authors have
also compared MILC with three other applications [47], [48], [49] and show comparison
based on security requirements. The comparison is based on the following six basic
criteria: mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity, pseudonymity, resistance to
DoS (Denial of Service) caused by insiders and location privacy. The comparative view
of all the applications considering the above mentioned seven basic criteria show that the
applications support user authentication and pseudonymity. MILC additionally provides
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mutual client–server authentication. Moreover, the pseudonym of a MILC user cannot
be associated with the permanent identity in any way. Excluding MILC, BuddyMob is
the only one supporting location privacy, but this applies for guest users only.
2.4.8 In-device spatial cloaking assisted by cloud
A number of privacy mechanisms proposed mostly deal with single point of service.
When there is a single point of service, things are bound to go wrong somehow some-
where. Song and Sean [42] talks about the cloud services available that makes it so much
more versatile in terms of the services being available in the cloud. The authors describe
how the location based services that are requested by the mobile device are delivered
to them by means of using spatial cloaking that is assisted by cloud capabilities. There
are clients in the mobile devices that would be responsible for generating the cloaking
region. The main difference of the In-device spatial cloaking solution in comparison to
the Casper solution is that here it is the device generating the cloaked region and hence
the work strongly portrays that using the in-device cloaking privacy can be preserved.
The in-device spatial cloaking solution involves a location trusted server, which takes the
information from the mobile device strips that information and carries only the spatial
cloaked information and the service request and passes it on to the service provider.
The works described above shows the various methods used in research for preserving
privacy in mobile environments. The details for each of the methods have been included
in their respective sections above with references to their work. The main reason to
showcase all the work above is to highlight the existing research work in the area and
the drawbacks in the existing solutions leading to my thesis on preserving privacy in the
mobile environments.
2.5 Policy based access control
Rei is a policy specification language defined in Web Ontology Language (OWL)-Lite
[50]. It is a highly expressive and extensible declarative policy specification language
well suited for describing security policies in pervasive environments. Rei includes con-
structs for expressing rights, prohibitions, obligations and dispensations. It also includes
constructs for setting positive or negative modality preferences and allows for stating
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priority between policies. It models speech acts like delegation, revocation, request and
cancellation. This allows policies to be expressed in a less exhaustive way and also al-
lows for distributed policy management. In [51] and [52], the authors show how policies
can be used for guiding the behavior of entities within a domain. The advantage of
using policies lies in being able to modify the security functionality without having to
change the implementations of the entities themselves. It defines a policy as a set of
rules describing concepts like permission, prohibition, obligation and dispensation over
possible actions in the environment with respect to the requester, the action and the
context. For example, a privacy policy about not disclosing an Social Security Number
(SSN) would be a prohibition over taking any action that results in the SSN being dis-
closed. Rei allows the inclusion of Prolog-like variables that extend the expressivity of
Web Ontology Language (OWL). These variables allow relations like uncle of, same age
as, and different group from that are not directly possible in OWL .
It also models speech acts for remote policy management like delegation and revocation
that affect permissions and prohibitions, and request and cancel that affect obligations
and dispensations. Another set of specifications included in Rei are those for meta
policies. These are used to resolve any conflict that may arise. For example, if a
user is both permitted to and prohibited from performing a certain action, then the
meta policies are used to decide whether the permission or the prohibition holds. Rei is
capable of describing deontic concepts over entities and actions based on their properties.
Policies can be written in Rei that are based on properties of entities and other domain
conditions. Actions can be generically described specifying a subject “X” a target “Y”
and imposing constraints on both “X” and “Y” to satisfy certain properties. e.g. in
plain English, the policy would describe “Action A with target Y can be granted to
subject X, provided X satisfies certain properties and Y satisfies certain properties”.
Consider the following scenario: The “A” lab policy states that devices owned by “A”
lab in possession of people affiliated with “A” lab, are allowed to use the capabilities
of these devices inside the “A” lab, but not if they leave the lab. The Rei ontology
can be augmented with a suitable domain specific ontology which provides a sufficient
vocabulary to describe the security policy. For more expressive policies Darpa Agent
Markup Language (DAML)+ Ontology Interchange Language (OIL), OWL-Lite can also
be used.
Thus a policy written in Rei is able to specify in abstract terms the safe or acceptable
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use policy for the set of trusted devices. The policy enforcer along with the context
manager ensures that the appropriate policy is enforced and updated periodically.
Knowledgeable Agent-Oriented System (KAoS) is a policy language based in OWL and
is similar to Rei as it can be used to develop positive and negative authorization and
obligation policies over actions. KAoS policies are descriptions of actions that are per-
mitted (or not) or obligated (or not) limiting its expressivity as policies are restricted to
OWL. However, KAoS allows the classification of policy statements enabling conflicts
to be discovered from the rules themselves. The Rei engine includes run-time conflict
resolution but cannot predetermine conflicts. Another advantage of KAoS is that, if
policy descriptions stay within OWL-Lite or OWL-DL (Definition List), then the com-
putation is decidable and has well understood complexity results. In terms of speech
acts, however, KAoS only models delegations, whereas, Rei includes an integrated ap-
proach to speech acts for policy management, which is useful in autonomic, distributed
systems. Rei also provides specifications and tools for policy analysis and consistency
checking that KAoS does not. Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) is a rule language
for describing Horn like rules in OWL [53]. There are very few tools for it like Hoolet [54]
that are developed. There has been some work done on attribute based access control
[55] by Vincent and his colleagues. Sun-Moon Jo has worked on research around access
control [56] system for telemedicine secure XML documents.
2.5.1 P3P based access control
Number of research work has been carried out in the area of P3P and Web Services
[57] - [58]. M. Zuidweg et al. [57] described P3P in a web-services based context-
aware application platform. They proposed the requirements for applying a P3P based
privacy control mechanism in context aware Web Architecture for Service Platforms
(WASP). G Myles et al. worked on preserving privacy in environments with location
based applications [59]. They describe the initial stages of an extensible system for
enabling privacy in environments that support location-based applications. They show
[59] a privacy system especially to protect information related to personal location.
There has been some work done in the area of personalised applications in ubiquitous
environments. Brar and Kay described the underlying concepts of privacy and security
in ubiquitous personalised applications [3]. A study of the exact requirements of security
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and privacy rights in ubiquitous environments has been conducted by M Fahrmair et al.
[60]. The conclusion of the work resulted in describing a system that enables description
and enforcement of limitations for the user of confidential/private data. Trust can be
used to provide fine grained control over the use of personal information resulting in
managing privacy. A trust based approach to control privacy exposure in ubiquitous
computing environment is proposed by P D Giang et al. [61].
2.5.2 XACML based access control
There has been some new security architecture for the integration of mobile agent and
WebServices technology [62]. This architecture provides a new authentication scheme
for Web service provider to verify the mobile agent owner’s identity by employing an
identity-based signature protocol without using the username/password pair, which is
infeasible for mobile agent. Furthermore, the server only needs one key to encrypt one
service that can be available to a group of users. The complete composite access control
model for mobile agents is described in [62] where they have presented two key aspects
of the role-based access control for mobile agents: a) authorization infrastructure, and
b) the structure of role-based access control policies. The policies map agent role to user
role and provide a composite policy for PDP (Policy Decision Point) decisions regarding
access control applied to mobile agents. Currently policies are limited to a single do-
main. Future research is planned to be pursued to identify role-based XACML policies
for mobile agents in a federation. The challenges and requirements existing in mobile
environments relates to the subject ID. The Subject ID of the requester plays a critical
role in both the authentication and authorization stages for any access control system.
Unfortunately, a subject ID issued by one domain will probably not be recognised by
another; that is to say, a mobile user requester cannot be authorised by a local do-
main until he/she obtains a valid subject ID from the local domain. SSO (Single sign-
on)-based Identity Management seems to solve the problem, however it doesn’t work
very well for temporary subject IDs that could last as little as oneday. The traditional
XACML polices, used for user access control in distributed environments, can be used
for mobile agents’ access control [63]. Such polices are used to manage delegation of
access rights from users to agents while at the same time following the core principles of
the XACML standard. In [63], the authors propose a combination of policies that map
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users to their mobile agents and make access control decisions for mobile agents by eval-
uating complex policy sets. An XACML-based architecture is proposed in [29] to tackle
the problems of compromise to the requester’s data confidentiality and integrity, and the
issue of applicability of reputation data. A Subject ID mapping service is the foundation
of the architecture, upon which a Meta Policy Server (MPS) is designed to locate the
policies for a requester and provide guidelines for overall security management, while
reverse authorization is used to guarantee the requester’s privacy. In addition, a private
reputation attribute authority (AA) handles reputation data applicability problem. A
security handshake protocol for secure communication between the MPS and subject
attribute authorities is also an important part of the solution.
The above sections on policy based access control cover the details of the various policy
languages that have been in use. This chapter also details the access control method-
ologies that have been considered using P3P and XACML.
2.6 Geospatial access control
In the previous section, I had covered policy based access control and introduced the
review on XACML based access control models. This section looks at the work that has
been done along the lines of geospatial access control for mobile devices. It also looks
at the importance of location attestation and the various approaches that research has
explored in order to achieve attestation.
2.6.1 Geospatial access control for mobile devices
Jansen et al. [64], [65] describe an implementation of assigning and enforcing policies on
handheld devices using Java smartcards. The organization policy is distributed via tam-
perproof smartcards. All the devices are smartcard enabled. The policy to be enforced
is read from the smartcard, which requires authentication by a username and pin. After
authentication a card monitor continuously monitors the existence of the smartcard. If
the smartcard is removed the device reverts to the default policy of the device. In [65],
[66] the authors describe the use of a policy specification language, a policy distribution
mechanism and certificate representation. An XACML-based architecture is proposed
[29] to tackle the problems of compromise to the requesters data confidentiality and
33
Chapter 2. Background and Related Work
integrity, and the issue of applicability of reputation data. The traditional XACML
polices, used for user access control in distributed environments, can be used for mobile
agents access control [63]. Such policies are used to manage delegation of access rights
from users to agents while at the same time following the core principles of the XACML
standard. In [63], the authors propose a combination of policies that map users to their
mobile agents and make access control decisions for mobile agents by evaluating com-
plex policy sets. The work in [67] deals with the use of P3P policy by extending it for
data access control and use of XACML policy [68] in the mobile device for data access
control. Xuebing et al. [29] detailed in their work how XACML can be used to solve
some of the issues with mobile environment.
GeoXACML [69] is a geo-specific extension to XACML 2.0 and it is standardised by Open
GeoSpatial Consortium (OGC). GeoXACML supports the declaration and enforcement
of geospecific access rights. It also makes sure that it controls access to services, data
and other information in a service oriented type architecture. GeoXACML [70] has
been standardised but there has not been any open standard implementation of this to
control the access rights to resources. My work is the first attempt to a fully functional
implementation of GeoXACML for access control as per the authors understanding.
Roese and his team worked on research for location based access control in data network
[71]. Abedi and team had done some work on tracking spatio-temporal movement of
human [72] in terms of space utilisation.There has been some work that has been done
on multi-granularity spatial-temporal access control model [73].
2.6.2 Location attestation
Saroiu et al. [74] have described location proofs as a new mechanism that enables the
existence of mobile applications that needs proof of the user’s location. The wireless
access point to mobile devices handles it. The solution is mainly based on users and
wireless access points (APs) exchanging their signed public keys to create time-stamped
location proofs. The research describes an implementation of the location proofs. The
work shows six potential applications that would be used by an infrastructure that
provides location proofs. It also showcases a protocol that is demonstrable over WiFi and
characterises security properties of the design. The research details the difficulties that
come from collusion attacks such as when sharing devices with one another. VeriPlace
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[75] is a location proof architecture that takes care of the challenges involving user trying
to fool the systems by receiving location proofs for locations where they are not located.
These solutions take care of the user’s privacy and are capable of detecting cheating.
VeriPlace used cryptographic techniques in order to achieve system security. VeriPlace
needs three types of trusted entities that are run by different parties to avoid collusion.
To protect users privacy, each trusted entity is aware if either a users identity or the
location, but not both of them. VeriPlace uses Cheating Detection Authority (CDA)
to check if any cheating has occured. Using the encrypted access point information,
the CDA decrypts it and checks whether any two APs are far from each other, if yes it
indicates cheat. Zhu et al. [76] proposes a Privacy-Preserving Location proof Updating
System (APPLAUS) in which co-located mobile devices, which are bluetooth, enabled
generate location proofs and then transfers the changes to a location proof server. In
order to protect source location privacy pseudonyms, which are changed periodically,
are used. The solution also shows a model in which the users can assess their location
privacy levels and when and whether to receive the location proof requests. The work
also shows a way to secure from colluding attacks by presenting betweenness ranking
based and correlation clustering basd approaches for outlier detection. Implementation
and deployment of APPLAUS is easily done in bluetooth enabled devices and doesn’t
require a lot of computation cost.
Spatial-Temporal provenance Assurance with Mutual Proofs (STAMP) scheme [77] is a
solution that gives security and privacy assurance to mobile users proofs for their past
location visits. STAMP is based on mobile devices in vicinity
to mutually generate location proofs. Some of the key features of STAMP have been to
maintain the integrity and non-transferability of the location proofs and location privacy
of the users. The implementation also shows that it requires very low computational
costs to execute this on the mobile devices. Hasan et al. [78] analysed the secure location
provenance problem and introduced methods for making location proofs resistant against
collusion. The proofs lets the user prove the location in different granularity to a number
of auditors. The research shows two schemes using hash chains and bloom filters. Some
of the experimentation results from the proof of concept shows that these schemes are
realistic in today’s mobile environments.
35
Chapter 2. Background and Related Work
Another interesting research [79] shows that they have designed two privacy-preserving
alibi schemes: one for corroborators who have no personal privacy issues and another
one for corroborators who want to keep control over the disclosure of their identities.
The research also demonstrates that schemes are implementable and usable in today’s
mobile devices.
I have reviewed the geospatial access control models for mobile devices in the above
sections and also reviewed the methods used to achieve location attestation. It is in-
teresting to see that location attestation has been addressed from a local attestation
perspective which has issues when it faces consistency check. In my work in further
chapters, I will be showing the benefits of using global attestation of location for mobile
devices.
2.7 Trust in mobile environments
This section highlights the research contributions in the trust environment. I have also
tried to highlight the key differences in the existing research and my contributions to
the area of trust.
2.7.1 Trust based solutions
There has been research in areas of trust based data management. Patwardhan et al. [80]
propose a trust-based data management framework for enabling individual devices to
harness the potential power of distributed computation, storage, and sensory resources
available in pervasive computing environments. They take a holistic approach that con-
siders trust, security, and privacy issues of data management in these environments. Lim
et al. [81] has explored data stream management and exploited the notion of confidence
policy while taking into account trustworthiness of data items in data management and
query processing. They propose a provenance-based framework that enforces confidence
policies in the evolution of continuous queries over streaming data. Based on the notion
of physical and logical networks, they introduce the notions of the physical and logical
provenances for data items, respectively. The authors also introduce a cyclic framework
of computing actual trust scores of data items and network nodes based on the value and
provenance similarities embedded in data items. Unlike these approaches, in my work,
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I use unstructured reports from unreliable information sources and derived structured
knowledge based on Controlled English(CE -natural language processing mechanism)
using International Technology Alliance (ITA), which is a military project for the mil-
itary of United States of America and United Kingdom) assets. ITA is a collaborative
research alliance between United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (UK MoD) and US Army
Research Laboratory (ARL) and a consortium of leading industry and academic part-
ners. Some of the assets that has resulted due to this research collaboration includes
Controlled English [82] and Information Fabric [83]. Controlled English (CE) is an ITA
asset that has been extended and modified by the ITA programme. Mott defines the
syntax with examples of CE formatted text and shows how to map to predicate logic
[82] . CE is a type of Controlled Natural Language (CNL) and is mainly used to be
readable by any one who knows English. It represents information in a very structured
form using certain syntax. This syntax can be parsed and the content can be under-
stood by a computer. Hence, CE enables the communication between computer and
humans. Role of transfer based and performance based cues on initial trust in mobile
shopping services was an area explored in the recent paper [84]. It is cross environment
perspective and an interesting angle to the trust problem. The role of security, design
and content factors on customer trust in mobile banking has been explored in the recent
paper [85]. Schwitter has described the use of controlled natural language as a high level
specification language for modelling commonsense reasoning problems [86]. The work
shows how defaults and exceptions can be incorporated into a current controlled natural
language and what is required to signify and motive with them in a not so straight way.
In my work which I explain in further chapters, I use a trust model that is based on
trust evidence. The retrieval or derivation of trust evidence is out of the scope. Usually,
there are two types of evidence: direct and indirect. In the literature, there are sev-
eral trust approaches where direct evidence is combined with indirect evidence to model
trust in information sources. Direct evidence is based on personal observations, while
indirect evidence is received from others. Jøsang and Ismail proposed the beta reputa-
tion system (BRS) [87]. It estimates the trustworthiness of an information source using
beta probability density functions. For this purpose, aggregation of direct evidence and
indirect evidence from information sources are used as the parameters of beta distribu-
tions. Evidence shared by sources are equivalent to binary opinions in Subjective Logic
[1]. Whitby et al. extended BRS to handle misleading indirect evidence from malicious
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agents using a majority-based algorithm [88].
Teacy et al. proposed TRAVOS [89], which is similar to BRS, but it uses personal
observations about information sources to filter misleading indirect evidence. Subjective
logic has been extended to include belief updates from partially visible evidence [90].
Lance et al. show that assets of the partial observable update as a function of the state
likelihood and demonstrate the use of these likelihoods for a trust estimation application.
The value of the partial observable updates is shown through different imitations in-
cluding the trust estimation case. Yu and Singh proposed a trust approach that handles
misleading indirect evidence using a version of weighted majority algorithm [91]. In
their algorithm, weights are assigned to information sources. These weights are initi-
ated as 1:0 and can be considered as the trustworthiness of the corresponding sources.
The algorithm makes predictions about trust related propositions (e.g, 1 is trustworthy)
based on the weighted sum of indirect evidence (i.e., ratings) provided by those sources.
The authors proposed to tune the weights after an unsuccessful prediction so that the
weights assigned to the unreliable sources are decreased. They assume that the ratings
from dishonest sources may conflict with the personal observations. By decreasing the
weights of these sources over time, misleading evidence is filtered.
In chapter 5, I describe conflicts between binomial opinions and analyse evidence about
information sources to resolve conflicts between opinions before performing fusion. Con-
flicts in knowledge lead to inconsistencies that hamper the reasoning over the knowledge.
Therefore, before using such knowledge bases, their conflicts should be resolved. Gobeck
and Halaschek in [92] present a belief revision algorithm for ontologies, which is based on
trust degrees of information sources to remove conflicting statements from a knowledge
base. However, as the authors point out, the proposed algorithm is not guaranteed to
be optimal. Dong et al. [93] propose to resolve conflicts in information from multiple
sources by a voting mechanism. Double counting in votes is avoided by considering the
information dependencies among sources. The dependences are derived from Bayesian
analysis. When considering multiple sources espousing multiple claims, it is possible to
estimate their reliability through corroboration without direct and/or indirect evidence.
For example, fact finding algorithms aim to identify the truth given conflicting claims.
Yin et al. proposed TruthFinder [94] that utilises an iterative approach to estimate
trustworthiness of information sources and information they provide. Their approach
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based on the assumption that a source is trustworthy if it provides many pieces of true
information, and a piece of information is likely to be true if it is provided by many
trustworthy sources. Therefore, very similar to BRS, TrustFinder also assumes that the
information provided by the majority is trustworthy.
The above section has described trust in mobile environments and how my approach
defers from what research has done so far. I highlighted the importance of fused opinions
and need for trust when there are continuous streaming of information.
2.8 Location based mobile security
In this section, I describe the various methods that have been used to look at location
and identity privacy related issues and solutions proposed by various research work in
the past.
2.8.1 Location privacy
A number of papers related to mobile environments and its vulnerabilities have been
published in the recent past. Sniffing attacks have been talked about in [31]. They ex-
plore the vulnerability where attackers snoop on users by sniffing on their mobile phone
sensors, such as the microphone, camera, and GPS receiver. [95] discusses about Sound-
comber, which is a stealthy Trojan with innocuous permissions that can sense the context
of its audible surroundings to target and extract a very small amount of high-value data.
As sensor-rich smartphones become more ubiquitous, sensory malware has the poten-
tial to breach the privacy of individuals at mass scales. There have been a number of
different papers concentrating on the different vulnerabilities of mobile devices and how
the operating system in the device allows users to control access to sensitive information
including location, camera images, and contacts. In [96] the authors have introduced
TaintDroid, which operates as an efficient system wide information flow-tracking tool.
This tool has the capability of tracking multiple sources of sensitive data. The authors
also studied the behaviour of thirty popular third party applications chosen at random
from Android marketplace and concluded that two-thirds of those applications display
suspicious handling of sensitive data. A paper is dedicated to the mobile phone vul-
nerabilities, which talks about the different malwares that are targeted on the mobile
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devices [9]. The work details on how some of the malwares can be implemented easily
in order to make the mobile phones vulnerable to attacks. Preventing the cell phones
from malicious users or infiltrators is very important and there have been a number of
research papers concentrating on the same. In [97], VirusMeter is detailed which detects
existence of malware with abnormal power consumption. VirusMeter relies on a concise
lightweight user-centric power model and aims to detect mobile malware in two modes:
While the real-time detection mode provides immediate detection, running VirusMeter
under the battery-charging mode can further improve the detection accuracy without
concerns about resource consumption. Using real-world malware the authors have ex-
perimentally shown that VirusMeter can effectively and efficiently detect their existence.
In [98] the authors adapted a special and feasible method, blind signature, to generate
an authorised anonymous ID that replaces the real ID of an authorised mobile device.
They presented a two-phase protocol to address location privacy, however, did not con-
sider that the randomness introduced during the blinding phase can be removed easily.
They also prove that the administrator can link real ID with authorised anonymous
ID. In addition to this they propose an improved registration and re-confusion protocol
using the same cryptographic technique, blind signature based on bilinear pairings. A
considerable amount of research work has been carried out in the area of location-based
applications. In [10], authors propose a security model for location based services using
outsourced databases and demonstrate how one can use distributed storage and inter-
national mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) as user identification to secure the location
data. In [99], the authors investigated the problem of protecting location privacy of
mobile users in the setting of ubiquitous computing. They find it challenging, as there
are various requests that are forced by the organisation and the users. In [99], [100] the
authors proposed an authorised-anonymous-ID based scheme, which is used to replace
the real ID of an authorised mobile device. With authorised-anonymous-IDs, they also
designed an architecture that is able to provide the mobile users with complete control
over their location privacy and still allowing the organisation to authenticate the mo-
bile users. In [101], the authors have designed novel protocols to provide location-based
services, which do not require a user to trust a third party. They also analysed a class
of location-based services that do not directly transfer user locations. L Barkhuus et
al., discusses users’ concerns about the location-based services that would disclose their
location and in turn user’s privacy [102]. In this work, the authors have presented two
types of location-based services, location-tracking and position-aware services. They
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have shown a case study that examines user’s concern for privacy in relation to location-
based services and compared people’s perceived usefulness of the two types of services.
The work concludes that the concerns are more when third parties are tracking a user’s
location. Location based services with privacy as the main concern has been described
in [12], [13], [103], [5], [6], [104] and [105]. In [12], authors have refined the mix zone
model, describing a quantifiable metric of location privacy from the point of view of the
attacker. In [106], the authors discuss the issues in the location-aware mobile devices in
context by addressing the basic technology issues involved. They also discuss issues that
are possible and not possible in the future. Further they outline privacy issues that arise
from the conjunction of technical feasibility and government/marketplace activities that
might use location information. In this work a representative sample of important issues
is enumerated and discussed. Regulation is then discussed as a broader term covering
the various entities and agencies that might structure and regulate the use of location in-
formation and provide the appropriate levels of privacy protection to constituents while
promoting appropriate advances in new products and services. Other challenges such
as user privacy are also important in ubiquitous environments. Privacy related efforts
have been made in the past [3]. Research has been carried out around privacy awareness
systems that allow certain privileges to data collectors [7]. Karyda and Gritzalis [4]
listed some of the challenges in this area and the future research directions.
This section has provided a summary of the various issues that exist within location
privacy aspects of mobile environments. Details show the possible attacks related to
privacy and various mechanisms used to preserve end-user location privacy and access
control. It gives a comparison of the different privacy preserving methods in mobile
environments and their drawbacks to provide guidance to the readers. I also identify
the open research challenges in the area of privacy and highlight the problems with the
prior art.
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Privacy through access control
and attestation
3.1 Overview
Preserving the location of the individual user of any fixed device has also been the
concern for a number of researchers recently [103], [5] and [6]. Other challenges such
as user privacy are also important in ubiquitous environments. Privacy related efforts
have been made in the past [3]. Research has been carried out around privacy awareness
systems that allow certain privileges to data collectors [7]. Karyda and Gritzalis [4]
listed some of the challenges in this area and the research directions for the future.
Mobile devices have been used in the modern world to access information, exchange
information and to store information. With new applications and new solutions coming
to existence every day, handheld devices are being used more and more to completely
take over the functionality of a wallet, laptop, computer, briefcase and books. With the
increasing demand on the mobile devices usage, the number of threats and issues related
to security with regards to the handheld devices are doubled. Information exchange is a
key requirement for every sector and handheld devices are being used for the very same
purpose more frequently than ever before. It is very important to address the question
“How to enforce location privacy?” In the literature review section, I have shown various
methods that have been used to ensure location privacy but with drawbacks. In this
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chapter, I would like to show the methods that I propose to ensure that privacy is
achieved.
I also address the issue around “How can one ensure that the data being accessed is being
accessed by the right user of the data”. How can one ensure that the data requestor is
the genuine requestor of the data and has the right to access the data being requested.
This is a very interesting problem which highlights the very existence of access control
mechanisms. The process of making sure that data is accessed by the right source for
the right requirement is called access control. Making use of access control in order to
ensure that the right user is getting hold of the right data has always been a concern
in all major areas of business. Using one of the usecases described in Introduction i.e.
Healthcare data involves a lot of personal data of the end users and hence it is critical
to ensure that the data is not misused and is not mishandled. It is equally important to
ensure that data is being accessed by the right user and does not fall into the hands of a
malicious user who would mishandle the data. Researchers in the past have introduced
solutions around access control for healthcare with P3P and XACML. By making use of
P3P and XACML policy, and through policy negotiation, relevant data is provided to
the requestor based on the information provided in the P3P and XACML policy. The
solution has taken care of the access control of the data but something very important
has been forgotten in this solution. The data can be requested from anywhere and
there is no way to stop an outsider from requesting the data. This introduces the
importance of contextual information for the requestor of the data. I have considered
the location information of the data requestor before granting access to the data. This
has been achieved by making use of geospatial attributes of the handheld device from
where the request is made. Once the geographical coordinates are verified, the policy
is then applied on the request and then access to the data is eventually granted. This
solution has been implemented by using GeoXACML policy. This is the first of a kind
implementation of GeoXACML for access control in mobile healthcare.
As far as privacy is concerned, there is always a privacy Vs utility trade-off. This is
very well known and in order to access sensitive information, one has to ensure a specific
level of trust on the location. In order to achieve this, location attestation is the way
forward and in this chapter, I will provide a new solution using global attestation of
location. This chapter shows a detailed implementation of the solution that I designed
through the various stages in my thesis. This chapter also shows a detailed evaluation of
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the various mechanisms used to achieve privacy in mobile environments. It details the
evaluations for policy based access control and global location attestation. It explains
that scenario used to evaluate the setup and shows the results.
3.2 P3P extension for access control
Privacy of the information being transmitted is very important so is the location. The
location information also needs to be protected. A number of researchers have been
investigating these issues recently [5], [6], and [107]. P3P provides a flexible and powerful
mechanism to extend its syntax and semantics using one element: EXTENSION. This
element is used to indicate portions of the policy reference file which belong to an
extension. The meaning of the data within the EXTENSION element is defined by the
extension itself. < EXTENSION > For example, if www.catalog.example.com would
like to add to P3P a feature to indicate that a certain set of data elements were only to
be collected from users living in the United States, Canada, or Mexico, [28] it could add
a mandatory extension similar to the one shown below:
< DATA-GROUP >
...
<EXTENSION optional=“no” >
<COLLECTION-GEOGRAPHY type=“include”
xmlns=“http://www.catalog.example.com/P3P/region”>
<USA/> <Canada/> <Mexico/ >
</COLLECTION-GEOGRAPHY>
</EXTENSION>
</DATA-GROUP>
There are some extensions that needs to be carried out to P3P in order to make it
work with the handheld devices. The first step is to extend the P3P policy to be used
within the security capsule. The second step is to implement the P3P policy within the
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handheld device. The next step is to integrate the P3P policy in the sensors within the
ubiquitous environment. The extensions that will be used in the P3P policy within the
security capsule of the mobile device include the identities that are used in the capsule.
These include IP Multimedia Private Identity (IMPI) number and International Mobile
Equipment Identity (IMEI) number. IMPI is the mobile operator assigned identity for
the mobile user. IMEI is the unique identity for the mobile device and this is issued by
the mobile device manufacturer. These extensions will be embedded in the P3P Policy
within the <EXTENSION> tag of the policy. Web sites can publish their policies in
Websites, headers or in the source file format. For handheld devices, there needs to be
a mechanism to publish the policies. In order to store the P3P policy in the mobile
device, it is saved as an XML file and stored in the device
3.3 P3P extension application
The proposed architecture deals with the implementation of a policy in the mobile
environment. P3P policy is extended in this approach in order to give access to the
data requested by the mobile device from the service provider. For requesting sensitive
information (i.e. healthcare data, financial data or personal data) from the service
provider, the mobile device needs to establish trust with the service provider.
3.3.1 Architecture
This trust is established by the security capsule during the registration process with the
identity and service providers. In response to the request from the mobile device, the
service provider sends the sensitive data to the device in encrypted format. In order to
have access to the data, the mobile client needs to request the service provider for the
real time key. The service provider used the real time key to encrypt the sensitive data
requested by the mobile device. The proposed architecture demonstrates the process
involved in retrieving the real time key from the service provider. The architecture
includes the following steps to access the data from the service provider. The first step
starts with the mobile client requesting for a real time key from the service provider. As
a response to this request the service provider will send a challenge request along with
the policy of the service provider.
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3.3.2 Protocol implementation
The security capsule in the mobile client will process the challenge request and sends
back the challenge response along with the policy user preferences from the mobile client
[27]. The policy file sent by the service provider in case of P3P will be parsed in the
mobile client and the identity, which is in the extension data type of the parsed file,
will be retrieved. This identity information, which is known to the mobile device, is
then hashed and will be sent to the service provider. The identity provider and service
provider initially decide on certain computational techniques and negotiate the compu-
tations to be performed on the hash. In the service provider the hash value undergoes
these computations and the resulting value is used as a key to encrypt the real time key.
The service provider will then encrypt the real time key with this new computed value
and sends back the encrypted key to the mobile client. The mobile client, which already
has the hash value of the identity, will perform the same negotiated computations de-
cided between the identity and service provider. The computed value is used as the key
to decrypt the encrypted key resulting in the real time key. The real time key is then
used to decrypt the encrypted data. This process is depicted in Figure 3.1 below. The
steps as shown in the figure are:
1. Mobile device makes the real time key request to the WebServices.
2. WebServices sends the challenge request and the policy and asks for user preferences.
3. Mobile client sends the challenge response and hash of the identity retrieved from the
policy file.
4. WebServices encrypts the real time key with the modified hash (hash undergoes some
computations decided during registration) as the encryption key and sends the real-time
key response.
5. The encrypted real-time key is decrypted in the mobile client by using the modified
hash as the decryption key.
The real time key is then used to decrypt the encrypted data. In case, if the identity
information of P3P file do not exist in the mobile client, then the service provider will
send a request asking for additional information from the mobile client. The mobile
client needs to send responses to the request and eventually the service provider decides
whether the information is sufficient in order to send the real time key. P3P policy is
stored in a XML file format in the mobile client. Secondly, the service provider does not
have a standard format for storing the P3P policy file. It is possible to publish the P3P
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Figure 3.1: Steps involved in the proposed architecture for privacy.
Figure 3.2: Steps involved in the proposed architecture for privacy.
policy in WSDL or by using Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI).
P3P policy can be published in a WSDL file in a Web Services environment. In case
of XACML policy, in response to the initial request, the service provider will send a
challenge request and a request created by PEP for XACML policy from the mobile
device. The mobile client will send the XACML policy with the relevant details in it.
WebServices will then pass the request through the PDP which will look at the request
and decide whether the request is eligible to be granted access to the information. Based
on the decision made by the PDP, WebServices encrypts the real time key and sends
it as a response to the mobile device. The key is then decrypted in the mobile device
and the original information is retrieved. A proof of concept is developed to validate the
proposed architecture. The prototype is shown in Figure 3.2 and is implemented using
open source software tools and development kits. The business logic of the implemen-
tation is developed in Java 2 Platform Enterprise Edition (J2EE) environment and is
deployed in GlassFish V2 Web Services. It uses the Java Development Kit (JDK) 1.6.
The mobile client is developed using the Java 2 micro edition (J2ME) wireless toolkit
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in NetBeans by creating a Midlet application. The toolkit includes Mobile Information
Device Profile (MIDP) libraries. MIDP is a key element of J2ME. When combined with
the Connected Limited Device Configuration (CLDC) MIDP provides a standard Java
runtime environment for mobile phones and mainstream PDAs. All the communica-
tions between the mobile device and the Web Services are performed using the Simple
Object Access Protocol (SOAP) protocol over HTTP. The main functions or methods
are written in the Web Services and these methods are invoked accordingly. The Web
Services is deployed and appropriate stubs are created for it. A WSDL is created for
each of the Web Service methods and this is published in order to test and invoke the
appropriate methods. WSDL is an XML based language for describing Web Services.
Details are available in the specification document [108]. This WSDL document can also
be used to perform quick tests on each Web Service method and to verify the results.
SOAP monitor can be used to monitor all the traffic between the mobile client and the
Web Services. A number of SOAP monitoring tools are available to do the same. The
communications are secured using well-known Java crypto and security libraries. The
prototype proves the implementation of secure mechanism for the access of data sent by
the service provider. The model validates the mechanism of extending the P3P policy
for successful data access control. Other possible implementation methods are described
in [109].
3.4 Evaluation setup for policy based access control
A number of P3P policy requests have been created and sent to the server to check for
the policy extension functionality in order to achieve access control. Various P3P policy
requests were sent to check the use cases including various parameters such as personal
information from the requestor, location details, query and other mandatory attributes
to allow the policy file to pass the negotiation check.
3.4.1 Results for P3P access control
With the P3P policy extensions and with various use cases that allowed to check for the
policy negotiation in order to achieve access control, I have proposed the architecture for
controlling the data access from service provider into mobile devices. The main novelty
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of this is the introduction of P3P policy into the mobile device environment. P3P policy
has widely been used for web sites but has never been extended into the mobile area.
This work has made an attempt to implement and prove the same. The P3P policy
is extended in order to be used for validating the user preferences and for using the
identity to be part of the key to the actual data. The proposed architecture is validated
through the implementation of a prototype mobile testbed implementing the extended
P3P polices. Since XACML is the latest technology for mobile environments and it
overcomes a number of limitations of P3P policy with the help of the policy decision
and policy enhancement capabilities. The XACML components PEP and PDP enhance
the implementation capabilities and provide more control over the policies in the mobile
environments. The XACML implementation is also being tested and is expected to see
better results than P3P. The proposed architecture makes way for the ubiquitous envi-
ronments to be safe in controlling access to any kind of sensitive information. With the
introduction of P3P and XACML policies into the devices in ubiquitous environments,
privacy can be preserved and security will not be compromised.
3.5 XACML based access control
In this section, I get into the details of using XACML for accessing the data in the
mobile device. In a typical health services scenario, the authorised individual/doctor
will request the patient’s information from the central health repository. This data will
be sent to the mobile device or handset of the doctor in an encrypted format. The data
is encrypted using the real time key which is available at the central health repository
also known as Service Provider in WebServices terminology. Although the doctor will
not be able to read any content that is been sent, the information is still transferred to
the doctor’s handset. This work proposes an architecture that performs certain policy
decision checks using XACML and computations in order to get to the real time key
which is being used to encrypt the content sent to the device. By using the real time
key, the data in the handset can then be decrypted and the doctor will be able to read
the original contents of the patient’s information he requested.
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3.6 Proposed solution
The proposed architecture deals with the implementation of XACML in the mobile
environment. As shown in Figure 3.3, XACML policy is used to give access to the data
requested by the mobile device from the Central health repository (service provider).
This work assumes that the initial trust between the mobile device and the Central
health repository (service provider) is established.
3.6.1 Architecture
The message flow begins with the doctor requesting the patient’s information from the
Central health repository (service provider). When the service provider receives the
request it will send the data by encrypting it using the real time key. The proposed
architecture depicts the processes involved in retrieving the real time key and the steps
used to access the data sent by the service provider. The first step in this architecture
begins with the handset making a request to the central health repository requesting for
a real time key. In response to this request, the service provider will send a challenge
request and XACML policy with the key policy decision checks. On receiving these,
the mobile device will parse through the XACML policy and provide a response in the
form of a hash value of the values requested by the XACML request policy from the
service provider. The XACML policy on the mobile device is stored as an XML file.
The Central health repository receives the challenge response and the hash value. An
initial set of secret computation techniques is decided and both the service provider and
the mobile device’s provider are aware of it. These computations are performed on the
hash value and the resulting value is used as a key to encrypt the real time key on the
service provide (Central health repository) side. This new encrypted key is then sent
to the mobile device. Since the device is also aware of the same secret computation
techniques, it will perform the same computations on the hash value which it already
has. The resulting value is used to decrypt the encrypted real time key. The real time
key is then used to decrypt the encrypted data.
The Figure 3.3 depicts the proposed architecture. The numbers shown in the figure
refers to the different steps involved. They are briefed as follows:
1. Health care personnel(Doctor) requesting for the patient’s information.
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Figure 3.3: Proposed Architecture steps.
2. Encrypted patient information sent after encrypting it using real time key.
3. Health care mobile device requesting the real time key.
4. Challenge request and XACML policy request with policy decision checks sent to the
device.
5. Challenge response and hash of the policy decision values returned to the service
provider.
6. Real time key is encrypted using modified hash value ((hash undergoes some compu-
tations decided during registration) and is sent to the device.
7. Real time key is decrypted using the modified hash value. Real time key is used to
decrypt the encrypted patient information.
3.6.2 New protocol
A proof of concept was developed to prove the proposed architecture. Mobile device is
simulated using the Java 2 micro edition (J2ME) wireless kit in Netbeans by creating
a Midlet application. The toolkit includes Mobile Information Device Profile (MIDP)
libraries and JSR 172. MIDP is a key element of J2ME. When combined with the Con-
nected Limited Device Configuration (CLDC) MIDP provides a standard Java runtime
environment for mobile phones and mainstream PDAs. All the communications between
the mobile device and the WebServices are performed using the Simple Object Access
Protocol (SOAP) protocol over HTTP. The main functions or methods are written in
the Web Services and these methods are invoked accordingly.
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The Web Services is deployed and appropriate stubs are created for it. XACML imple-
mentation can be done by using Sun’s XACML Open Source implementation or other
implementation methods as described in [109]. A WSDL is created for each of the Web
Service methods and this is published in order to test and invoke the appropriate meth-
ods. WSDL is an XML based language for describing Web Services. Details are available
in the specification document [108]. This WSDL document can also be used to perform
quick tests on each Web Service method and to verify the results. SOAP monitor can
be used to monitor all the traffic between the mobile client and the Web Services. A
number of SOAP monitoring tools are available to do the same. The communications
are secured using well known Java crypto and security libraries.
3.6.3 Results for XACML based access control
In this work we propose an architecture for controlling the access to the data in the health
services sector. The main novelty is the approach used to control privacy of the data
using XACML within the mobile environment. With the implementation of XACML
policy in the mobile environment, data access control can be preserved and privacy
can be maintained. This implementation also mitigates man-in-the middle attacks and
maintains privacy of the information.
3.7 Geospatial access control
The main contribution of this work is to restrict access to data from mobile devices based
on geospatial attributes of the requester. XACML policy is applied to check the access
rights before making a decision on an access request. However, it does not have oper-
ators and construct to handle geospatial attributes. There are several well-established
open source XACML libraries, such as SUN’s implementation1. In an XACML policy,
several attributes of a requester are checked against their values to grant access. In
this work, I propose to extend the existing XACML implementations with the ability of
handling geospacial attributes efficiently. For this purpose, I introduced new functions
and attributes that support geospatial functionality.
1http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net/
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I have two main attribute extensions: GeoPoint and GeoPolygon. A GeoPoint attribute
represents a particular point which stores a latitude and a longitude. For instance,
position of an access requester is represented as a GeoPoint instance. A GeoPolygon
instance represent a region or geospatial boundaries, e.g., a building, or a room. This
can be achieved by storing multiple GeoPoints, which when combined create a polygon.
The polygon generation can be done with polygonization provided by existing topology
libraries such as JTS2. In addition to these attribute extensions, I implemented a function
called geo-contains,which takes a GeoPoint and a GeoPolygon as arguments and checks
to see if the point is contained by the polygon. The geopolygon can be defined in any
shape and form, it can be a rectangle, square, circle or any other shape and form.
With these extensions, the requester may send its current location together with its ac-
cess request using XACML request to a Policy Decision Point (PDP). The PDP checks
geospatial policies to decide if it may allow the requested access or not. Once the access
is allowed, Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) provides the requested resource. A simple
example policy and access request are listed in Listing 3.1 and Listing 3.2 respectively.
In the example policy, it is stated that doctors can access medical records within the
geospatial boundaries defined through a geoPolygon object. In the request example, a
doctor with name John request medical records for Alice. The PDP may examine the
request and provide access based on the policy.
<Policy PolicyId="ExamplePolicy"...>
<Target ><AttributeValue >/reports /*</AttributeValue ></Target >
<Rule RuleId="ReadRule" Effect="Permit">
<Target >
<Subjects ><AnySubject/></Subject ><Resources > <AnyRespurce/></Resources >
<Actions ><Action >...
<AttributeValue DataType="... XMLSchema#string">read</AttributeValue >
...</Action ></Actions >
</Target >
<Condition FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:and">
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:string -equal">
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:string -one -and -only">
<SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="doctor" DataType="...# string" />
</Apply>
2http://www.vividsolutions.com/JTS
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<AttributeValue DataType="... XMLSchema#string">John</AttributeValue >
</Apply>
<Apply FunctionId="geo -contains">
<Apply FunctionId="geoPoint -one -and -only">
<SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="location" DataType="geoPoint" />
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="geoPolygon">
41.027514 ,29.189435;
41.029514 ,29.189435;
41.029514 ,29.191435;
....
</AttributeValue >
</Apply>
</Condition >
</Rule>
</Policyl >
Listing 3.1: A GeoSpatial policy example.
<Request >
<Subject >
<Attribute AttributeId="doctor"
DataType="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
<AttributeValue >Ihsan</AttributeValue >
</Attribute >
<Attribute AttributeId="patient"
DataType="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
<AttributeValue >Alice</AttributeValue >
</Attribute >
<Attribute AttributeId="location"
DataType="geoPoint">
<AttributeValue >41.028514 ,29.190435 </AttributeValue >
</Attribute >
</Subject >
<Resource >
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: resource:resource -id"
DataType="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#anyURI">
<AttributeValue >http :// server.example.com/reports/alice</AttributeValue >
</Attribute >
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</Resource >
<Action >
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: action:action -id"
DataType="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
<AttributeValue >read</AttributeValue >
</Attribute >
</Action >
</Request >
Listing 3.2: A GeoSpatial request example.
In the policy example, the geospatial boundaries are unnamed. In other words, I ex-
plicitly define the geospatial boundaries instead of addressing this region. This makes
it harder to author policies, since the policy author may not correctly enter the geo-
points composing the polygon. Authoring policies become an important issue as the
number of policies. To handle this, I propose to store geoPolygon objects in a separate
database and use alias to refer to them. For instance, the geoPolygon object used in the
example policy is stored in a database table with alias CentralHospital. Then, the alias
can be used while defining the policy, instead of explicitly using the geoPolygon object.
Therefore, the policies could be more human friendly and less error prone.
The geo-contains function is responsible for checking if the location of the requester
is within a region defined by geoPolygon object. This may be a costly operation if
I represent the polygon as a set of geopoints. However, if I use GeoHashing [110] to
represent geoPolygon objects instead of multiple geopoints, I can very efficiently perform
the containment test. Geohash is a geocode system invented by Gustavo Niemeyer. For
each geopoint, geohashing produces a code. By gradually removing characters from the
end of the code will reduce the precision and the code would be representing a region
instead of a single point. Therefore, geohash codes belong to nearby points may have
similar prefixes. That is, the longer a shared prefix is, the closer the two points are.
In other words, we can efficiently check if a point falls into a region by checking the
prefixes. As a result, I propose to store geohashing prefixes for geoPolygon objects and
exploit these while checking if requesters’ location falls into predefined regions.
Figure 3.4 shows the components of our framework. Policies and requests are composed
based on GeoXACML standards using the introduced techniques. In this framework,
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Figure 3.4: GeoSpatial Access control framework.
geospatial attributes are handled in preprocessing step in which a GeoXACML policy is
converted into a regular XACML policy (with equality/prefix/range constraints on geo-
hash) and during policy verification step the input geospatial attributes of requesters are
converted to their geohashes and the regular XACML policy can be applied. The main
advantage of this solution is that we can use an existing XACML engine to implement
a geoXACML engine very easily and perform geospatial policy reasoning efficiently.
3.8 Geospatial access control for healthcare application
In this section, I will introduce a scenario from healthcare domain to evaluate and
demonstrate our framework for geospatial access control in mobile devices.
3.8.1 Architecture
Medical records contains important information for diagnosing and curing various health
problems. Authorised doctors with expertise may access medical information about their
patients while fulfilling their responsibilities such as diagnosing, monitoring, and curing
patients. However, these doctors may not access these records for a different purpose,
since they may have sensitive data. There may be a relationship between purpose of
access and the location of access requester. For instance, a doctor may be in the hospital
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Figure 3.5: Architecture of the demo application.
while diagnosing or examining an outpatient. Therefore, she may request medical reports
of the patient from the hospital, e.g., her office. It is less likely that the doctor will be
using the requested information for the right purpose (i.e., diagnosis) if he is trying to
access it outside of the hospital. Doctors may access their patients’ records only when
they are in the right location. In order to restrict the access based on attributes and
location of the requester, I may use policies written in GeoXACML. An example policy
and related request are listed in Listing 3.1 and Listing 3.2 respectively.
3.8.2 Protocol implementation
In order to demonstrate how our solution is deployed for this and similar problems, we
implemented a mobile iOS application. Architecture of this demo application is shown
in Figure 3.5. In the PDP, we store policies such as “Doctor’s must be in the premises
of their hospitals if they are required to access particular patients records”. Then, we
have extended SUN’s XACML implementation as described in the previous section to
implement GeoXACML policy decision and enforcement points. In order to store patient
records, we have used a relational database at the back-end.
Figure 3.6 shows the polygon defined and a point within the polygon which refers to
the location of the doctor making the request. Since the doctor’s location is within the
polygon, the doctor will be allowed to access the records. One of the snapshot from our
demo application is shown in Figure 3.7. The figure shows the patient details that is
visible to the doctor, once he has passed the policy check.
In our framework, the location information of the requester is sent along with other
attributes in the request. In other words, the requester’s device provides the location
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Figure 3.6: Geopolygon showing a point inside the polygon.
Figure 3.7: A screen shot from the mobile application.
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information. A malicious requester can forge the location information to get access
to a resource from an unauthorised location. Therefore, it is not wise to relay only
on the location information provided by the requester while reasoning with geospatial
policies. In other words, we may use one or more reliable location services to correctly
determine true location or at least need to check the claimed location of the requester.
For this purpose, we can use information from various sensors. If a device is bluetooth
enabled, we can use bluetooth surveillance techniques to determine if the device of the
requester is around. In bluetooth surveillance, the mac addresses of a bluetooth devices
are registered and tracked using various bluetooth sensors [111]. Similarly, we can use
information from wi-fi hotspots and GSM operators about the true location of requester’s
devices.
3.8.3 Results for GeoXACML based access control
With increasing volumes of data tagged with space and time (e.g., from smartphones)
it is becoming increasingly important to support contextual (e.g., location-based) access
control to data and resources. Through this research, I have explored solutions to realise
the GeoXACML access control model that allows a security administrator to specify
location-based access control policies. This work presents the first implementation and
architecture for GeoXACML. The key novelty in the approach is the ability to use
geohashes to translate a GeoXACML policy into a conventional XACML policy - this
allows us to fully reuse existing implementations of the XACML engine. The research
also describes a case study in the context of healthcare services wherein access control
to handheld devices is moderated based on the location of the device. The code for the
GeoXACML based access control is made publicly available [112].
3.9 Summary
This chapter has focused mainly on looking at the policy extensions for preserving
privacy in mobile environments. It has detailed the methods of extension using P3P and
XACML. The chapter also highlighted the new method I have introduced to achieve
geospatial access control using XACML. This is a novel contribution to the research
as there is a new way of using XACML engine with the geographical extensions and
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geohashing to ensure that the information is received by the same person requesting for
the information and that privacy is preserved. The chapter also introduces a new model
for attestation of location which is a global attestation model and is the next step to
the existing research in local attestation. Introducing global attestation through global
consistency check is a novel contribution to the research community which has been
possible through my work. This chapter has provided details on the implementation of
the P3P and XACML extension for access control, GeoSpatial access control through
GeoXACML showing the details on how the solution is novel. The chapter also detailed
how global attestation of the location for mobile devices can be achieved using the
trust matrix and calculations of EigenTrust. “How to enforce location privacy” has
been addressed through this thesis and this chapter shows an implementation of this
solution. This chapter has detailed the evaluation setup for policy based access control
and highlighted the results of using 2 policy languages including P3P and XACML. It
also shows the importance and benefits of using GeoXACML based access control model.
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Global attestation of location for
mobile devices
4.1 Overview
As far as privacy is concerned, there is always a privacy Vs utility trade-off. This is
very well known and in order to access sensitive information, one has to ensure a specific
level of trust on the location. In order to achieve this, location attestation is the way
forward and in this chapter, I will provide a new solution using global attestation of
location. This chapter shows a detailed implementation of the solution that I designed
through the various stages in my thesis. This chapter also shows a detailed evaluation of
the various mechanisms used to achieve privacy in mobile environments. It details the
evaluations for policy based access control and global location attestation. It explains
that scenario used to evaluate the setup and shows the results.
4.2 Attestation of location
Location proofs are very important to ensure that the user providing the location co-
ordinates are not misrepresenting the location. This could potentially be very important.
Users provide their location information through location proofs to be able to access
location based services. There are a number of solutions available in research that
address the local attestation of the users. By making use of the Access Points (APs)
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like WiFi or Bluetooth, the users can get the APs to give location proofs in order to
access the services they require. Local attestation is a means where the user gets a
location proof from it’s local Access Point. Research shows that there are number of
challenges and drawbacks in the local attestation scheme as the users can by various
means cheat the system and get location proofs for the location where they are not
located. Consider an example where a user from London is requesting for a service
that is available only to users located in New York. In order to receive the service,
the user requests his friend in New York to communicate with the corresponding AP
in New York and then somehow asks the friend to send the communication channel to
the user in London. By using local attestation, I can very well verify that the MAC
address related to the request that came form New York to the corresponding AP was
actually in New York. One of the mechanisms by which the user in London can use this
service is to physically receive the WiFi card that was used in New York for accessing
the service from London. Using local attestation, there is no way one can check if
the card used in New York was reused in London in a short span of time. This is an
open problem and is addressed extensively in this work. I introduce the concept of
global attestation through consistency check where the user is checked for being located
at different locations specified through various APs. Individual local attestation may
be successful but when multiple local attestation are put together and scrutinised, the
global attestation will show any fake activity at any stage in the pattern. I detail the
challenges involved with the local attestation schemes that exist today and also explain
how our solution using global attestation through consistency check is a better solution
for providing location proofs in mobile environments. The future sections explains the
global consistency check that is done based on the block chain methodology in Bitcoin.
The block chain is a distributed global log of all the transactions. In this work, I use
the block chaining model for tracking the details of the entities reporting the location
information. Global trust values can be calculated using a number of methods. In this
work, I have used EigenTrust and PeerTrust models to estimate the trust values.
4.2.1 System model
There are increasing number of mobile applications being used by end users to access all
kinds of services. Location based services are mainly used for accessing location related
capabilities. To ensure that the right user is receiving the location based services, the
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requirement of location proofs have been commonly seen and understood. So by making
use of the Access Points, the location proofs are provided by the APs in the form of a
proof to ensure that the mobile device requesting a service is at a particular location
at a particular point in time. This has been very well implemented and researched by
various researchers including Saroiu et al. [74], Zhu et al [76] and through VeriPlace in
[75]. When the user and the AP are colluding, it clearly indicates that the user is in the
vicinity of the AP and hence it is convenient for the AP to attest for the user’s location.
Another example for location attestation could be where a user is in the vicinity of 3 APs
nearby. Individually each of the APs can attest the user’s location and the attestation
could be verified. However, what are the consequences when a global check is done for
capturing inconsistency. If all the 3 APs are put together and if a consistency check
is done, it could either result in a positive feedback where all the points add up or it
could also result in a negative feedback where all the points don’t add up. This proves
that one of the locations provided by the user is a false location. By doing a global
check through a mechanism named global attestation, it is possible to check whether
the user has been lieing all through the path. This brings us to a strong point that
even if local attestation passes the check, does it mean that its correct. If it is correct,
when multiple local attestations are done, will all the points add up? Our system model
using global attestation scheme proves that a global consistency check is very crucial to
prove the location proofs add up and that the user is not faking the location information
through the entire journey of the request. Bitcoin has been using Block chain as the
transaction database shared by all the nodes in a system [113] . This has been used as
part of our system model for the global consistency check. A global log of the contacts
is maintained in the database similar to block chain which is used to ensure that the
locations reported by the entities themselves and other contacts in the proximity add
up to result in a positive/negative feedback.
4.2.2 Global attestation scheme
In our model, each device (e.g., users and access points) provide reports about their
locations. These devices register to our system with their Bluetooth or WiFi MAC
addresses and each is given a unique ID. A location report from an entity x does not only
contains its location, but also the MAC addresses sensed in the proximity. Therefore, if
two devices are close in location, they may sense and report each others’ MAC addresses.
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Figure 4.1: Trust Feedback Graph.
If all of the devices honestly report their locations and others they sensed, we may
easily confirm the locations of these devices by cross checking the reports from different
devices. However, these devices may not be honest, and even they may collude to mislead
the system. Therefore, we do not assume the reliability of devices and compute their
trustworthiness while reporting their and others’ locations.
There are various statistical trust models. On the other hand, most of them require some
sort of ground truth to come up with positive and negative evidence (or feedback) for the
behavior of entities. In these models, each report from an entity is evaluated with respect
to ground truth. The report serves as a positive feedback for the trustworthiness of the
entity if it comply with the ground truth. Similarly, it serves as a negative feedback
if it does not complies with the ground truth. While the computation of positive and
negative feedback is trivial when ground truth is available, in our setting, I do not have
ground truth for the location of devices.
I propose to use report consistency instead of ground truth to derive positive and negative
feedback for the computation of trust. Our system uses a global log of location reports
in the system. This global log can be implemented similar to blockchain [114], which is
a transaction database shared by all nodes participating in Bitcoin protocol [113].
Let us consider two devices i and j that provide a number of location reports over time.
At time t, let us assume that they share their reports Rti and R
t
j , which include the
locations of these devices as lti and l
t
j , respectively. If l
t
i and l
t
j are in proximity, report
of each device may confirm the existence of other by including its MAC address. If lti
and ltj are not in proximity, report of each device may not include the MAC address of
other. In these cases, the reports are considered consistent; otherwise, they are not.
I use consistent reports from pairs of devices as positive feedback for their trustwor-
thiness. Similarly, inconsistent reports serve as negative feedback. If devices i and j
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have n positive and m negative feedback, their overall positive feedback ratio is com-
puted as ci,j = n/(n+m). Using positive and negative feedback, I compose a feedback
graph where edges are weighted based on the computed overall positive feedback ratios.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates a sample feedback graph.
Once a feedback graph is computed, I can use existing graph-based trust models to
calculate trustworthiness of the nodes in the graph. While various trust models can be
used, in our system, I use two specific graph-based trust models: EigenTrust [15, 115]
and PeerTrust [16, 116]. These are models that compute global trust values for the
nodes a graph based on their local trust values, e.g., edge weights.
EigenTrust [15] provides an efficient and robust method for computing global trust
values. The calculation of the trust values are similar to the ranking calculations of
the well-known page rank algorithm. It generates a matrix C whose each entry C(i, j)
corresponds to
ci,j∑
k ci,k
(4.1)
Then, the principal eigenvector of the feedback matrix C gives the global trust values
for the nodes.
PeerTrust [16] computes a node’s trust value based on the number of feedback and the
credibility of feedback. The credibility of feedback for pairs of nodes may be measured
by the personalised similarity of these nodes. In order to compute the similarity between
two nodes i and j, I first create their feature vectors fi and fj , respectively. The k
th
element of fi is set as ci,x – the weight of the edge between i and k in the feedback graph.
Then, cos(fi, fj) – the cosine distance between fi and fj – is computed as
cos(fi, fj) =
fi · fj
||fi|| × ||fj || (4.2)
and taken as the personalised similarity of the nodes. Details of the PeerTrust algorithm
can be found in [16].
After calculating global trust scores for the entities, our location attestation algorithm
considers these trust scores as follows. When an entity reports its location, I find a set
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Figure 4.2: Demonstration application framework.
of positive reports (reports that concur with the location claimed by the entity) and
negative reports (reports that claim that the entity was located elsewhere, or a lack of
report from a trusted entity close to the claimed location). Then, I select the report
from the most trusted entity (in this set) as the consensus report. If the consensus report
agrees with the entity’s claimed location then it is accepted; otherwise it is rejected.
4.3 Global location attestation application
I have implemented a mechanism to show the importance of global attestation of location
and how it works in a mobile environment with a user requesting for information.
4.3.1 Architecture
My demonstration capability shows how the mobile device user requesting for certain
information is being attested before getting access. Doctor requests the patient records.
In order to gain access to this information, the doctor has to send the location infor-
mation once logged in along with the names of the other devices in the vicinity seen
through the Near field communications protocol. The server will then verify the location
received and ensures that the other devices are also using the same access point as the
requester. On verification, the access permission decision is made.
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Figure 4.3: Workflow for the demo application.
4.3.2 Detailed design of the solution
Devices registered to the system once logged in will generate a name for the zero con-
figuration network. The device will send the location and the name to the server and
keep these information up to date. When the device requests for data it will send the
following information for the creation of the Request Context that will be sent to the
Policy Decision Point.
• Requesters ID
• Requesters location
• Names of the near by devices that are discovered using both wireless network and
bluetooth.
Once the server receives the request it will run the request against the policies defined
and generate a verdict. While generating a verdict the server will check for dishonest
nodes.
4.4 Evaluation setup for global location attestation
This section details a scenario for evaluating the need for using Global location attesta-
tion and the benefits that our evaluation concluded through the results. The evaluation
shows the results in a collusive and non-collusive setting with honest and dishonest users.
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San MIT Infocom06
Francisco Reality
Num Entities 512 75 78
Location Source GPS WiFi Bluetooth
Sampling Interval (secs) 30 300 120
Spatial Extent (km2) 600 10 1
Temporal Extent (days) 30 30 4
Num contacts 28,241 18,665 182,951
Table 4.1: Datasets.
4.4.1 Scenario
I present an experimental evaluation of the proposed approach using three publicly
available datasets [117], [118] and [119] (see Table 4.1). The San Francisco taxicab
dataset includes GPS location traces from about 500 taxicabs over a period of 30 days.
These cabs covered a spatial extent of about 600 km2 around the city of San Francisco.
Contacts between cabs were synthetically induced when two cabs happened to be within
600 meters of each other. When the spatial resolution of contacts was reduced below 200
meters, contacts were very infrequent and that over 1200 meters induced a large number
of contacts; hence the choice of 600 meters for experimentation. The MIT Reality Mining
dataset includes WiFi location traces from about 75 entities (typically personal laptop
and handheld devices) over a period of 30 days. These entities covered a spatial extent of
about 10 km2. Contacts between two entities were naturally induced when two entities
connected to the same WiFi access point. The Infocom06 dataset includes Bluetooth
contacts from about 78 entities (a subset of attendees of IEEE Infocom 2006 conference)
over a period of 4 days. These entities covered a small indoor spatial extent of under
1 km2. Contacts between two entities were naturally induced by pair-wise Bluetooth
contacts. We remark that these datasets were intentionally chosen with varying degrees
of contact density (number of contacts per entity per unit time). The taxicab trace from
San Francisco has the least contact density, while the indoor Bluetooth contact trace
from Infocom06 has the largest contact density.
In our experiments we emulate both honest and dishonest entity behavior. A honest
entity faithfully reports contacts with other entities; e.g., in the taxicab data a honest
taxicab would report contacts with all the other taxicabs that are within the chosen
threshold distance of 600 meters. A dishonest entity can report both false positives and
false negatives: a false positive report is one wherein a dishonest entity reports contact,
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that which has not really occurred (e.g., a dishonest taxicab a claims that it is in contact
with taxicab b when b is currently more than 600 meters from a); a false negative report
is one where a dishonest entity fails to report a true contact (e.g., a dishonest taxicab a
fails to report contact with taxicab b when b is within the threshold 600 meters from a).
In our experiments we also emulate both collusive and non-collusive settings for the
dishonest entities. In a non-collusive setting a dishonest entity randomly chooses to
induce a false positive or a false negative report. In a collusive setting a dishonest entity
is more strategic: a dishonest entity would also concur with its colluder, i.e., if a dishonest
taxicab a reports a contact with its colluder b, then b would also report a contact with
a. Further, the choice of the location in the contact report between two colluding
entities could be arbitrarily chosen (including a location that which neither a and b are
currently located). In this setting dishonest entity would continue to randomly induce
false positive and false negative reports against non-colluders (i.e., honest entities).
When two entities a and b concur (e.g., a reports a contact with b at location l at
time t and b reports a contact with a at location l at time t) then the trust management
system would treat this as a positive feedback between a and b. When two entities a and
b fail to concur, the trust management system would treat this as a negative feedback.
Indeed based on one instance of non-concurrence it is impossible to say whether a is
dishonest or b is dishonest or both are dishonest (both being dishonest is feasible only
under the non-collusive setting). We combine multiple positive and negative feedbacks
to determine a trust score (between 0 and 1) in an entity using the EigenTrust and the
PeerTrust algorithms.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the error in trust score under non-collusive and collusive set-
tings (respectively). Given the trust score estimate for an entity a ( ˆtsa) and the ground
truth trust score (tsa = 0 for dishonest entity and 1 for honest entity), the error in trust
estimate is computed as the root mean square error in the estimate. I observe that in
a non-collusive setting, then both the EigenTrust and the PeerTrust approach is very
effective in estimating trust even when the fraction of dishonest entities is large (and
hence do not offer corroborating evidences). Also, the localised approach to trust esti-
mation helps PeerTrust outperform the EigenTrust solution that attempts to compute
a global trust score for each entity. However, in a collusive setting both the Eigen-
Trust is generally effective when the fraction of dishonest entities is small than 0.5. The
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Figure 4.4: Trust Estimation Error in a Non-Collusive Setting: San Francisco, MIT
Reality and Infocom06.
PeerTrust approach (again due to its localised trust estimation strategy) is relatively
more robust. Nonetheless both the approaches are ineffective (compared to the baseline
random strategy) when an overwhelmingly large fraction of entities are dishonest.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the error in location attestation under non-collusive and col-
lusive settings (respectively). Location attestation considers the trust scores of entities
that report the target entity’s location as described in the previous section. That is, I
select the report from the most trusted entity (in this set) as the consensus report. If
the consensus report agrees with the entity’s claimed location then it is accepted; else
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Figure 4.5: Trust Estimation Error in a Collusive Setting: (a) Using San Francisco
dataset (b) MIT Reality (c) Infocom06.
rejected. I also check for absence of reports from highly trusted nodes that are in the
vicinity (e.g., within 600 meters of the location claimed by a taxicab in San Francisco
dataset). Location attestation error is captured as the root mean square error in accept-
ing / rejecting a location claim, with “accept claim” assigned a numerical value of one
and “reject claim” assigned a numerical value of zero.
I observe that under a non-collusive setting both the EigenTrust and the PeerTrust so-
lution are effective even when a large fraction of entities are dishonest. Since location
estimation relies on the entity with the highest trust score, under a collusive setting I
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Figure 4.6: Location Attestation Error in a Non-Collusive Setting: (a) Using San
Francisco dataset (b) MIT Reality (c) Infocom06.
observe that when an overwhelming fraction of entities are malicious, neither of the solu-
tions are more effective than the baseline random strategy. However, for most practical
settings wherein the fraction of dishonest entities is under 0.5, the EigenTrust and the
PeerTrust solution offer a viable solution for robust location attestation.
4.4.2 Results for global attestation
A summary of key observations from our experiments are as follows:
72
Chapter 3. Policy Based Access control
Figure 4.7: Location Attestation Error in a Collusive Setting: (a) Using San Francisco
dataset (b) MIT Reality (c) Infocom06.
• In general, the trust estimation error and location attestation error are acceptably
small (< 15%) when I have fewer than one-third dishonest entities.
• In general as the contact density increases the error in trust estimation and location
attestation decreases. Recall that the San Francisco dataset has the lowest contact
density, while the Infocom06 dataset has the highest contact density.
• The PeerTrust approach of computing the trust score is more robust when I have
a large fraction of dishonest nodes. The PeerTrust approach can handle more
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dishonest nodes because it uses personalised trust scores for each entity, rather
than a global trust score (as in EigenTrust).
4.5 Summary
This chapter details the steps used for evaluating global attestation. In order to show
this, 3 publicly available datasets including SFO taxi cab dataset, MIT reality dataset
and Infocom06 datasets have been used. The results show the errors in location attes-
tation under collusive and non-collusive settings and includes outputs from both honest
and dishonest users. In general, the trust estimation error and location attestation error
are acceptably small (< 15%) when I have fewer than one-third dishonest entities.
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Trust assessment in mobile
environments
5.1 Overview
Fusing of location information is very crucial as information needs to be sent to the
right resource for the right reasons and in order to achieve this, it is very important to
evaluate and estimate some level of trust on the fused information. The more you trust
an entity the more relaxed the privacy is when it comes to sharing information with
that specific entity. Here is an example of why trust is very important in the overall
context of privacy. On facebook, we have friends and we have friends of friends and
rest of the world. We share more information with our friends as we trust our friends
much more than we trust the others in the facebook. We share lesser information with
friends of friends as we don’t trust them so much. Further more, we would share even
lesser information with the rest of the world as we don’t trust them as much as we trust
our friends and friends of friends. This is a classic example of the direct link between
trust and privacy. In this chapter, trust has been shown with a specific use case and
evaluation of trust value and its importance in the overall context of fusing information
and resolving conflicts has been explained.
Humans or intelligent software agents are increasingly faced with the challenge of making
decisions based on large volumes of streaming information from diverse sources. Deci-
sion makers must process the observed information by inferring additional information,
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estimating its reliability and orienting it for decision-making. In this chapter, I pro-
pose a stream-reasoning framework that achieves all these goals. While information is
streamed as unstructured reports (e.g., text in natural language) from unreliable sources,
my framework first converts it into a structured form using Controlled English [82] and
then it derives some facts that are useful for decision-making, and estimates the trust in
these facts. Lastly, various facts are fused based on their trustworthiness. This process
is totally undertaken on streaming information resulting in new facts being inferred from
incoming information which immediately goes through trust assessment framework and
trust is propagated to the inferred fact. In a crowdsourcing scenario there are multiple
trust issues based on networking and connectivity. When the infrastructure is fixed,
there are no trust issues as authorization is done through payment system. But in a
mobile adhoc network, there are trust issues even for network connectivity. Further, if
we consider the information layer, the real problem here is not whether it is fixed or
mobile adhoc network. The problem here is information collected from multiple layers
needs to be fused and trust is very important for this. Hence I came up with the idea
of trust assessment in mobile environment.
In this chapter, I propose a comprehensive framework where unstructured reports are
streamed from heterogeneous and potentially untrustworthy information sources. These
reports are processed to extract valuable uncertain information, which is represented
using Controlled Natural Language [82] and Subjective Logic [1]. Additional information
is inferred using deduction and abduction operations over subjective opinions derived
from the reports. Before fusing extracted and inferred opinions, the framework estimates
trustworthiness of these opinions, detects conflicts between them, and resolve these
conflicts by analysing evidence about the reliability of their sources. This chapter shows
the detailed implementation of trust assessment framework. Further, evaluation setup
for trust assessment is explained and the results of conflict resolution is described. The
performance and accuracy achieved using the trust assessment framework is highlighted
in this chapter.
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5.2 Trust
A number of effective decision-making processes devised to support strategic operations
and/or tactical missions and tasks in both military and civilian settings follow a recur-
ring pattern from information gathering to action taking. This pattern is summarily
represented by USAF Col. John Boyd’s OODA loop [120]. The phrase OODA loop
refers to the decision cycle of observe, orient, decide, and act, developed by military
strategist and USAF Colonel John Boyd. It contains the following four phases (see
Figure 5.1):
• The Observe phase comprises the processes of accumulating information pertinent
to a situation of interest.
• The Orient phase comprises the processes of analyzing the information within the
context of the particular task (operation or mission) at hand.
• The Decide phase comprises the processes of determining a proper course of action
based on the knowledge gained during the Orient phase.
• The Act phase comprises the processes involving the actual (physical) actions
taken.
The OODA phases continuously interact with each other, with, for example, the Orient
phase requesting additional information from the Observe phase to drive better deci-
sions. The interpretation of facts and information analysis in the Orient phase is heavily
influenced by the existing (background) knowledge and understanding of the current sit-
uations at various levels including social, political, economic, cultural, administrative,
logistic capabilities, resource availability, past experiences, and so on. In proposing the
OODA loop, Col. Boyd had argued that in conflict situations, such as when acting to
intercept an enemy airplane, in order to prevail one must execute his own OODA cycle
at a pace faster than that of his opponent’s OODA loop causing the opponent confusion
by acting on stale information from situations that have already changed.
This chapter covers the first two phases that deal with the gathering, processing, and con-
textual placing of information to drive subsequent decisions and actions. It is motivated
by the fact that decision makers (humans or software agents alike) are increasingly faced
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Figure 5.1: The OODA loop.
with the challenge of examining large volumes of information originating from hetero-
geneous sources requiring to ascertain opinion in various pieces of arriving information.
Detection of conflicts between opinions and resolution of conflicts is a very important
part of the solution. Resolving conflicts by analysing evidence about the reliability of
the sources is shown very well in this chapter. The challenge is exacerbated when the
decision makers employ uncertain rules to reason about the information collected from
these heterogeneous sources. However, this is the case in most settings, since inference
rules are uncertain and vague in many sensing domains and scenarios.
In typical applications of the OODA loop, the information sources feeding the Observe
and supporting the Decide phases, such as the intelligence gathering scouts or the visual
and electromagnetic sensors on a fighter airplane, are assumed to be administratively
associated (if not physically owned and controlled) by the OODA beneficiary, e.g., the
mission planners or the fighter pilot. In such cases, the capabilities of these sources are
typically well known and documented and this background knowledge can be accounted
for sufficiently well during the Orient phase. However, in coalition environments in-
volving loosely coupled sensory systems [121] ownership, control and effectiveness of the
sources cannot be guaranteed. The sensing resources may belong to different coalition
partners or the informants may be locals. In such cases, the provenance and ultimately
the quality of the information [122, 123] derived from these sources becomes question-
able. Therefore, to properly support decision and action processes, the Observe and
Orient phases must explicitly deal with uncertain information from sources whose ca-
pabilities are only partially (if at all) known and documented. In other words, the level
of trustworthiness of the gathered information needs to be accounted for and properly
weighed in the decisions and actions taken. There are various definitions of trust. McK-
night and Chervany [30] defines trust as follows: Trust is the extent to which one party
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is willing to depend on somebody, or something, in a given situation with a feeling of
relative security, even though negative consequences are possible.
It is thus an objective of this work to design an opinion assessment framework that
“scores” information arriving from uncertain sources and resolved conflicts. In support-
ing the Observe and Orient phases of the OODA loop, the framework will accommodate
streaming information, acknowledging the need to deal with fast-paced information, such
as that derived from sensors deployed across geographical spreads.
The main significance of this work shows the information being processed from streaming
data, facts derived from it and new facts inferred from it. When new facts are inferred,
trust is assessed for the new facts. So the process is executed on a continuous online
mode. This is main difference between the previous works described in chapter 2 in this
area and our work. In the oﬄine mode, the facts are not processed immediately and the
trust is not assessed instantaneously.
Another key observation from this chapter is that the work introduces key facts being
derived from streaming data and the key facts lead to new facts being inferred. As the
new facts are inferred it is passed through the trust assessment framework to propagate
a trust value to the new inferred fact.
This solution is very applicable in social computing and social networks [124]. Social
networking platforms like twitter can be used to collect information. In this case our
information sources are users, information is received as unformatted text, which needs
to be converted into Controlled English format. The formatted text would be used to
infer new facts and a trust assessment framework is used to assess the trustworthiness
of these facts. With more trustworthiness, the privacy can be relaxed as described in
the facebook example scenario in the overview section of this chapter.
5.2.1 Use case and system highlights
As information accumulates and is read for consumption, its trustworthiness must be
assessed for weighing properly in subsequent decision-making. Several authors have
explored various opinion computation models on static data (e.g., eBay recommendation
system [125], NetFlix movie ratings, EigenTrust [15], PeerTrust [16], etc.). A common
data model subsumed by several trust computation models (as succinctly captured in
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Kuter and Golbeck [126]) is the assignment of numeric trust scores between pairs of
entities (e.g., in eBay recommendation buyers rate sellers, in Netflix movie ratings users
rate movies, etc.). Such pair-wise numeric ratings contribute to a (dis)similarity score
(e.g., based on the L1 or L2 norms, cosine distance, etc.) which is used to compute
personalised trust scores (as in PeerTrust) or recursively propagated to compute global
trust scores (as in EigenTrust).
There are two common assumptions in several such opinion models that are viable in
commercial settings: (i) a statistically significant number of trust evidence (e.g., ratings)
is available prior to opinion assessment, and (ii) assessed opinion values tend to vary
slowly over time. In contrast, military settings warrant: (i) trust assessment over partial,
uncertain and streaming (live and real-time) information from heterogeneous sources,
and (ii) coping up with the dynamic and evolving nature of the ground truth.
Let us consider the following scenario comprising the events:
• Event e0: An explosion occurs at location l0 at time t0. Event e0 represents the
ground truth and is assumed that there is no direct evidence available to support
it in the opinion assessment system.
• Event e1: An acoustic sensor reports a possible explosion at location l1 at time t1.
• Event e2: A human agent reports unusual dust level at location l2 at time t2.
In this scenario, the goals are two-fold: (i) fact inference (e.g., infer an explosion from
event e2) and information fusion (e.g., fuse events e1 and e2 based on their spatio-
temporal proximity), and (ii) assessing additional information (metadata) about the
inferred/fused facts, such as an estimate of where and when (lˆ0 and tˆ0) the explosion
took place, or an assessment of opinion in the fact that an explosion occurred based on
previously seen events.
With reference to Figure 5.2, the first goal is addressed by the analytics component. In
general, I expect to deal with a live (and potentially bursty) stream of events (e.g., tex-
tual or sensory reports) that are tagged with metadata (e.g., location, time, owner/author-
ship, beliefs). The stream of events may be subject to various analytics operations, e.g.,
fact extraction from event data using the Controlled English Store [82], event data fu-
sion using the Information Fabric [83], etc. I do not make any specific assumptions on
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Figure 5.2: Opinion Assessment on Streaming Information.
the nature of such analytics operations, but for the fact that they are constrained to
operate on streaming data. Hence, given latency constraints, storage, archival and post
processing (or even batch processing) of event data may not be a viable option. I remark
that this does not preclude the option of storing compact summaries (e.g., in a CE fact
store [82]); only storing all (or a signification portion of) historical events is deemed
infeasible. I also note that the goal of this work is not to support such analytics opera-
tions; instead the goal is to augment such operations with opinion metadata assessment.
While the internal workings of the analytics component are isolated from the opinion
assessment system, I assume that the background knowledge is shared (e.g., rules for
Bayesian inference, Controlled English fact inference rules, etc.). Intuitively, I model
the analytics operation as accepting one or more inputs and a quasi-static background
knowledge and generating one or more outputs. Here, the “quasi-static” qualifier means
that the background knowledge is updated at a rate that is significantly slower than
the event rate. This background knowledge is sometimes also referred to as the domain
knowledge.
I model opinion assessment as a family of operators that accepts input opinion metadata
and background knowledge and computes output opinion metadata. This model only
requires that the background knowledge be shared between the analytics and the opinion
assessment. Typically, such background knowledge is compact and has well defined
semantics and isolates the opinion assessment system from understanding all the intricate
details of the analytics operations (see Figure 5.2). Architecturally speaking, opinion
is assessed as a part of a call-back function that is invoked each time the analytics
operation generates a new output; the call-back function is supplied with the opinion
metadata of the relevant inputs that were used to derive the said output.
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Another interesting component of this work is the representation of rules with opinions.
Past work assumed that the rules were always certain. Through this work, I have
experimented the rules with opinions and certain uncertainty using the Subjective logic
triples, i.e., belief, disbelief and uncertainty.
In this work I present a realization of this model using subjective logic triples (i.e.,
belief, disbelief and uncertainty) for representing opinion and Bayesian inference net-
work for the background knowledge. In this setting, I have built a family of subjective
logic operators that can be used to compute opinion metadata for an output event,
given the opinion metadata on the input events and a Bayesian network that encodes
probabilistic dependencies between one or more facts, e.g., Pr(dust|explosion) = 1,
Pr(dust|¬explosion) = 0.25, and these probabilities may change over a time horizon
that is significantly longer than the duration of an event burst.
5.2.2 Subjective Logic
Subjective logic (SL) is a type of probabilistic logic that explicitly takes uncertainty and
belief ownership into account. In general, SL is suitable for modelling and analysing
situations involving uncertainty and incomplete knowledge [1]. Arguments in SL are
subjective opinions about propositions.
A binomial opinion of an agent A about the truth of a proposition x is represented by
the quadruple wAx = (b, d, u, a), where: b is the belief that x is true; d is the belief that
x is false; u is the uncertainty (or, uncommitted belief) about x; and a is the base rate
about x which represents the a priori probability about x in the absence of evidence;
and b+ d+ u = 1.0 and b, d, u, a ∈ [0, 1]. Characteristics of a binary subjective opinion
can be summarised as follows:
• b = 1 then it is equivalent to binary logic TRUE
• d = 1 then it is equivalent to binary logic FALSE
• b+ d = 1 then it is equivalent to traditional probability
• b+ d < 1 then it expresses some degrees of uncertainty
• b+ d = 0 then it expresses total uncertainty
82
Chapter 5. Trust assessment in mobile environments
A binomial opinion can be represented as a Beta distribution. The probability expec-
tation value of an opinion is defined as E(wAx ) = b + u × a, based on the correspond-
ing Beta distribution [1]. Through the correspondence between binomial opinions and
Beta distributions, SL provides an algebra for subjective opinions. Some of the opera-
tors defined over subjective opinions are listed in Table 5.1. Detailed descriptions and
proofs for soundness of these operators are out of the scope, but they can be found
elsewhere [1, 127–131].
Table 5.1: Some operators for binary opinions in Subjective Logic [1].
Operator Name Notation
Complement [127] w¬x = ¬wx
¬(b, d, u, a) = (d, b, u, 1− a)
Discounting [127] wA:Bx = w
A
B ⊗ wBx
Fusion [128, 131] wABx = wAx ⊕ wBx
w1...nx = ⊕{w1x, . . . , wnx}
Disjunction / OR [130] wx1∨x2 = wx1 unionsq wx2
wx1∨...∨xm = unionsq{wx1 , . . . , wxm}
Conjunction / AND [130] wx∧y = wx · wy
wx1∧...∧xm = ·{wx1 , . . . , wxm}
Deduction [129] wy||x = wx } (wy|x, wy|¬x)
Abduction [129] wy|¯|x = wx}¯(wy|x, wy|¬x)
Each opinion wx = (b, d, u, a) for a proposition x implies another opinion w¬x =
¬wx = (d, b, u, 1 − a). For instance, let x be the proposition “Dust storm in loca-
tion X”, the a priori probability for x be 12 , and the opinion of sensor s1 about x
be ws1x = (0.75, 0.1, 0.15,
1
2), then the sensor’s opinion about “No dust storm in loca-
tion X” would be ws1¬x = (0.1, 0.75, 0.15,
1
2). If another sensor s2 has another opinion
ws2x = (0, 0.7, 0.3,
1
2), these two opinions are fused into a single opinion using the con-
sensus (a.k.a., cumulative fusion) operator ⊕ [131]: (0.75, 0.1, 0.15, 12) ⊕ (0, 0.7, 0.3, 12) =
(0.55, 0.34, 0.11, 12). The consensus operator is defined as follows in definition 4.1, [128].
Definition 5.1. Let wAx = (b
A
x , d
A
x , u
A
x , a
A
x ) and w
B
x = (b
B
x , d
B
x , u
B
x , a
B
x ) be opinions re-
spectively held by agents A and B about the proposition x. When uAx , u
B
x → 0, the
relative dogmatism between wAx and w
B
x is defined by γ = u
B
x /u
A
x . The fused opinion
wABx = (bABx , dABx , uABx , aABx ) can be computed as follows, where κ = uAx + uBx − uAx uBx :
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for κ 6= 0
1. bABx = (bAx uBx + bBx uAx )/κ
2. dABx = (dAx uBx + dBx uAx )/κ
3. uABx = (uAx uBx )/κ
4. aABx = (aAx uBx + aBx uAx − (aAx + aBx )uAx uBx )/κ
for κ = 0
1. bABx = (γbAx + bBx )/(γ + 1)
2. dABx = (γdAx + dBx )/(γ + 1)
3. uABx = 0
4. aABx = (γaAx + aBx )/(γ + 1)
Discounting operator ⊗ allows normalisation of opinions based on the trustworthiness
of their owners [127]. In order to allow different trust models in our work easily, I adopt
a slightly modified version of the discounting operator. Let us assume that I get the
opinion (bix, d
i
x, u
i
x, a) from source i about the fact x and have ti as the trustworthiness
of the source. The resulting opinion normalised based on opinion is computed as
(bix × ti, dix × ti, uix + (1− ti)× (bix + dix), a)
where the idea is to move a percentage of belief and disbelief to uncertainty based on
the level of trust in the source. The trustworthiness of information sources can be
calculated using different models. For example, beta reputation system [87] uses beta
probability density functions [87] to model trust. A Beta distribution has two parameters
(ri+1, si+1), where ri is the amount of positive evidence and si is the amount of negative
evidence for the trustworthiness of the source i. The degree of trust ti is then computed
as the expectation value of the Beta distribution:
tji =
rji + 1
rji + s
j
i + 2
(5.1)
While this computation is simple and straight forward, there exist more complicated
approaches for modelling trust. Our work is flexible enough to integrate any of such
model as long as these models provide a trust value in range [0, 1].
Now, I give a concrete example of discounting operation. Let the trustworthiness of s1
and s2 be 0.1 and 0.8, respectively. Then, normalised opinions of s1 and s2 would be
ws1x ⊗ 0.1 = (0.07, 0.01, 0.92, 12) and ws2x ⊗ 0.8 = (0.0, 0.56, 0.44, 12), respectively. In this
case, fusion of the normalised opinions would be (0.03, 0.54, 0.43, 12). I assume that all
opinions are normalised based on trustworthiness of their owners (i.e., sources).
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Figure 5.3: Opinion Assessment Framework.
Given opinions about different propositions (e.g., wx1 and wx2), SL provides conjunction
(·) and disjunction (unionsq) operators to compute opinions for the conjunction (e.g., wx∧y)
and disjunction (e.g., wx1∨x2) of the propositions [130]. In addition to these operators,
deduction operator (}) is used to deduce new opinions from existing ones [129]. For
instance, let x be the proposition “Country A is buying missiles” and y be “Country A
is preparing to attack”. Let us assume that I have the following conditional opinions
about “y given x” and “y given ¬x”.
• wy|x = (0.9, 0.0, 0.1, 12)
• wy|¬x = (0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 12)
Given an opinion about x, I can deduce an opinion for y using wy||x = wx} (wy|x, wy|¬x)
as described in [129]. If the opinion about x is wx = (0.75, 0.25, 0.0,
1
2), the deduced
opinion about y is computed as wy||x = (0.68, 0, 0.32, 12) based on the algorithm in [129].
Details of the deduction operator is not in the scope, but it can be found in [129].
5.3 Opinion assessment framework
Figure 5.3 shows the architecture of our opinion assessment framework; wherever ap-
propriate, I indicate ITA assets that could be leveraged in implementing the framework.
As described earlier, I assume information analytics operates over a stream of input in-
formation and generates information products e.g., by fusing information, by extracting
facts and using inferences to derive new facts, etc. Similarly to Figure 5.2, in Figure 5.3
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I also show those parts of the architecture that relate to the Observe and Orient phases
of the OODA loop.
Our opinion assessment framework operates in parallel with the information-processing
pipeline. The opinion assessment framework extracts facts and opinion metadata from
the stream of input information. The background knowledge store is queried for iden-
tifying relevant facts, i.e., facts whose opinion level may influence or may be influenced
by the opinion level of the input information. For example, the input information may
indicate unusual dust levels and background knowledge may encode the fact that un-
usual dust levels are often a result of an explosion; hence, the fact store may be queried
for potential explosion information. Also, the background knowledge may encode the
fact that explosion may be identified using its acoustic signature; hence, the fact store
may be queried for acoustic information from a relevant space-time region (volume, to
be more accurate) that surrounds the unusual dust level.
Once relevant facts are extracted, opinion in input information and information products
is assessed using the family of opinion operators built using subjective logic. The choice
of the opinion operator depends upon the nature of analytics operation (e.g., conjunction
vs. deduction vs. consensus). In this section I present three examples, which illustrate
the functionality of various components in our opinion assessment framework.
One of our key design features is that of decoupling the analytics component with the
opinion assessment system. The analytics component is responsible for extracting and
inferring facts (e.g., from unstructured text or other primitive facts). In doing so the
analytics component may leverage (e.g., use a static road/terrain map to enrich facts)
and update (e.g., Controlled English (CE) [82] rules to infer new facts) background
knowledge. The opinion assessment system, on the other hand, does not infer new facts
(as indicated by the unidirectional flow of information from background knowledge to
the opinion assessment system in the figure). Instead it augments the inference task in
the analytics component with opinion assessment capability, i.e., assesses opinion on the
inferred fact.
In the rest of this section, I describe each of these steps in detail.
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Figure 5.4: A Snippet of an Unstructured Report.
5.3.1 Fact extraction
The input to our system is typically a stream of unstructured reports. Each report is
subjected to fact extraction, resulting in a set of facts that are subsequently used by
both the analytics and the opinion assessment components. The extracted facts and
texts may be stored in Controlled English (CE) format in a CE Store. Here is a snippet
of the intelligence report.
For example, given an intelligence report the following facts may be extracted1:
• there is a group named ent1 wisrep08 that has ‘a foot patrol’ as description
• there is an entity reference named er1 wisrep08 that has ‘a foot patrol’ as
description and
– has the document wisrep08 as source and
– has the group ent1 wisrep08 as entity and
– has 40 as start position and
– has 53 as end position
5.3.2 Metadata extraction
Beyond fact extraction, I also extract various metadata attributes from a report includ-
ing, Creator, Keywords, Opinion, Subject, Title, Security Level, Company, Category,
Document parts, etc. For example,
1I use teletype lettering to emphasise CE specific word patterns.
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• Source = “Dr Dave Sloggett”
• has ‘Opinion’ as (0.7, 0.2, 0.1, 0.5)
• Keywords = “IED, Pathfinder”
• Subject = “Daisy Chain Device”
• Title = “WISREP 001”
• Security Level = 0
• msole:codepage = 1252
• Company = “someCompanyName”
• Category = “WISREP”
• Document Parts = [(0, “WISREP 001”)]
Metadata attributes thus generated are also asserted as facts, thereby, permitting a
uniform representation for both data and metadata. For example,
Document ‘20110228 WISREP Report 001 ISAF’
• has the ms-word metadata ‘20110228 WISREP -Report 001 ISAF.doc.meta.txt’
as metadata and
• has ‘ISAF’ as filename security level and
• has ‘001’ as filename subtitle and
• has ‘WISREP’ as filename report type and
• has ‘20110228’ as filename date and
• has ‘Report’ as filename title and
• has ‘20110228 WISREP Report 001 ISAF.doc.plain.txt’ as plain filename and
• has ‘Wed Jun 8 13:24:33 2011’ as time processed and
• has ‘PFIII document processor’ as agent and
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It is important to emphasise the following about the reports, facts, and opinions. Within
the same report, there can be multiple facts written by multiple sources. When a fact
is extracted from a report, the meta-data includes the source and opinion asserted by
the source about this fact. Before asserting the opinion from the specific source into the
knowledge base, I discount it with the trustworthiness of the source. If the opinion is
not asserted by the source in the report, I take it as (1, 0, 0) by default and discounted
based on opinion. For instance, if the trustworthiness of the source is (0.5, 0.1, 0.4), the
opinion about the fact is taken as (0.5, 0, 0.5) after discounting. Normally, the fact may
appear in different reports. Therefore, there may be many opinions about the facts in
our knowledge base. Some of these facts may be in conflict. For instance, I may derive
opinions (0.8, 0, 0.2) and (0.1, 0.8, 0.1) for the same fact “there is a problem in the road”.
The first opinion indicates that the fact is probably true while other implies that the
fact is not true. I will later describe how to handle these conflicting opinions about the
same facts.
5.3.3 Opinion query
Each opinion is associated with a proposition, which may be a fact or meta-data. For
example, the knowledge base stores the opinion (0.9, 0, 0.1) from USGS about the fact
“seismic activity has happened at location X on 20th June 2014 at time 16:01” and the
opinion (0.8, 0, 0.2) for the proposition “USGS is a reliable source for seismic data”. In
this section, given a specific fact extracted from a report, I describe how to identify
relevant facts (and meta-data), and retrieve opinions related to these. In particular, I
extract three types of relevant facts and retrieve associated opinions from the knowledge
base:
• The facts that exhibit causal relationships with the input fact (e.g., dust level,
acoustic sensor measurements with an IED explosion)
• The facts that exhibit spatio-temporal similarity (e.g., two explosion reports whose
space-time tags are relatively close to each other)
• The facts with matching meta-data attributes such as creator, keywords, etc.
After retrieving all the known opinions about the relevant facts and meta-data, I perform
opinion analysis as described in the next section.
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5.3.4 Opinion analytics
The opinion analytics component is designed to operate in parallel with the main an-
alytics component; one could view our opinion analytics component as being triggered
by the main analytics component whenever new facts are inferred or updated by the an-
alytics component. The trigger would include as references the input and output facts
from the analytics component and the relevant background knowledge queried in the
previous step (Opinion Query step). The opinion analytics component uses a subjective
logic (SL) operator library for deducing new opinions from the existing opinions about
known facts. In this section I describe three sample opinion analytics operations.
5.3.5 Forward chaining (input opinions are known)
Consider two known facts that are annotated with metadata such as source (e.g., coali-
tion member) C, location L and time T and an opinion tv. Given two annotated facts
(f1, c1, l1, t1, tv1) and (f2, c2, l2, t2, tv2), the analytics operation may infer and generate
a new opinion about another fact f3 using deduction as: f1 and f2 ⇒ f3. The goal of
the opinion assessment system in this case is to infer the opinion in the fact f3. In order
to do this, the opinion analytics system would identify facts f1 and f2 and the inference
rule used to generate fact f3, namely, f1 and f2 ⇒ f3. In this example, the conjunction
of the opinions about f1 and f2 are computed using the conjunction operator of SL,
which is described in Definition 5.2. The resulting opinion is the opinion for the left
hand side of the rule, i.e., f1andf2. Based on the computed opinion and the deduction
operator } mentioned in Section 4.2.2 (Subjective Logic), I compute the opinion tv3
associated with the fact f3.
Definition 5.2. Let wx = (bx, dx, ux) and wy = (by, dy, uy) be opinions about two dis-
tinct propositions x and y, respectively. Then the opinion about x∧y is computed using
the conjunction operator as wx∧y = wx · wy = (bx∧y, dx∧y, ux∧y) where,
1. bx∧y = bxby
2. dx∧y = dx + dy − dxdy
3. ux∧y = bxuy + byux + uxuy
90
Chapter 5. Trust assessment in mobile environments
Deduction operator of SL allows us to associate uncertainty with rules that are used to
infer new facts. In our example, f1 and f2 ⇒ f3 may not be certain. That is, f3 may
not always follow from f1 and f2. Let shortly refer to f1 and f2 as θ. The deduction
operator uses two conditional opinions about the rule θ ⇒ f3 while deducing opinions
for f3: i) wf3|θ and ii) wf3|¬θ.
The first conditional opinion wf3|θ refers to the belief, disbelief, and uncertainty for
the proposition that f3 follows from θ. It is computed using the evidence derived from
observations. Given θ holds, if it is observed that f3 holds as well, this observation
is counted as a positive evidence while computing wf3|θ; but if f3 does not hold, the
observation is taken as a negative evidence. Let r and s refer to the number of positive
and negative evidence derived from observations. Then, following [129], the belief and
disbelief in the opinion wf3|θ are computed as r/(r+s+2) and s/(r+s+2), respectively.
The second opinion wf3|¬θ refers to the belief, disbelief, and uncertainty for the proposi-
tion that f3 follows from ¬θ. This opinion is also computed using the evidence derived
from observations, as described above. If we set wf3|θ as (0.8, 0, 0.2), this means that
most of the time f3 follows from θ, but sometimes this may not hold.
While describing rules, we can use arbitrary propositional logic statements ( and , or ,
and not ). Then, these rules can be used to infer a new fact, given a set of existing
facts. For clarity, I have only shown conjunction operator, other SL operators can be
found elsewhere.
5.3.6 Backward chaining (input opinions are unknown)
We can also infer new opinions about facts using backward chaining, i.e., through ab-
ductive reasoning. For instance, let us assume that we have a SL rule indicating that an
explosion may lead to high level of dust. When we have a report asserting some opinions
about high level of dust, we can use abductive reasoning or backward chaining to infer
there might be an explosion resulting in the dust.
More formally, let us assume that f1 and f2 refer to facts representing unusual dust level
and explosion at location l and time t, respectively. In our knowledge base, we may
have a SL rule relating these facts, i.e., f2 → f1 with conditional opinions wf1|f2 and
wf1|¬f2 . The conditional opinions can be considered similar to conditional probabilities in
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a Bayesian network, e.g., Pr(dust|explosion) and Pr(dust|¬explosion). Given an opinion
w1 retrieved from a specific source about f1, we can infer another opinion w2 using
abduction operator ⊗¯ of SL [132].
5.4 Spatio-temporal relevance and reasoning with location
Consider two facts f1 and f2 that assert the same statement (e.g., an explosion occurred)
but with a small mismatch in its metadata. For instance, the location metadata l1
associated with fact f1 is slightly different to l2 that is associated with fact f2. Since
the facts essentially agree with each other, the goal of opinion assessment is two-fold:
(i) combining opinions in both the facts (because we now have collaborating evidence)
and reduce uncertainty, and (ii) assuming that the location l1 is not same as l2, refine
the location metadata associated with the facts. For sufficiently small deviations, we
may simplify and assume that l1 = l2 in which case we can apply the SL consensus
operator for fusing the opinions tv1 and tv2 to compute tv3. However, in general, when
l1 6= l2, traditional SL cannot be used directly. The authors are exploring spatial-aware
extensions of SL (coined saSL) to address cases like this, with the objective to compute
a new location l3 where the fact (e.g., explosion) could have occurred with high belief.
Early results from this work and its application to a localization scenario for cognitive
radio networks can be found in [133].
Location information in a report can be in the form of latitude and longitude values.
In this case, the comparisons of locations in terms of proximity can be done using a
set of geographical calculations. On the other hand, it may be more likely to have
address information (e.g., street name, area, city etc.) in reports to indicate a specific
location. Therefore, in order to identify proximity or spatio-temporal relevance between
locations, we may need to do some reasoning. For this purpose, we can use an ontology
that determines the relationships between different locations. The linked geographical
data2 can be used to determine if an area is within or close to another area. Once we
determine the relevance between locations appearing in different facts, we can determine
if the opinions about these facts are supporting one another or not.
2http://linkedgeodata.org
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Let us describe this using the following example. We consider that a sniper has killed
someone in an area. There are two reports about the sniper’s location. The first report
is from local police and indicates with high belief that “the sniper shot from a building
x on street y”. The second report is from a military force conducting operations in the
region. The military force also knows that the sniper shot from the building x. However,
it does not want to reveal the positions and density of its sensors on the region. Hence,
it shares a report after obfuscating (e.g., generalising) the location information. For
instance, if the street y is in the area z, it reports that “the sniper shot from a building
in area z”, being sure that this information does not reveal that it has sensors around the
building x. When these two reports are received by the system, the locations indicated
within the reports are analysed and the relevance between these facts and opinions are
determined. That is, the system can figure out that the building x locates in the area
z, therefore, the opinions appearing within these reports support each other. Using
deduction (forward chaining), we can infer from the first report that the sniper was in
the area z, which supports the second report. Similarly, through abduction (backward
chaining), the second report supports the first report. That is, if the sniper was at a
building on the area z, it is possible that this building is the building x.
5.5 Fusing of assessed opinions
There are different ways of getting various opinions about the same fact. We can get
opinions direct from one or more information sources and discount them based on the
trustworthiness of their sources or infer opinions through some sort of reasoning mech-
anism such as deduction (i.e., forward chaining) or abduction (i.e., backward chaining).
Therefore, we may expect more than one opinion about the same facts. At this point,
we may fuse these opinions using cumulative fusion operator of SL as described in Defi-
nition 5.1 or some other fusion method. On the other hand, some of these opinions may
be in conflict. The conflicting opinions may significantly reduce the quality of the fused
opinion, especially in the environments with malicious adversaries. In this work, I ad-
vocate that conflicts between opinions should be resolved before fusing. In this section,
I detail our approach and justify it using a set of simulations.
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5.5.1 Conflicts between opinions
When we have two or more opinions about the same fact, these opinions may conflict.
Let us assume that we have two information sources that provide opinions some how
related to the fact f1 “The road R is bombed”. These sources are Peter and Jane,
whose levels of opinion are 0.8 and 0.75, respectively. Peter reports that the fact f2 “the
road is safe” with opinion (1, 0, 0); this opinion is discounted as (0.8, 0, 0.2) based on his
trustworthiness. Given that we have a certain rule hasExplosion(x) → ¬safe(x), we
infer, lets say, the opinion (0, 0.8, 0.2) for f1 using abduction based on Peter’s report.
On the other hand, Jane reports an explosion on the road with opinion (0.9, 0, 0.1); this
opinion is discounted as (0.675, 0, 0.325) based on her trustworthiness. Therefore, we
have two opinions for f1: (0, 0.8, 0.2) and (0.675, 0, 0.325). It is easy to conclude that
these opinions are in conflict. The first opinion indicates that most likely there is no
explosion on the road while the other implies that there is a significant possibility of
explosion.
The conflict indicates that at least one of these opinions is misleading. To resolve this
conflict, these opinions may be discounted (possibly at different rates), hence the uncer-
tainty within them is increased enough to resolve the conflict. For instance, discounting
the first opinion (0, 0.8, 0.2) with 0.0 makes it (0, 0, 1), which absolutely does not con-
flict with (0.675, 0, 0.325) or any other opinion, since it does not contain any belief or
disbelief, but only uncertainty. Similarly, discounting both of these opinions with 0.5
leads to opinions (0, 0.4, 0.6) and (0.335, 0, 0.665), which are quite uncertain and do not
conflict.
In this work, I argue that conflicts between opinions may serve as evidence for the
necessity to increase uncertainty within them. Although there can be more than one way
to define conflicts between subjective opinions, in this work, I introduce Definition 5.3
where conflicts are defined based on the satisfiability of beliefs and disbeliefs within
opinions. In the rest of this section, I represent opinions using only belief and disbelief
when a coincide notation is required; that is, I use (b, d) instead of (b, d, u) since u =
1− b− d.
Definition 5.3. Let O = {w0, w1, . . . , wn} be opinions about the same proposition,
where each opinion wi = (bi, di, ui). These opinions are consistent if it is possible to
have a valid opinion that can satisfy all of these opinions. An opinion w∗ = (b∗, d∗, u∗)
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can satisfy the opinion wi ∈ O iff bi ≤ b∗ and di ≤ d∗. Although there can be infinitely
many such w∗, the one with the highest uncertainty (i.e., one with the highest u∗) would
be
(max(b0, b1, . . . , bn), max(d0, d1, . . . , dn)).
Therefore, there cannot be any opinion that can satisfy all opinions in O if and only if
max(b0, b1, . . . , bn) +max(d0, d1, . . . , dn) > 1.
That is, O is inconsistent iff ∃wi, wj ∈ O s.t. bi + dj > 1.
The intuition behind the definition of conflicts between opinions is as follows. Let the
ground truth about a proposition x be represented as an opinion wτx = (b
τ
x, d
τ
x). Also, let
wix = (b
i
x, d
i
x, u
i
x) be an arbitrary opinion about x. If w
i
x has a higher belief than w
τ
x does
(i.e., bτx < b
i
x), then w
i
x is misleading. Similarly, if w
i
x has a higher disbelief than w
τ
x does
(i.e., dτx < d
i
x), then w
i
x is misleading. How much w
i
x is misleading depends on how much
extra belief and disbelief it imposes. On the other hand, if bix < b
τ
x and d
i
x < d
τ
x, then w
i
x
is not misleading, because it does not impose any extra belief or disbelief, but only extra
uncertainty that conflicts with neither the belief nor the disbelief within the ground
truth wτx. In reality, I do not have the ground truth about x. Therefore, I cannot say
whether wix is misleading or not. However, if we have another opinion w
j
x = (b
j
x, d
j
x, u
j
x),
we can reason about if it is possible to have a ground truth for which neither wix nor w
j
x
is misleading. Such a ground truth exists if and only if max(bix, b
j
x) +max(dix, d
j
x) ≤ 1.
If such a ground truth cannot exist, we say wix and w
i
x are in conflict, i.e., at least one
of them must be misleading at some degree.
5.6 Resolving conflicts
Before fusing opinions regarding a specific fact, for example using cumulative fusion
operator in Definition 5.1, the conflicts between opinions should be resolved. Once we
determine conflicting opinions, several approaches can be used for this purpose. In this
section, I introduce three conflict resolution approaches and demonstrate their perfor-
mance in terms of the success of the fusion operation. In these approaches, discounting
operator is used to resolve conflicts between opinions by increasing uncertainty in some of
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these opinions. Let us have two conflicting opinions wi and wj from information sources
i and j with opinion values ti and tj , respectively. These opinions are discounted by
coefficients 0 ≤ xi, xj ≤ 1 based on information like ti and tj .
1. Trust-based deleting: If two opinions wi and wj are in conflict, the opinion from
the less trustworthy source is deleted, and if both sources are equally trustworthy
both opinions are deleted. Thus, if the trust we have in the source of opinion wi is
greater than that of the source of wj (ti > tj) then xi = 1 and xj = 0, and when
t1 = t2, we assign x1 = x2 = 0.
2. Trust-based discounting: If two opinions wi and wj are in conflict, they are
discounted in proportion to the trustworthiness of their sources. That is, the
more trust worthy opinion is discounted relatively less. Let us define a conflict
over wi = (bi, di, ui) and wj = (bj , dj , uj) as bi + dj > 1. Then, the additional
discounting factors for wi and wj are computed as ti/(biti+djtj) and tj/(biti+djtj),
respectively.
3. Evidence-based discounting: The previous two conflict resolution methods
uses discounting based on trust to resolve conflicts. Trustworthiness of informa-
tion sources are computed based on past experience, i.e., evidence. Evidence
relates to how reliable or unreliable a source was in the past. The evidence-based
discounting uses TRIBE [134] approach for conflict resolution and depends on
evidence analysis instead of trust values. As described before, each opinion in
the proposed system is already discounted by the trustworthiness of its source.
Discounting an opinion further to resolve a conflict implies making its trustwor-
thiness less than the trustworthiness of its source. For instance, let us assume that
our trust for Jack and Jane as information sources are 0.8 and 0.9, respectively;
and they give opinions (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0) for the fact “the road is not safe”,
respectively. After discounting based on the trustworthiness of their sources we
have opinions: (0.8, 0, 0.2) and (0, 0.9, 0.1). These opinions are still in conflict.
To resolve the conflict, we need to discount them further. For instance, we can
discount both of these opinions with 0.5 and have two non-conflicting opinions:
(0.4, 0, 0.6) and (0, 0.45, 0.55). Hence, the trustworthiness of the first opinion be-
comes 0.5 × 0.8 = 0.4 and that of the second becomes 0.45. Let us assume that
the trust in the source of the first opinion is computed as (r+ 1)/(r+ s+ 2) = 0.8
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Figure 5.5: Opinion Assessment Framework.
based on Equation 5.1 where r = 8, s = 0. We can trivially calculate that 11 extra
negative evidence, i.e., speculative evidence, should be added to s to decrease the
trust from 0.8 to 0.4, i.e., (8+1)/(8+11+2) = 0.4. TRIBE aims at optimising the
total amount of speculative evidence necessary to resolve all conflicts by finding
the best discounting factors. Therefore, it considers not only the trust values, but
also the evidence used to calculate them.
5.7 Trust assessment framework
The trust assessment framework has been implemented to show how streaming informa-
tion can be assessed and annotated with a trust value and also to evaluate the level of
trust when the information is fused.
5.7.1 Architecture
Figure 5.5 shows the trust assessment framework. Trust assessment model is imple-
mented using Information Fabric along with the Subjective Logic triples. Information
Fabric acts as the underlying framework that allows the trust assessment workflow to
be a part of it. The fabric wrapper allows us to implement the required parts within it
using services. The Fabric code has been implemented using Java code and built using
Java Virtual Machine. The code is written using Eclipse SDK. The fabric wrapper calls
out to these individual services as and when required. The Subjective Logic calculation
code is imported into the Eclipse Development environment as a JAR file and is used
with the code by the trust calculation and trust evaluation service.
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5.7.2 Detailed design
The SL-based trust assessment process has been implemented on the Information Fabric
(or Fabric) that serves as the underlying platform for executing the trust assessment
workflows. The trust assessment operations appear as a service that is accessible over
the Fabric. Specifically, packaged as a Java library, the SL-based operators are invoked
as needed by the trust assessment service.
The trust assessment code is written using Java and Information Fabric has been made
accessible as a wrapper to the trust service. The code connects to the Controlled English
(CE) [82] store to check for the details on any existing information about the trust values
of any of the sources and if not the Controleld English rule engine would do inference
and the trust for the inference would be calculated using the appropriate Subjective
Logic operator.
Assessed trust values are then used to annotate information products and appropriately
update the background knowledge with revised trust values. We note that the trust
assessment component only updates the trust values of information products and the
facts in the background knowledge; it does not create new facts and thus does not
trigger new rules in the analytics component. This decoupling ensures the stability
(convergence) of the joint information processing and trust assessment pipeline.
5.8 Evaluation setup for trust assessment
All our experiments were performed on the SYNCOIN dataset [135]. I used the Con-
trolled English Store to a priori extract facts from the dataset. These facts are then
streamed over the Information Fabric to an in-memory database wherein facts are an-
notated with trust metadata.
5.8.1 Results of conflicts resolution
I evaluated the performance of the listed conflict resolution approaches in cumulative
fusion through a set of simulations. In these simulations, there are two types of infor-
mation sources that provide opinions about fact: honest and malicious sources. At each
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Figure 5.6: Error of cumulative fusion operator in the face of liars for varying Rliar .
time step, a fact is randomly selected and a ground truth is generated for the fact. Our
fusion model collects opinions provided by various information sources and fuses these
opinions by i) detecting conflicts, ii) resolving conflicts, and iii) applying the cumulative
fusion operator to generate a single fused opinion. The success of the fusion operation
is measured using absolute error. Let (b, d, u) be the ground truth and (b′, d′, u′) be the
fused opinion, then the absolute error is computed as errB(a) = abs(δb) +abs(δd), where
δb = b
′ − b and δd = d′ − d.
The honest sources provide opinions close to ground truth; they add small amount of
Gaussian noise with N(0, 0.01) to belief and disbelief within the ground truth. The
malicious sources behave like honest sources for a while until they build up some trust
(above 0.7) and then they start to provide misleading opinions. The misleading opinions
are generating by switching the belief and disbelieve within genuine opinions, which are
close to the ground truth. In order to increase the uncertainty in the behaviour of
sources, I also let honest sources provide misleading opinions with a probability of 0.1.
During simulations there are 10 information sources and I have run the simulations for
different ratio of liars.
For each ratio of liars, I repeat the experiments 10 times and I demonstrate the mean
absolute error for our experiments in Figure 5.6. In the figure, Naive Deleting method is
a baseline method in our evaluations. This method simply deletes all of the conflicting
opinions before fusion. My results indicate that trust-based discounting and evidence-
based discounting have similar performance for low ratio of liars. However, considering
only trust is not enough for higher ratios of liars. Trust-based deleting and naive deleting
approaches do not perform well. They lead to highly erroneous fused opinions. Evidence-
based discounting is by far the best conflict resolution approach. It allows misleading
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Metric Mean Std dev
Throughput (per sec) 33.6 / 33.5 / 2.98% 2.4 / 2.8 / 16.67%
Latency (ms) 32.2 / 36.4 / 13.04% 12.1 / 13.2 / 9.09%
Table 5.2: Performance Overhead. x/y/z
opinions to be discounted before the cumulative fusion takes place. Therefore, I suggest
to use evidence-based discounting in the proposed system.
5.8.2 Performance
Table 5.2 summarises the performance overhead added by our trust assessment approach.
I compared the latency and throughput of a nop (no operation) Fabric service with that
of our Fabric trust service by streaming events through them at high speed. The nop
Fabric service takes a stream of events as input and returns an identical stream of events
as output. Thus, execution of nop reflects the cost of an event entering and exiting the
Information Fabric platform without any processing within the Fabric platform. The
trust service takes a stream of events as input and returns a trust annotated stream of
events as output. I have repeated the experiment by calling each of the SL operators
shown in Table 5.1. The variation in latency and throughput across these SL operators
were hardly noticeable. All our experiments were repeated seven times until the numbers
converged.
In Table 5.2 x denotes the performance of a nop Fabric service, y denotes the perfor-
mance of the trust service and z shows the relative overhead (i.e., percentage decrease
in throughput and percentage increase in latency)
My initial results indicate that including a trust service does not significantly alter the
throughput of the Fabric platform. In general, I expect the information analytics oper-
ator is likely to be at least as complex (if not more) than the trust assessment operator;
hence, the relative loss in throughput is expected to be reasonably small (roughly 3%).
With regard to latency, the trust service adds a relatively larger overhead (13%). This is
because in my current implementation, the trust assessment operator does not run con-
currently with the analytics operator; I require the analytics operation to be complete
and the output information product be available before the trust assessment operation
can infer the trust metadata on the information product. For future implementations,
I anticipate that once the choice of the analytics operation is determined, e.g., which
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Controlled English rule will be applied, I could concurrently issue a request to the trust
service without waiting for the analytics operation to complete. Hence, in this case, I
expect that the latency overhead due to the trust service would decrease.
5.8.3 Accuracy
Next, I compare the accuracy of the assessed trust using our online trust assessment
system versus an oﬄine approach. The oﬄine approach waits for all reports to be
received before assessing trust in various facts. In contrast, my online approach operates
on a stream of incoming reports with the goal of ascertaining trust in various facts as
information arrives. Assuming that trust levels in reports do not change with time, the
trust assessed by the oﬄine approach can serve as a benchmark, representing a ceiling
for the trust levels that can be ascertained as the entire body of information is available
at decision time. Against this benchmark, I can assess how our online approach fares.
The online approach operates on a compact set of facts where the incoming reports are
discarded immediately after the extraction of facts and trust assessment. I will refer to
the difference between the trust levels attained by the oﬄine and online approaches as
the accuracy in the trust assessment.
Figures 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 compare the accuracy for different classes of trust analytics
operators. Note that the forward chaining operators (such as the Subjective Logic
and and or operators) and the Subjective Logic consensus operator are associative and
commutative and, hence, the order in which these operators are applied does not change
the outcome. As a result, the online trust assessment approach will eventually converge
to the value attained by the oﬄine approach when these operators are used; this behavior
is seen in Figures 5.7 and 5.8. On the other hand, backward chaining operators (such
as the Subjective Logic deduction and abduction operators) are neither commutative
nor associative and, hence, the order of their application does matter. In the backward
chaining case, in figure 5.9, the online trust assessment system exhibits inaccuracies by
assessing trust at levels that remain “distant” to those attained by the oﬄine approach.
The inaccuracy notwithstanding, the online approach allows for fast-paced evaluation of
trust as information arrives. In the particular example, besides the computer processing
time, there is practically zero delay from the moment the information arrives until a
new trust level can be assessed. When trust level reaches satisfactory levels and remain
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Figure 5.7: Forward Chaining.
Figure 5.8: Consensus (Self Chain-
ing).
Figure 5.9: Backward Chaining.
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at such levels for a sufficient period of time, decisions could be made and actions taken
at earlier times, resulting in fast-paced execution of the OODA loop as well. Clearly,
the level in trust accuracy attained and the responsiveness with which it is attained
presents a design and system management trade-off parameter. To this end, in future
work, I will explore operational implications of alternative designs where, for example, I
trade-off delay to accuracy by operating in a near-streaming manner. In the latter case,
the system could operate over time frames assessing trust based on reports arriving over
a single frame in an oﬄine fashion, but assessing trust over successive windows in an
online fashion.
5.9 Summary
This chapter has proposed a new trust assessment framework that could be used to eval-
uate the trust on the fused information in a streaming setup. The chapter also discusses
Subjective Logic operators and how these Subjective Logic operators can be used to
achieve a level of trust on fused location information. The chapter also describes the
methods used to resolve conflicting opinions based on a number of mechanisms includ-
ing trust based deleting, trust based discounting and evidence based discounting. This
chapter describes the implementation details for achieving trust on fused information
using Information Fabric and CE store. Further, this chapter evaluates the trust as-
sessment model and reviewed the performance with the conflicts resolution. It can be
observed that the service does not significantly alter the throughput of the platform but
with better analytics the latency could be decreased. I also compare the accuracy of
different classes of trust analytics operators.
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Location and identity privacy
enforcement
6.1 Overview
Mobile devices can request for location based services from service providers. This leads
to various attacks made in order to tamper the end user security. Hence end user security
is another major issue along with the data security flowing from one end to the other.
On requesting a service from a mobile service provider, the location and identity of the
individual making the request is unknowingly accessed by the Service Provider leading
to taking advantages and misusing it. Hence preserving the security of the individual
including location and identity is a very difficult open research problem today. One
of the approaches is to ensure the location security and the other is through identity
security. Both these techniques are equally important as either of them can compromise
the security in the mobile space. There is a vast body of work in the area of location
security [44] -[46]. However, there is no thorough evaluation on where to enforce location
security and what are the trade-offs involved. There are two approaches for information
flow control in mobile environments.
Privacy has been an issue from the time technology has been into existence. In the
mobile world, there is a lot of data being transmitted from and to and hence there is
a very important place for privacy. The information being transmitted could be simple
information or could be much more sensitive information that could be misused if fallen
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Figure 6.1: A tactical network scenario – enabling efficient computations over dy-
namic networks.
into the hands of a malicious user. Mobile devices are being used not just for data
transmission but also for requesting services from various service providers available.
When a user makes requests to service providers asking for a specific location based
service, the service providers would be using the information of the user and also the
location of the user. This information can be misused by the service provider or can also
be handed over to other third parties without the consent of the user. Hence it is very
important and critical to preserve the self information and also the location information
of the user making the request to the service provider. The identity of the individual
making requests needs to be preserved as the requestor would not like his personal
information to be public. Similarly the mobile device holder would not be agreeable
in giving away the location information as it would be a breach of his security. The
results of knowing once location and identity can open doors to a lot of activities that
a malicious user can perform. Hence preserving the privacy of any individual is very
important.
It is very important to understand the placement of the location security solution and
where to enforce security is key to this work. Introducing mobile micro-cloud in this
section will help in understanding the placement of the solution. Mobile micro-cloud
[136] envisions that applications (or computing tasks) will be deployed in a mobile micro-
cloud, a logical network composed of two components, the core (e.g., the command and
control center) with access to large quantities of static (and possibly stale) information
and the edge (e.g., the forward operating base) with access to smaller quantities of
more real-time and dynamic data. The edge and core are separated by dynamic and
performance constrained networks with a many-to-one relationship between the core and
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the edge. It is also possible for edge nodes to communicate with each other. Further,
the (edge and core) nodes can belong to different coalition partners, raising the question
of security and operational policies for handling of data and computation. Figure 1
illustrates a typical architecture of the mobile Microcloud in the army coalition context.
The benefits of embedding storage and computation into such a micro-cloud tactical
network are two fold: (i) Effective provisioning for diverse information requirements the
micro- cloud supports users with different latency requirements and access rights and
(ii) Effective information exchange in a constrained environment. Complete shuﬄing of
information is impractical in a tactical network and the micro-cloud reduces congestion
by providing computation at the edge. This chapter shows a detailed implementation
of the location privacy application. The chapter also details the evaluation setup for
enforcing location privacy and the results.
6.2 Device Vs edge based solution
This section focuses on Device Vs Edge based implementation and the trade-offs in them.
It quantifies the trade-offs and proves that edge based solution is the better solution for
enforcing security. My results show that while device-based solutions do not require
trust in the edge location server, they either suffer from high false positive rate (about
25% probability of not meeting the desired security requirement) or low utility (about
600 meters higher error in obfuscated location data).
6.2.1 Solution at the core
The core is the centralised network and hence has a lot of bandwidth and can maintain
huge repository of information. It also has a lot of computational power allowing it
to process complex solutions. It is important to note that it takes longer time for
transactions to work between the device and the core. This is a major drawback to the
location based solution where spontaneous decisions needs to be made. Solution at the
core will retain same false positive and false negative and will have a very high latency.
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6.2.2 Solution on the device
The delays caused due the solution being placed at the core of the network gave rise to
the new wave of solutions that were placed on the device. It is important to notice that
the device doesn’t have a lot of flexibility, bandwidth or computation power. Besides
any of these, the device does not have visibility of the other devices in the network.
Hence any kind of computations performed by the device will not be leading to accurate
results. It could very well lead to misleading answers to the user’s request. This leads
to the new methodology that I introduce in this work called the solution at the edge of
the network.
6.2.3 Solution at the edge
The edge of the network is closer to the device and is an intermediate channel between
the device and the core of the network. The edge has visibility of all the other users in the
network and the edge can perform computations faster and provide results spontaneously
to the device. The advantage of having the solution at the edge is that edge will have
information about other people and hence solution will have lower false positive and
lower false negative. The only catch with this solution is that trust with the edge is
needed. The edge will have the raw obfuscated data or slightly obfuscated location
data. Latency with this solution is higher than device based solution and is lower than
the solution at the core. This helps the device user make decisions on the location based
service requests that one has. Hence this solution is the best solution compared to the
other 2 solutions explained above. In this chapter I compare optimal choice on the device
(based on historical data) with optimal choice on the edge and examines the trade-offs
between enforcing location security at a device vs. enforcing location security at an
edge location server. To the best of our knowledge this the first attempt to quantify the
effectiveness gap between the optimal solution at the device versus that at the edge/core.
6.3 Location privacy enforcement
Location Security mainly deals with the location of the requester. In mobile environ-
ments, users requests for location based services very frequently, for example, when the
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user requests nearby restaurant information from the location based server, the location
based server needs to know the location of the user and hence the location information is
normally requested. However, in most of the cases, the user doesn’t want to disclose the
location information to arbitrary location based service providers. This can be achieved
by a number of different mechanisms. One of the well known methods is k-anonymity.
In this method, users location information is updated with pseudo-ids and then the
generalised location information is sent to the location based service provider. Due to
some groups being created that fail to provide overall anonymity, another mechanism
called s-proximity has been implemented [37] . This mechanism creates a larger number
of anonymous user profiles to ensure that the location based service provider cannot
identify the location of the requestor. Another location Security mechanism that is de-
scribed is Casper [38]. Casper is a combination of location anonymiser and Security
aware query processor. Few other mechanisms like the Encrypted data store [39], key
agreement [40], privacy tools [41], In-device spatial cloaking assisted by cloud [42] is also
part of the location security.
6.3.1 Anonymization methods
Preserving privacy using anonymization has been discussed in a number of research
papers [37], [43], [44], and [45]. The authors in [46] have looked at the k-anonymity in
order to generalise the location. The user of a mobile device usually requests information
for 2 main types of resources namely static resources and mobile resources. In case of
static resources, pseudo-identifiers are sent and the location is anonymized. In the case
of mobile resources, IDs are updated with pseudo-ids and then the generalised location
and profile are sent back to the requestor. Figure 6.2 shows the representation of this
k-anonymity model. It shows how the mobile device makes a request to one of the
location service providers asking for a location-based service. The anonymizer and the
location information pick this up and the mobile user information is anonymized and
is then transmitted to the location service provider. In this way the user and location
information are hidden.
Although the profile anonymization model works well using the k-anonymity, there have
been a number of attacks that can be performed on the k-anonymity model that has
led to the identification of the query issuer in the location based services. To overcome
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Figure 6.2: k-anonymity model.
some of the shortcomings in the current k-anonymity model the s-proximity model was
proposed. The next paragraph discusses the advantages of the s-proximity compared to
k-anonymity model.
The k-anonymity model as described above tries to hide the location of the query issuer
who tried to request for location based information from the Location Service Provider
(LSP). In [37], the authors shows that the k-anonymity is not enough as it can be easily
prone to attacks thus resulting in the re-identification of the query requester. Two main
attacks that have been explored are heterogeneity attack and conformity attacks. K-
anonymity can create groups that fail to provide the overall anonymity due to lack of
sufficient match among members with respect to some sensitive user attribute. The
communication between the query requester and the Location Service Provider shown
in the Figure 6.2 is as follows: Initially, the user sends a location-based query to the
Anonymizer, which then replaces the exact location with a cloaked region. It is then
passed on to the Location Service Provider. The attacks prove that in this process, by
some combined work by the Location Service Provider’s or a Location Service Provider
can individually break down the anonymity set and prove the identification of the specific
query requester in cases where the query is specific or not too generic. Hence [37]
109
Chapter 6. Location and Identity Privacy Enforcement
comes up with a solution that generalises the query and hence makes it difficult for
the Location Service Provider to identify the actual query requester. This is achieved
in the s-proximity model. The paper suggests that both k-anonymity and s-proximity
are needed to anonymize the query requester’s identity in a location-based service. In
the s-proximity model, the Anonymizer is replaced by context aware anonymizer with
further modules such as query generalization, query analyser and partitioning agent.
With the detailed implementation of these modules privacy of the user is preserved and
hence the privacy preservation is achieved in allocation-based environments.
Hence I propose a model that uses both k-anonymity and s-proximity in order to perform
anonymization at the edge so that the location security is enforced at the right place.
6.3.2 Mobile Integrated Server
I propose a new architecture that would ensure that the privacy information of the
user is preserved. This is achieved by using one of the main components called Mobile
Integrated Server (MIS). MIS is a dedicated server that is mainly used to perform two
tasks. Its existence is mainly for the purpose of preserving the privacy. Privacy as
discussed before is mainly consisting of any information that would be related to an
individual and his existence. Hence MIS is mainly targeted in preserving the location
information of the mobile user and the identity of the user. This is done by the two
main parts of the MIS namely Location Concealer and Profile Cloner.
Figure 6.3: Mobile Integrated Server showing Location conealer and Profile cloner
The Location Concealer as the name suggests makes sure that the location of the user
making the requests to the mobile service provider is hidden and is not retrieved for
the service provider to misuse it. Location Concealer accepts the location information
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from the mobile user making requests to the service provider and performs some manip-
ulations on the location information and transforms the information sent to the service
provider.Figure 6.3 shows the MIS components. Hence, the location information does
not reach the service provider. The other part of the MIS is the Profile Cloner. When
the mobile user sends requests for services to the service provider, MIS picks it and
looks at the user’s profile information that is sent as part of the request. It then makes
a large number of similar profiles so that the profile of the actual requestor is cloned
into a number of similar profiles making it difficult for the service provider to track the
actual requestor’s identity.
Location Concealer The Location Concealer is mainly used to hide the location in-
formation of the mobile user trying to request services from any mobile service provider.
The concealer conceals the location information in the MIS and makes use of a general
value which is passed on to the Location Service Provider.
Profile Cloner Profile Cloner clones the user’s identity and then by using a large
number of similar profiles send similar requests to the service provider. As a result, the
service provider will not be able to identify the actual mobile requester. This larger set
of profiles is created by using a cloning algorithm
6.3.3 Registration process of mobile user with MIS
The mobile user has to register with the MIS before performing any transactions. Mobile
provider needs to have the unique identifiers of the mobile device in order to allow the
MIS to authenticate with the device. Mobile provider receives the hash values of IMEI
and IMPI numbers from the mobile device in encrypted form. A small application within
the mobile device would encrypt the hash values of IMEI and IMPI numbers using the
public key of mobile provider. The mobile provider would then decrypt and retrieve the
hash values using its private key. Figure 6.4 shows the registration process steps.
Once the MIS is assigned by the Mobile provider it would also provide the hash of
IMEI and IMPI numbers of the particular mobile device. MIS stores these information
for establishing a secure connection between the MIS and mobile device. The initial
registration process of the mobile device with the MIS will be done based on the unique
identification of the mobile device. When the mobile provider assigns a MIS to the
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Figure 6.4: MIS registration process of a mobile device
mobile device, it would send the Mobile Intergrated Server’s public key to the mobile
device and parallely it would send the hash of IMEI and IMPI numbers of the mobile
device to MIS. The hash values would be sent to MIS by encrypting them using mobile
the public key of MIS. The MIS will then decrypt the hash value of the unique identifiers
using it private key.
The mathematical representation of sending the mobile device’s unique identifiers to the
MIS is shown as below: On the Mobile client side, Hash (IMEI, IMPI) = Huni
Enc (Hash (IMEI, IMPI)), MPPub = CipherText1
Enc (Huni, MPPub ) = CipherText1 = Enc1
On the Mobile Provider side, CipherText from mobile client that was generated for Hash
(IMEI, IMPI) = Enc1
Dec [Enc (Hash (IMEI, IMPI)), MPPub , MPpriv] = DecMP
Enc (Hash (IMEI, IMPI)), MISPub = CipherText2 = Enc2
On the Mobile Integrated Server side, CipherText from mobile provider = Enc2
Dec [Enc (Hash (IMEI, IMPI)), MISpriv] = DecMIS
The Mobile Integrated Server stores a copy of the Hash(IMEI, IMPI) for the mobile
device to be used during initial handshake of the mobile devicewith the MIS
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6.3.4 Mobile user handshake with Mobile Integrated Server
The process involving the handshake of the mobile user with the Mobile Integrated
Server involves the unique identifiers of the mobile users. The unique identifiers of the
mobile device IMEI and IMPI are hashed and encrypted using the public key of the MIS.
The mobile provider keeps a copy of the public key of the MIS in the security capsule
within the mobile device and can be accessed by the security capsule only. Figure 6.5
shows the handshake between user and MIS.
Figure 6.5: MIS handshake with mobile integrated server
On the mobile client side: Hash (IMEI, IMPI) = Huni
Enc (Hash (IMEI, IMPI)), MISPub = CipherText = E1
On the MIS side :
CipherText from mobile device = E1
Dec [Enc (Hash (IMEI, IMPI)), MISpriv] = D1
D1 = Hash (IMEI, IMPI) = Huni
The MIS already has a copy of the hash values stored in DecMIS A comparison of
DecMIS and Huni are performed. If the comparison succeeds the initial handshake
between the mobile device and the MIS is established for future transactions.
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6.4 Identity privacy enforcement
Identity obfuscation is equally important when mobile device users are requesting for
location based services. The location and identity are both being captured by the service
providers in order to provide the user with the accurate results to the query. Hence it
is very important to obfuscate both the identity and location so that the security is
enforced but accurately providing the same set of results to the query.
In a mobile micro-cloud setting there are multiple entities with varying concerns for trust
and vulnerability wherein a security solution may be deployed. I examine the interplay
between security solutions and the mobile micro-cloud architecture. I use Identity based
security as a use case. In particular I consider identity cloning to throttle information
release to coalition partners. An identity cloning module may operate in one of the
following three layers in a mobile micro-cloud: (i) device, (ii) edge and (iii) core. Each
of these solutions has diverse implications on the overall performance of an application
(e.g., latency), application quality and security objectives. For instance, a device based
solution has incomplete information (on the location of other devices) and thus may
either be over conservative (more obfuscation which leads to poor application quality)
or too liberal (less obfuscation and thus fail to meet security requirements). In the im-
plementation section, I showcase using simple performance, quality and security metrics
the effectiveness of operating a security solution at different layers of a mobile micro-
cloud. My observations highlight the need for edge computing for delay sensitive and
security conscious coalition applications. Here I highlight the importance of preserving
the identity information and still being able to get the same accurate results for the
query. All the existing solutions out in the market today be it any smart phone takes
the location, identity and query when one makes a location based service query. By
default the Service providers use the identity information and hence knows where you
are and who you are. This is a major breach of privacy if one does not want to share
the identity information. In addition to this, the service providers also misuse the infor-
mation and also pass it on to third party applications who further misuse the identity
information. The key idea is to exploit the availability of low latency edge server to do
identity cloning in order to preserve the identity of the mobile application user. Location
anonymization has scope for improvement and hence identity cloning is our new concept
to mobile security. The concept of mixing user identifiers have been around for several
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decades (e.g., Chaumian mix). The key novelty here is to extract user profiles and mix
only users whose profiles are within a certain distance from each other (i.e., mixing is
only done amongst users with similar profiles).
In the identity cloning scenario, I mix the identifiers of multiple users with the identifier
of the user making a query. By doing this the Service provider will not be able to
distinguish who the actual user making the query is among the population of k users.
k-anonymity matrix is a very well known matrix but this new concept of identity cloning
is novel and is my contribution to research.
Take a hypothetical scenario where you have 1 coffee drinker among k- 1 other drinkers.
Obfuscating the location would be sufficient and good enough as long as there is an
envelope that includes other coffee drinkers. But in scenarios where there are no coffee
drinkers at all except the one user making the query to the Service provider, obfuscating
the location may not be sufficient. In such scenarios, introducing identity cloning is very
important and a must. Identity cloning is achieved by taking the identity from the user
and using the trust server on the edge to clone the users identifier by mixing it with one
of the other identifiers that match the same criteria as the user in question. The key
Steps are as follows:
(i) Hosting an edge server at the network edge (WiFi access points, cellular basestation,
etc.).
(ii) Building user behavior models (e.g., based on click stream and interactions with
applications).
(iii) Device trapping access to identification information (IMEI , IMSI) and location
data from an app and redirecting the request to a (spatially) nearby edge server.
(iv) The edge server obfuscating the identifier and/or location data based on the location
and identities of other devices in the vicinity, the proximity of user profiles and privacy
preferences of the end-user and returning the obfuscated data to the device.
(v) device returning the obfuscated identifier and location data to the application.
6.5 Location privacy application
This section shows the implementation of “Where to enforce Location privacy” and
highlights the archicture and design to show the usecases of the solution being at the
115
Chapter 6. Location and Identity Privacy Enforcement
edge and on the device.
Here I describe the solution architecture for preserving the privacy in a mobile environ-
ment. As seen in the previous sections, the main component of the architecture is the
Mobile Integrated Server (MIS). Additional players in the architecture are mainly mo-
bile handset, mobile Providers and location based Service Providers. The below diagram
shows the end-to-end flow of the solution architecture.
The mobile device is always tied to a mobile provider namely (Vodafone, O2 and so
on). In our solution, it is assumed that the mobile provider randomly allocates a MIS
to the mobile device. The allocation would be done in such a way that in future even
if the mobile provider wants to find out which mobile device is tied to which MIS, it
would be impossible. There is no way the mobile provider would be keeping track of the
MIS assignment. Once a mobile handset is tied to a MIS, initial handshake between the
mobile device and MIS will be done. This handshake is done based on the key that is
generated on the mobile device. A random key is generated on the mobile device and
this key with some additional shared secret is used to create a handshake with the MIS.
Once the handshake is established, the mobile device is tied to the MIS. This initial
handshake is done based on the unique characteristics of the mobile device. There is
an initial authentication process that is performed using keys. Once the handshake is
established, the mobile handset can then start making requests to the Service Provider
asking for location based services.
Mobile Integrated Server is a Server which in a non-cloud setup will be a server installed
in a specific secure location using webserver technology. In case of a cloud environment,
the MIS can be located anywhere in the Cloud and hence it doesn’t matter where the
MIS is exists physically. MIS has 2 main components. One of them is the Location
concealer which is used to hide the mobile user’s location information when the mobile
user makes a request to the Service Provider asking for a particular location based service
(eg: nearest restaurant, nearest car park). The second component is the Profile cloner.
Profile Cloner clones the user’s identity and then by using a large number of similar
profiles send similar requests to the service provider. As a result, the service provider
will not be able to identify the actual mobile requester and his location. Figue 6.6 shows
the application scenario and the interactions.
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Figure 6.6: MIS architecture of the end to end solution
The location information is concealed in the MIS and is generalized by making use of
some kind of a general value. The generalization of the location information is carried
out by making use of a unique concealing algorithm. The concealing algorithm goes
through the process of manipulating the location information and creating a generic
value as the output of the algorithm. Once the generic value is created, the profile
cloner then takes the profile of the service requesting mobile device and using a profile
multiplier algorithm creates a huge list of similar profiles as the output. The generic value
information from the location concealer along with a large number of similar profiles
created by the profile cloner is sent to the service provider making the request for a
particular service. The service provider will look at the incoming requests and assume
that the requests are coming from a large group of profiles and it provides the location
based service requested. This results in the service provider being totally unaware of
the service requesting mobile user’s location and identity. The Service provider sends
back the information to MIS and MIS would be looking at this information and it can
process the information in two ways. It could forward this information as it is to the
specific mobile user or it can narrow it down further and send it to the user. There are a
number of tasks involved within the MIS that are to be done by the Location concealer
and the Profile cloner. This includes writing a Concealing algorithm, multiple profile
creation and query formation. The expression can be described as follows: (Mu, Uq)
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Mobile user information and User query This is passed through to MIS MIS transforms
this into (Mu1, Mu2, Mu3. . . . . . . . . Mun), (Uq) Anonymization is applied to this and it
transforms to Anony (Mu1, Mu2, Mu3. . . . . . . . . Mun), (Uq) The resulting output from
the MIS is a generic value and a huge set of profiles requesting a particular location
based service from the Location Service Provider. The proposed architecture would be
simulated and implemented in the near future and the results for the performance and
the accuracy would be published in the near future.
6.5.1 Architecture
This work has been implemented as an android based system. An application has been
implemented in the android device in order to showcase the difference in the 2 method-
ologies. The solution at the device and the solution at the edge have been implemented
using an example of the London Boris bikes. Boris bikes are the easiest way to hire a
cycle, ride it where you like and return it to any docking station. In this implementation,
we have shown the means of how the system solution works when the solution is at the
edge and when its at the device. In order to perform the implementation, we have made
use of an application in an android device and then have implemented an edge server on a
windows server. This server behaves as an edge which has the visibility to all the devices
in the network and perform computations accordingly. The device based solution shows
an Android application with the map of London in it indicating the Boris bikes available
for hire. Request from the mobile device is shown on the map by indicating the current
location of the device. By performing obfuscation on the device, it can be noticed that
the obfuscation is not accurate enough as the device does not have visibility to other
devices in the network. When the user then makes a request for the bikes, the responses
received are not accurate due to the drawback of inaccurate obfuscation. In the case of
solution at the edge, the edge has visibility to all the devices. When the user makes a
request asking for the nearest bike hire from the current location, the edge takes care
of obfuscating the current location of the device in comparison with the other devices
in the network who would have made similar requests. The request is then sent from
the obfuscated location and this results in accurate responses for the user requesting the
locations of the bikes nearby from his location. Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the different
stages in the demonstration of the location based request with the anonymized location
and the results of the query.
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Figure 6.7: Deviced based solution
view of the London Thames region
(Blue dot is the user location).
Figure 6.8: Green dots showing
search results for the device based so-
lution.
Figure 6.9: Yellow dots showing
devices that are visible to the edge
server with the user location shown
in blue.
Figure 6.10: Green dots showing
query results from true (blue dot)
and obfuscated (grey dot) location.
Yellow dots are other devices, red
dots are the results missed when
searched from obfuscated location
6.5.2 Detailed design of the solution
The solution has been fully implemented using the Eclipse development kit and has been
tested with real use case scenarios. Figure 6.7 shows the device based solution where
user clicks on a particular point and then checks are done to see if the chosen location
has enough obfuscation. Device level obfuscation cannot be performed as the device has
no visibility to the other devices. Hence checks are done at the edge server to ensure
that the obfuscation is good enough to make a query. Figure 6.8 shows the search results
for Boris bike using the device based solution. Figure 6.9 shows the view that the edge
server would have of all the devices. Since the server can see all the devices, when a
device makes a request for the bikes, the server can obfuscate the location based on
the other devices in the area. The query resutls highlighting the bike locations from
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the true and obfuscated location are shown in Figure 6.10. The comparison of results
based on the search from the true location and the obfuscated location is shown using
the 2 circles. This proves that the edge server functions close enough to the query made
directly to the Boris bikes provider without any obfuscation.
6.6 Evaluation setup for enforcement of location privacy
and results
In this section I present an empirical evaluation of the proposed location information
flow control solution. Table 6.1 shows a summary of the datasets used for evaluation.
Three of the datasets Shanghai [137], San Francisco [117] and Stockholm are taxicab
traces obtained from the respective cities. The fourth (Cellular) is a user location
trace and URL accesses obtained from a cellular network. The fifth (Watson) is an
enterprise dataset obtained from WiFi location traces and URL accesses. The Stockholm
dataset, cellular data and Watson data are proprietary datasets. These databases are the
standard databases that have been used in a number of simulations on various privacy
related experiments. I obtained it from a research website.
In the Shanghai and San Francisco datasets, there are explicit markers that indicate
when the taxicab is occupied; in the Stockholm dataset collection of location trace is
turned off when the taxicab is occupied (i.e., I only have trajectory information when
the taxicab is not occupied). I use these datasets to quantify tradeoffs between the
extent of obfuscation and anonymity.
In addition to these datasets, I use coarse grained mobility data from 16K mobile users
obtained from CDRs (Call Detail Records) and from about 1.2K enterprise users ob-
tained from WiFi and web data accesses. While a taxicab’s trajectory may be viewed as
a mixture of several user trajectories (i.e., multiple passenger trajectories), this dataset
captures movement information at the granularity of each user. However, location in-
formation is captured is at the level of cellular Basestation association, which depending
upon urban/rural areas can range from a few 100 meters to about 5,000 meters. From
a population of about 11.6M users, I selected about 16K users that had more than
400 CDRs per day (i.e., >400 location samples and data accesses per day). While I
use the taxicab dataset to analyse fine grained trajectories (each corresponding to one
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Characteristic ShanghaiSan Francisco Stockholm Cellular Watson
Sampling rate 2/min 12/min 1/min >400/day all web accesses
Number of entities ∼ 10,000 ∼ 500 ∼ 2000 ∼ 16,000 ∼1200
Source type GPS GPS GPS Cellular Basestation WiFi
association
Privacy None None No sampling Coarse grained None
when taxi hired samples
Timeline 1 month 1 month 1 month 1 month 1 month
Total number of trips 1,335,360 26,767 570,690 55,200 -
Total number of web accesses - - - 12.4M 5.6M
Table 6.1: Summary of datasets.
trip), I use the cellular and enterprise dataset to analyse mobility across multiple trips
undertaken by a single user.
Figures 6.11, 6.12, 6.13 and 6.14 show the average anonymity as the extent of obfuscation
is varied for times 7am-10am, 10am-4pm, 4pm-7pm and 7pm-7am respectively. As the
extend of obfuscation is increased so does the extent of anonymity; further anonymity
is generally higher during busy hours in the morning and the evening because several
mobile users are active within a small spatial extent. The key challenge in practice is
that these measures of anonymities are averages over the respective dataset. Hence,
given a user location at a point in date and time, the challenge is to identify the amount
of obfuscation required to achieve a desired level of anonymity.
Figure 6.15 shows the number of users on the y-axis and similarity on x-axis. A point
(x, y) in the figure indicates that there are at least y users whose profiles have a similarity
of at least x with a randomly selected user. Similarity between user profiles is computed
using a cosine distance on the set of URLs (web pages) accessed by a user with that of
another user.
Figures 6.16, 6.17 and 6.18 show the complexity of a device-based model and false pos-
itive and false negative rates in enforcing the desired level of anonymity. A choice of
obfuscation k is said to result in a false positive if it results in cloaking < k users; and
in a false negative if it results in cloaking ≥ k users. A false negative is an indicator
of over obfuscation which would in turn affect the utility of the obfuscated data; while
a false positive is in direct violation of the k-anonymity security requirement. In or-
der to determine the level of obfuscation I analyse historical data using decision tree
based machine learning algorithms − parameterised by location (typically encoded as
latitude/longitude boxes) and timestamps (typically time of day and week). I tradeoff
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Figure 6.11: Average
anonymity as the extent of
obfuscation is varied for the
time : 7-10am.
Figure 6.12: Average
anonymity as the extent of
obfuscation is varied for the
time : 10am-4pm.
Figure 6.13: Average
anonymity as the extent of
obfuscation is varied for the
time : 4-7pm.
Figure 6.14: Average
anonymity as the extent of
obfuscation is varied for the
time : 7pm-7am.
model complexity (i.e., number of nodes in the decision tree) with accuracy (i.e., being
able to predict the desired level of obfuscation). It is clear that increasing model com-
plexity beyond a desired level increases the error. primarily due to over fitting. I observe
that in most cases the false positive and false negative rate of an optimal device-based
algorithm (with large model complexity) varies between 0.12 and 0.25 for our datasets.
This captures the extent of sub-optimality in a device-based solutions in comparison
with an edge-based solution.
Figures 6.19, 6.20 and 6.21 show the false positive rate (i.e., the odds of not meeting the
desired level of anonymity) and location error. Location error is only computed when
the choice of obfuscation meets the desired level of anonymity. Otherwise, location error
is computed as the difference between the extent of obfuscation chosen and the optimal
obfuscation needed to achieve the desired level of anonymity.
Figures 6.22, 6.23 and 6.24 shows the false positive rate (i.e., the probability of not meet-
ing the desired level of anonymity) and location error with and without consideration
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Figure 6.15: Similarity of user profiles (based on data accesses).
to user similarity respectively. For this experiment the desired level of anonymity k =
16 and the desired level of user similarity is 0.0 (first case that ignores user profiles),
0.7 (in the second case) and 0.9 (in the third case). For instance when user similarity
threshold is 0.7, amongst the set of users that are within the extent of obfuscation only
those users whose profiles are at least 70% similar to the given user are considered for
quantification of anonymity. The above figures shows the additional cost (higher false
positive rate and higher location error) that is incurred when enforcing location security
based on profile cloning. I observe that when the similarity threshold is low the device-
based solution pays a high penalty in terms of location error, while when the threshold
is high the device-based solution pays a higher penalty in terms of false positive rate
(i.e., the inability to meet the security requirement).
Figures 6.25, 6.26 and 6.27 show the false positive rate (i.e., the odds of not meeting the
desired level of anonymity) and location error while requiring a user similarity thresh-
old of 0.7. Profiles for entities are drawn at random from the Watson dataset with the
goal of showcasing tradeoffs between location security and identity/profile based obfus-
cation. Similar to prior experiments, location error is only computed when the choice
of obfuscation meets the desired level of anonymity. If the choice of obfuscation meets
the desired level of anonymity and nothing more then location error is zero. Otherwise,
location error is computed as the difference between the extent of obfuscation chosen
and the optimal obfuscation needed to achieve the desired level of anonymity.
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Figure 6.16: False posi-
tive/false negative rates of
a device based model for
Shanghai dataset.
Figure 6.17: False posi-
tive/false negative rates of a
device based model for Stock-
holm dataset.
Figure 6.18: False posi-
tive/false negative rates of a
device based model for San
Francisco dataset.
This work builds upon the vast literature in location anonymity by investigating a large
unexplored facet of this problem−where to enforce location security and what are the
tradeoffs in doing so? I have explored both device and edge based enforcement of
location security and quantified the gap between optimal device-based enforcement with
that of the edge-based enforcement. In particular, I have identified machine learning
algorithms that determine the extent of location obfuscation that is needed to achieve
a desired level of anonymity. I have shown that even with good models a device based
solution (that is unaware of the instantaneous locations of other entities or their profiles)
is largely suboptimal in determining the extent of location obfuscation. The experiments
on various mobility datasets show that device-based solutions either suffer from high false
positive rate (about 25% chance of not meeting the desired security requirement) or low
utility (about 600 meters higher error in obfuscated location data). The code for the
enforcement of location privacy is made publicly available [138] .
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Figure 6.19: False positive
rate and location error for
Shanghai dataset.
Figure 6.20: False positive
rate and location error for
Stockholm dataset.
Figure 6.21: False positive
rate and location error for
San Francisco dataset.
6.7 Summary
This chapter describes the mechanisms used to enforce location privacy in the right
place. It compares the solutions at the device level and at the core of the network and
showcases that both the solutions have drawbacks. It proposes implementing location
security and enforcing it at the edge of the network and explains the reasons for doing
the same. It also showcases the anonymization methods including k-anonymity and s-
proximity and explains how the location anonymizer replaces the exact location with
the cloaked region to create a new anonymized location. Identity privacy enforcement
is described in this chapter and the key steps involved in achieving the same has been
shown through the chapter. This chapter also highlights the way the multiple users are
mixed based on similar profiles and Chaumian mix. “Where to enforce location privacy”
has been addressed through this thesis and this chapter shows an implementation of this
solution. The chapter also shows the setup for enforcement of location privacy using
a number of datasets. The experiments show that device-based solutions either suffer
from high false positive rate or low utility.
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Figure 6.22: False positive
rate and location error for
Cellular dataset with Similar-
ity threshold = 0.0.
Figure 6.23: False positive
rate and location error for
Cellular dataset with Similar-
ity threshold = 0.7.
Figure 6.24: False positive
rate and location error for
Cellular dataset with Similar-
ity threshold = 0.9.
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Figure 6.25: False positive
rate and location error for
Shanghai dataset with Simi-
larity threshold = 0.7.
Figure 6.26: False positive
rate and location error for
Stockholm dataset with Sim-
ilarity threshold = 0.7.
Figure 6.27: False positive
rate and location error for
San Francisco dataset with
Similarity threshold = 0.7.
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Conclusion
7.1 Overview
In this thesis, I have addressed the open problems in the area of data access control
and privacy in mobile environments. I have proposed new solutions for data access
control using P3P and XACML extensions and GeoXACML. I have proposed novel
solutions for the “where and when” to enforce location privacy and introduced a trust
assessment framework for fused information. The overall thesis contributes towards
better methodologies to ensure privacy in mobile environments.
This thesis details the methods and models of preserving privacy by introducing ex-
tensions to P3P and XACML. My research proposes a new model of using geospatial
co-ordinates for geographical access control with the use of geohash and converting the
XACML engine to GeoXACML. Through my research I have contributed novel solutions
to resolve the problems of “where to enforce security” and “how to enforce security”.
Through my research I show a direct link between trust and privacy. Trust has been
shown with a specific use case and evaluation of trust value and its importance in the
overall context of fusing information and resolving conflicts has been explained through
my work.
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7.2 Contributions
I have focused mainly on looking at the policy extensions for preserving privacy in mo-
bile environments and created new methods of data access control through extensions of
P3P and XACML. I have shown geographical access control through GeoXACML with
detailed description on the method, implementation and evaluation. With increasing
volumes of data tagged with space and time (e.g., from smartphones) it is becoming in-
creasingly important to support contextual (e.g., location-based) access control to data
and resources. I have explored solutions to realise the GeoXACML access control model
that allows a security administrator to specify location-based access control policies. The
key novelty in my approach includes the ability to use geohashes to translate a GeoX-
ACML policy into a conventional XACML policy - this allows us to fully reuse existing
implementations of the XACML engine. I also describe a case study in the context of
healthcare services wherein access control to handheld devices is moderated based on
the location of the device. This is a novel contribution to the research as there is a new
way of using XACML engine with the geographical extensions and geohashing to ensure
that the information is received by the same person requesting for the information and
that privacy is preserved. I have provided details on the implementation of the P3P and
XACML extension for access control, GeoSpatial access control through GeoXACML
showing the details on how the solution is novel. My research also details how global
attestation of the location for mobile devices can be achieved using the trust matrix
and calculations of EigenTrust. I have detailed the evaluation setup for policy based
access control and highlighted the results of using 2 policy languages including P3P and
XACML. It also shows the importance and benefits of using GeoXACML based access
control model. This thesis also details the steps used for evaluating global attestation.
In order to show this, 3 publicly available datasets including SFO taxi cab dataset, MIT
reality dataset and Infocom06 datasets have been used. The results show the errors in
location attestation under collusive and non-collusive settings and includes outputs from
both honest and dishonest users. In general, the trust estimation error and location at-
testation error are acceptably small (< 15%) when I have fewer than one-third dishonest
entities.
I further discussed the main open challenges around 2 main questions, which are “Where
to enforce Location privacy” and “How to Enforce Location Privacy” and provided
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related work in the area and shown the limitations in the existing solutions in the area.
To address the “how”, as per the privacy Vs utility tradeoff, when certain utility is
required there needs to be a certain level of trust before providing the required informa-
tion. To achieve this I have proposed a novel solution of Global Attestation of location
which gives additional information compared to local attestation and improves the accu-
racy of the location information provided by the user requesting for location information
services. My research has shown the implementation methods and the detailed evalua-
tions done to prove the proposed model. Introducing global attestation through global
consistency check is a novel contribution to the research community which has been
possible through my work.
This research has also shown the problems that occur when there is a set of location
information that comes in through streamed information that makes it difficult to derive
at a consensus and introduced a new and novel model called the trust assessment model
using Subjective logic and showed how the conflicts can be resolved when fused informa-
tion is provided. I have proposed a new trust assessment framework that could be used
to evaluate the trust on the fused information in a streaming setup. My research also
discusses Subjective Logic operators and how these operators can be used to achieve a
level of trust on fused location information. My work also describes the methods used
to resolve conflicting opinions based on a number of mechanisms including trust based
deleting, trust based discounting and evidence based discounting. Further it describes
the implementation details for achieving trust on fused information using Information
Fabric and CE store. This thesis evaluates the trust assessment model and reviewed the
performance with the conflicts resolution. It can be observed that the service does not
significantly alter the throughput of the platform but with better analytics the latency
could be decreased. I also compare the accuracy of different classes of trust analytics
operators.
My research work analysed the problem of “Where to enforce location privacy” and
compared the solutions on the device and at the core and highlighted the problems with
it. I have shown that by having the solution at the edge one can achieve acceptance
latency with considerable security. My thesis explored both device and edge based
enforcement of location security and quantified the gap between optimal device-based
enforcement with that of the edge-based enforcement. In particular, this work identified
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machine learning algorithms that determine the extent of location obfuscation that is
needed to achieve a desired level of anonymity. I have shown that even with good models
a device based solution (that is unaware of the instantaneous locations of other entities
or their profiles) is largely suboptimal in determining extent of location obfuscation.
The experiments on various mobility datasets show that device-based solutions either
suffer from high false positive rate (about 25% chance of not meeting the desired security
requirement) or low utility (about 600 meters higher error in obfuscated location data).
I have shown that by having the solution at the edge one can achieve acceptance latency
with considerable security. I have also detailed the anonymization methods including
k-anonymity and s-proximity and explained how the location anonymizer replaces the
exact location with the cloaked region to create a new anonymised location. My research
includes Identity privacy enforcement and the key steps involved in achieving the same.
I have highlighted how multiple users are mixed based on similar profiles and Chaumian
mix. My research also details the setup for enforcement of location privacy using a
number of datasets.
“Where and how to enforce location privacy” are the questions which has been addressed
through this thesis and an implementation of this solution has been demonstrated in
detail.
7.3 Future work
This thesis has presented new models and methods for achieving privacy in mobile
environments. I have found some directions for research that originated through this
work:
• Enhancing global attestation of location
It is interesting to evaluate the global attestation approach in real devices instead of
experimentation over datasets. One would want to increase the feasibility of location
change. For instance, a device cannot move from New York to London in a very short
span of time. This information is useful when network is sparse. I use consistency of
reports from different peers to assess positive and negative network feedback. On the
other hand, in the case of network sparsity, I may not have sufficient number of feedback.
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However, I can consider the previous location reports of a node to generate feedback.
Future research could deal with such scenarios and enhance the solution.
• Variations in anonymisation methods
It would be interesting to design new anonymisation methods that would be capable of
handling location privacy enforcement and identity privacy. Using fully homormorphic
encryption methods, I am interested in creating new anonymisation solutions for location
privacy.
• Design additional capabilities in trust assessment framework
A research area in trust assessment framework would be to consider handling information
in other languages. This requires integration with other controlled languages. Research
in extending my framework to integrate with other fusion operators that can handle
malicious activities such as collision would be another area. In the case of collision, some
sources come together and produce similar but deceptive opinions, which may mislead
the system. This fusion operator could use trust models to handle these deceptive
opinions. These trust models can also be used to estimate trust in sources when metadata
is missing [131]. I use binomial opinions in our current framework, but there are cases
when multinomial opinions are necessary to represent information [1]. Hence, it would
be a good research topic to extend the framework in future towards these directions.
132
Bibliography
[1] A Jøsang. Subjective Logic : A critical tool in understanding and incor-
porating uncertainty in decision making, http://www.springer.com/us/book/
9783319423357#aboutBook.
[2] U Varshney. Network access and security issues in ubiquitous computing. In
Workshop on Ubiquitous Computing Environment, Cleveland, 2003.
[3] Ajay Brar and Judy Kay. Privacy and security in ubiquitous personalized applica-
tions. Technical report, http://www.it.usyd.edu.au/research/tr/tr561.pdf, 2004.
[4] M Karyda and S Gritzalis. Privacy and fair information practices in ubiquitous en-
vironments, research challenges and future directions. Technical report, Emerald,
Internet Research Vol. 19 No. 2, Pages 194-208, 2009.
[5] M Hedenfalk A Escudero and P Heselius. Flying freedom, location privacy in
mobile internetworking. Technical report, INET2001, 2001.
[6] Alastair R Beresford. Location privacy in ubiquitous computing. UCAM-CL-TR-
612, ISSN 1476-2986, 2005.
[7] Marc Langheinrich. A privacy awareness system for ubiquitous computing environ-
ments. In 4th international conference on Ubiquitous Computing, Springer-Verlag,
pages 237–245, 2002.
[8] Danny Dolev and Andrew Yao. On the security of public key protocols. IEEE
Transactions on information theory, 29(2):198–208, 1983.
[9] Jazilah Jamaluddin, Nikoletta Zotou, Reuben Edwards, and Paul Coulton. Mobile
phone vulnerabilities: a new generation of malware. In 2004 IEEE International
Symposium on In Consumer Electronics, pages 199 – 202, 2004.
133
Bibliography
[10] Yu-Jia Chen and Li-Chun Wang. A security framework of group location-based mo-
bile applications in cloud computing. In Parallel Processing Workshops (ICPPW),
2011 40th International Conference, pages 184–190, 2011.
[11] Collin Mulliner, Giovanni Vigna, David Dagon, and Wenke Lee. Using labeling
to prevent cross-service attacks against smart phones. In Detection of Intrusions
and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA), 2006.
[12] A Beresford and F Stajano. Mix zones: User privacy in location-aware services. In
IEEE Workshop on Pervasive Computing and Communication Security (PerSec),
pages 127 – 131, 2004.
[13] Mobiloco: location based services for mobile communities. http://www.
mobiloco.de. Accessed 2008.
[14] http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/120125_
en.htm, 2012.
[15] Sepandar D Kamvar, Mario T Schlosser, and Hector Garcia-Molina. The eigentrust
algorithm for reputation management in p2p networks. In Proceedings of the 12th
international conference on World Wide Web, 2003.
[16] Peertrust: Supporting reputation based trust for peer-to-peer electronic communi-
ties, volume 16(7), 2004.
[17] Steven Bellman, Eric J Johnson, Stephen J Kobrin, and Gerald L Lohse. Interna-
tional differences in information privacy concerns: A global survey of consumers.
In The Information Society 20, pages 313–324, 2004.
[18] A Westin. Commerce, communication, and privacy online for privacy & ameri-
can business. privacy exchange. Technical report, H L Associates, http://www.
privacyexchange.org/iss/surveys/computersurvey97.html. Accessed 2015.
[19] R K Chellappa. The role of perceived privacy and perceived security. Technical
report, Consumers’ Trust in Electronic Commerce Transactions, http://asura.
usc.edu/ram/rcf-papers/secpriv.pdf. Accessed 2015.
[20] E A Kaluscha S Grabner. Empirical research in on-line trust: a review and critical
assessment. Technical report, Academic Press, 2003.
134
Bibliography
[21] Federal Trade Commission. Privacy online: A report to congress. Technical report,
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf. Accessed 2015.
[22] Annie Anton, Julie B Earp, Davide Bolchini, Qingeng He, Carlos Jensen, and
William Stuﬄebeam. The lack of clarity in financial privacy policies and the
need for standardization. Technical report, http://www.theprivacyplace.org/
papers/glbsecPrivtr.pdf. Accessed 2015.
[23] N Hain W H Stuﬄebeam, A I Ant. Specifying privacy policies with p3p and epal:
Lessons learned. Technical report, Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on
Privacy in the electronic society (WPES), 2004.
[24] R J Anderson. Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed
Systems. 2001.
[25] J Cannon. Privacy : What Developers and IT Professionals Should Know. J
Cannon, 2004.
[26] L F Cranor. Web Privacy with P3P. Sebastopol, CA, USA, 2002.
[27] D Weerasinghe M Rajarajan and V Rakocevic. Device data protection in mo-
bile healthcare applications. In The First International Conference on Electronic
Healthcare in the 21st century, 2008.
[28] L Cranor M Langheinrich M Marchiori and J Reagle. The platform for privacy
preferences 1.0 (p3p1.0) specification. In W3C recommendation, 2002.
[29] A Carlisle Q Xuebing. Xacml-based policy- driven access control for mobile envi-
ronments. In Canadian Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engi-
neering, 2006.
[30] A Jøsang and S L Presti. Analysing the relationship between risk and trust. In Pro-
ceedings of the Second International Conference on Trust Management (iTrust),
2004.
[31] Liang Cai, Sridhar Machiraju, and Hao Chen. Defending against sensor-sniffing
attacks on mobile phones. In 1st ACM workshop on Networking, systems, and
applications for mobile handhelds New York, pages 31–36, 2009.
135
Bibliography
[32] Federico Cerutti, Supriyo Chakraborty, Geeth R de Mel, Lance M Kaplan, Tim-
othy J Norman, Nir Oren, Stephen Pipes, Murat Sensoy, Mani B Srivastava, and
Paul Sullivan. Managing information sharing in coalitions through credible obfus-
cation. Technical report, ITA, 2014. URL https://www.usukitacs.com/node/
2770.
[33] Shiladri Chakraborty, Nicolas Bitouze´, Mani Srivastava, and Lara Dolecek. Pro-
tecting data against unwanted inferences. In Information Theory Workshop
(ITW), 2013 IEEE, pages 1–5. IEEE, 2013.
[34] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17192234, 2012.
[35] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-17178954, 2012.
[36] M Kulicke R Fedler, J Schutte. On the effectiveness of malware protection on
android. Technical report, Tech. rep., Technical report, Fraunhofer AISEC, Berlin,
2013.
[37] Chowdhury S Hasan, Sheikh I Ahamed, and Mohammad Tanviruzzaman. A pri-
vacy enhancing approach for identity inference protection in location-based ser-
vices. In 33rd Annual IEEE International Computer Software and Applications
Conference, 2009.
[38] C Y Chow M F Mokbel and W G Aref. The new casper: Query processing for
location services without compromising privacy. In Proceedings of Very Large
DataBases (VLDB), 2006.
[39] K Puttaswamy and B Zhao. Preserving privacy in location-based mobile social
applications. In HotMobile, pages 1–6, 2010.
[40] S A Menesidou A Loukas, D Damopoulos, M E Skarkala, G Kambourakis, and
S Gritzalis. Milc: A secure and privacy-preserving mobile instant locator with
chatting. In Springer Science plus Business Media, LLC, 2010.
[41] J Freudiger R Shokri and J P Hubaux. A unified framework for location privacy.
In Hot Topics in Privacy Enhancing Technologies (HotPETS), 2010.
[42] W X Sean W Song. In-device spatial cloaking for mobile user privacy assisted
by the cloud. In Eleventh International Conference on Mobile Data Management
(MDM), pages 381 – 386, 2010.
136
Bibliography
[43] R Wei Z Liang. Efficient k-anonymization for privacy preservation. In Computer
Supported Cooperative Work in Design, 12th International Conference, pages 737
– 742, 2008.
[44] Daniele Riboni, Linda Pareschi, Claudio Bettini, and Sushil Jajodia. Preserving
anonymity of recurrent location-based queries. In 16th International Symposium
on Temporal Representation and Reasoning, IEEE Computer Society, 2009.
[45] Dr V Kavitha P Deivanai, Mrs J Jesu Vedha Nayahi. A hybrid data anonymization
integrated with suppression for preserving privacy in mining multi party data.
In IEEE-International Conference on Recent Trends in Information Technology,
ICRTIT, 2011.
[46] J Vaidya H Shin, V Atluri. A profile anonymization model for privacy in a per-
sonalized location based service environment. In 9th International Conference on
Mobile Data Management. MDM’08, pages 73–80, 2008.
[47] GFindster. Gfindster. http://www.androidapps.com/t/gfindster. Accessed
2008.
[48] IMEasy. Introduction to hi aim. http://im-easy.com/. Accessed 2008.
[49] BuddyMob. Buddymob. http://www.buddymob.com/. Accessed 2009.
[50] L Kagal A Patwardhan, V Korolev and A Joshi. Enforcing policies in pervasive
environments. In International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems:
Networking and Services, 2004.
[51] Lalana Kagal, Tim Finin, and Anupam Joshi. A policy based approach to security
for the semanticweb. In 2nd International Semantic Web Conference (ISWC2003),
2003.
[52] Lalana Kagal, Tim Finin, and Anupam Joshi. A policy language for a pervasive
computing environment. In IEEE 4th International Workshop on Policies for
Distributed Systems and Networks, 2003.
[53] Ian Horrocks, Peter F Patel-Schneider, Harold Boley, Said Tabet, Benjamin
Grosof, Mike Dean, et al. Swrl: A semantic web rule language combining owl
and ruleml. http://www.daml.org/rules/proposal/.
137
Bibliography
[54] S. Bechhofer. Hoolet swrl reasoner. http://owl.man.ac.uk/hoolet/.
[55] Vincent C Hu, D Richard Kuhn, and David F Ferraiolo. Attribute-based access
control. IEEE Computer, 48(2):85–88, 2015.
[56] Sun-Moon Jo and Kyung-Yong Chung. Design of access control system for
telemedicine secure xml documents. Multimedia Tools and Applications, 74(7):
2257–2271, 2015.
[57] M Zuidweg J G Pereira Filho and M van Sinderen. Using p3p in a web services-
based context-aware application platform. In Proceedings of EUNICE 2003 9th
Open European Summer School and IFIP WG6.3 Workshop on Next Generation
Networks, 2003.
[58] L Cranor. M Langheinrich and M Marchiori. A p3p preference exchange language
1.0 (appel 1.0). Technical report, World Wide Web Consortium,, 2005.
[59] G Myles A Friday and N Davies. Preserving privacy in environments with location-
based applications. Technical report, IEEE Pervasive Computing, 2003.
[60] M Fahrmair W Sitou and B Spanfelner. Security and privacy rights management
for mobile and ubiquitous computing. In Workshop on UbiComp Privacy, 2005.
[61] P D Giang L X Hung R A Shaikh Y Zhung S Lee Y Lee and H Lee. A trust-based
approach to control privacy exposure in ubiquitous computing environments. In
IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Services, 2007.
[62] Y Wang J Zhang and V Varadharajan. Mobile agent and web service integra-
tion security architecture. In IEEE International Conference on Service-Oriented
Computing and Applications, SOCA, 2007.
[63] Alessandro Giambruno, Muhammad Awais Shibli, Sead Muftic, and Antonio Lioy.
Magicnet: Xacml authorization policies for mobile agents. In Internet Technol-
ogy and Secured Transactions, 2009. ICITST 2009. International Conference for,
pages 1–7. IEEE, 2009.
[64] T Karygiannis S G W A Jansen and V Korolev. Assigning and enforcing secu-
rity policies on handheld devices. In Proceedings of the Canadian Information
Technology Security Symposium, 2002.
138
Bibliography
[65] T Karygiannis M I S G W Jansen and V Korolev. Security policy management
for handheld devices. In The 2003 International Conference on Security and Man-
agement(SAM’03), 2003.
[66] T Karygiannis V K W A Jansen and S G. Policy expression and enforcement for
handheld devices. Technical report, National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy -NIST, 2003.
[67] A Raghavendra D Weerasinghe, S Arunkumar and M Rajarajan. Policy extension
for data access control. Technical report, In 6th IEEE workshop on Secure Network
Protocols (NPSec),, 2010.
[68] S Arunkumar and M Rajarajan. Healthcare data access control using xacml for
handheld devices. Technical report, In Developments in E-systems Engineering
(DESE), IEEE, 2010.
[69] Geospatial extensible access control markup language (geoxacml). http://www.
w3.org/Policy/pling/wiki/images/5/59/GeoXACML.pdf, 2008.
[70] Opengis geospatial extensible access control markup language (geoxacml) re-
vision working group. http://www.opengeospatial.org/projects/groups/
gxacmlrwg, 2007.
[71] John J Roese, Richard W Graham, David Frattura, and David Harrington.
Location-based access control in a data network, March 3 2015. US Patent
8,972,589.
[72] Naeim Abedi, Ashish Bhaskar, and Edward Chung. Tracking spatio-temporal
movement of human in terms of space utilization using media-access-control ad-
dress data. Applied Geography, 51:72–81, 2014.
[73] Ai-juan Zhang, Jing-xiang Gao, JI Cheng, Jiu-yun Sun, and BAO Yu. Multi-
granularity spatial-temporal access control model for web gis. Transactions of
Nonferrous Metals Society of China, 24(9):2946–2953, 2014.
[74] S Saroiu and A Wolman. Enabling new mobile applications with location proofs.
In ACM Hotmobile, 2009.
[75] W Luo and U Hengartner. Veriplace: a privacy-aware location proof architecture.
In In ACM GIS, 2010.
139
Bibliography
[76] Z Zhu and G Cao. Towards privacy-preserving and colludingresistance in location
proof updating system. In In IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2011.
[77] Xinlei Wang, Jindan Zhu, Amit Pande, Arun Raghuramu, Prasant Mohapatra,
Tarek Abdelzaher, and Raman Ganti. Stamp: Ad hoc spatial-temporal prove-
nance assurance for mobile users. In Network Protocols (ICNP), 2013 21st IEEE
International Conference on, pages 1–10. IEEE, 2013.
[78] R Hasan and R Burns. Where have you been? secure location provenance for
mobile devices. In In CoRR, 2011.
[79] H C B Davis and M Franklin. Privacy preserving alibi systems. In Proceedings of
the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Secu-
rity, 2012.
[80] A. Joshi A Patwardhan, F Perich and Y Yesha. Active collaborations for trust-
worthy data management in ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE
International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Sensor Systems, 2005.
[81] Hyo-Sang Lim, Yang-Sae Moon, and Elisa Bertino. Provenance-based trustwor-
thiness assessment in sensor networks. In Proceedings of the Seventh International
Workshop on Data Management for Sensor Networks, pages 2–7. ACM, 2010.
[82] D Mott. Summary of ita controlled english. Technical report, ITA Tech. Report,
https://www.usukita.org/papers/5658/details.html, 2012.
[83] Joel Wright, Christopher Gibson, Flavio Bergamaschi, Kelvin Marcus, Ryan Press-
ley, Gunjan Verma, and Gene Whipps. A dynamic infrastructure for interconnect-
ing disparate isr/istar assets (the ita sensor fabric). In Information Fusion, 2009.
FUSION’09. 12th International Conference on, pages 1393–1400. IEEE, 2009.
[84] Shuiqing Yang. Role of transfer-based and performance-based cues on initial trust
in mobile shopping services: a cross-environment perspective. Information Systems
and e-Business Management, 14(1):47–70, 2016.
[85] Mehrbakhsh Nilashi, Othman Ibrahim, Vahid Reza Mirabi, Leili Ebrahimi, and
Mojtaba Zare. The role of security, design and content factors on customer trust
in mobile commerce. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 26:57–69, 2015.
140
Bibliography
[86] R Schwitter. Handling defaults and their exceptions in controlled natural language.
In Language Production, Cognition, and the Lexicon, Springer, 2015.
[87] A Jøsangand R Ismail. The beta reputation system. In 15th Bled Electronic
Commerce Conference e-Reality: Constructing the e-Economy, 2002.
[88] A Jøsang A Whitby and A Indulska. Filtering out unfair ratings in bayesian
reputation systems. The Icfain Journal of Management Research, 2005.
[89] N Jennings W Teacy, J Patel and M Luck. Travos: Trust and reputation in the
context of inaccurate information sources. In Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems,, 2006.
[90] S Chakraborty L Kaplan, M Sensoy and G de Mel. Partial observable update for
subjective logic and its application for trust estimation. In Information Fusion,
Elsevier, 2015.
[91] B Yu and M Singh. Detecting deception in reputation management. In Proceedings
of Second International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems (AAMAS), 2003.
[92] J Golbeck and C Halaschek-Wiener. Trust-based revision for expressive web syn-
dication. Journal of Logic and Computation,, 19(5):771–790, 2009.
[93] L Berti-Equille X L Dong and D Srivastava. Integrating conflicting data: The role
of source dependence. 35th International Conference on Very Large Databases,
Lyon, France., 2009.
[94] J Han X Yin and P S Yu. Truth discovery with multiple conflicting information
providers on the web. In Proceedings of the Conference on Knowledge and Data
Discovery., 2007.
[95] Roman Schlegel, Kehuan Zhang, Xiao-yong Zhou, Mehool Intwala, Apu Kapadia,
and XiaoFeng Wang. Soundcomber: A stealthy and context-aware sound trojan for
smartphones. In 18th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
(NDSS), pages 17–33, 2011.
[96] William Enck, Peter Gilbert, Seungyeop Han, Vasant Tendulkar, Byung-Gon
Chun, Landon P Cox, Jaeyeon Jung, Patrick McDaniel, and Anmol N Sheth.
141
Bibliography
Taintdroid: An information-flow tracking system for realtime privacy monitoring
on smartphones. In In OSDI’10: Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Symposium on
Operating Systems Design and Implementation, 2010.
[97] Lei Liu, Guanhua Yan, Xinwen Zhang, and Songqing Chen. Virusmeter: Prevent-
ing your cellphone from spies. In In E. Kirda, S. Jha, and D. Balzarotti, editors,
RAID,, pages 244–264. Springer volume 5758 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, 2009.
[98] Jian Liao, Ying-hao Qi, Pei-wei Huang, Meng-tian Rong, and Sheng-hong Li.
Protection of mobile location privacy by using blind signature. In Journal of
Zhejiang University – Science A 7(6), pages 984–989, 2006.
[99] Qi He, Dapeng Wu, and Pradeep Khosla. Quest for personal control over mobile
location privacy. IEEE Communications Magazine, 42(5), pages 130–136, 2004.
[100] D Wu H Qi and P Khosla. A mechanism for personal control over mobile location
privacy. In Proceedings of IEEE/ACM First International Workshop on Broadband
Wireless Services and Applications, BroadWISE, 2004.
[101] Sheng Zhong, L Li, Yanbin Grace Liu, and Yang Richard Yang. Privacy-preserving
location-based services for mobile users in wireless networks. Technical report,
Technical report, State University of New York, 2005.
[102] L Barkhuus and A K Dey. Location-based services for mobile telephony: a study
of user’s privacy concerns. In International Conference on Human-Computer In-
teraction, Switzerland, 2003.
[103] A Escudero-Pascual T Holleboom and S Fischer-Hubner. Privacy for location data
in mobile networks. In Nordic Security Workshop, NORDSEC, 2002.
[104] S Skiadopoulos G Ghinita1, P Kalnis. Mobihide: A mobile peer-to-peer system for
anonymous location-based queries. In Proceedings of the International Symposium
on Advances in Spatial and Temporal Databases, SSTD, 2007.
[105] L Ling B Gedik. Location privacy in mobile systems: A personalized anonymiza-
tion mode. In Proceedings of 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems (ICDCS 2005), pages 620–629, 2005.
142
Bibliography
[106] R P Minch. Privacy issues in location-aware mobile devices. In Hawaii Interna-
tional Conference on System Sciences, pages 1–10, 2004.
[107] Carl A Gunter, Michael J May, and Stuart G Stubblebine. A formal privacy
systems and its application to location-based services. In Proceedings of Workshop
on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Canada,, 2004.
[108] Web services description language (wsdl) version 2.0 part 1: Core language. http:
//www.w3.org/TR/wsdl20/, 2007.
[109] Oasis extensible access control markup language (xacml) version 2.0 oasis
standard. http://docs.oasisopen.org/xacml/2.0/access_control-xacml-2.
0-core-spec-os.pdf, 2005.
[110] Zoran Balkic´, Damir Sˇosˇtaric´, and Goran Horvat. Geohash and uuid identifier
for multi-agent systems. In Agent and Multi-Agent Systems. Technologies and
Applications, pages 290–298. Springer, 2012.
[111] John Gilliom and Torin Monahan. Supervision: an introduction to the Surveillance
Society. University of Chicago Press, 2012.
[112] Code for geoxacml based access control. https://www.usukitacs.com/node/
3017, 2015.
[113] S Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. In Consulted,
1(2012):28, 2008.
[114] J DuPont and A C Squicciarini. Toward deanonymizing bitcoin by mapping users
location. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application
Security and Privacy, 2015.
[115] F Z Filali and B Yagoubi. Global trust: A trust model for cloud service selection.
In Computing, 3(18):19, 2015.
[116] S Moalla and M Rahmouni. Trust path: a distributed model of search paths of
trust in a peer-to-peer system. In Security and Communication Networks, volume
8(3), pages 360–367, 2015.
[117] San francisco taxicab data set. http://crawdad.org/epfl/mobility/20090224/,
2009.
143
Bibliography
[118] Nathan Eagle and Alex (Sandy) Pentland. Reality mining: sensing complex social
systems. Technical report, Journal Personal and Ubiquitous Computing Volume
10 Issue 4, March 2006 Pages 255 - 268, 2006.
[119] Infocom 2006 data set. http://crawdad.org/cambridge/haggle/20090529/,
2009.
[120] B Brehmer. The dynamic ooda loop: Amalgamating boyd’s ooda loop and the
cybernetic approach to command and control. In Proceedings of the 10th interna-
tional command and control research technology symposium, 2005.
[121] Murat Sensoy, Chatschik Bisdikian, Nir Oren, Chris Burnett, Timothy J Norman,
Mani B Srivastava, and Lance M Kaplan. Trust and obfuscation. In SPIE Defense,
Security, and Sensing Symposium, Baltimore, MD, USA, 2012.
[122] Chatschik Bisdikian, Lance M Kaplan, Mani B Srivastava, David J Thornley,
Dinesh Verma, and Robert I Young. Building principles for a quality of information
specification for sensor information. In In 12th Int’l Conf. on Information Fusion,
2009.
[123] L Kaplan C Bisdikian and M B Srivastava. Quality of information in sensor
networks. In In IBM Res. Rep. RC25254, 2011.
[124] Shiguang Wang, Lu Su, Shen Li, Shaohan Hu, Tanvir Amin, Hongwei Wang,
Shuochao Yao, Lance Kaplan, and Tarek Abdelzaher. Scalable social sensing of
interdependent phenomena. In In 14th ACM/IEEE Conference on Information
Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN), Seattle, WA, 2015.
[125] J Konstan J B Schafer and J Riedl. Recommender systems in e-commerce. In In
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 1999.
[126] U Kuter and J Golbeck. Sunny: A new algorithm for trust inference in social net-
works, using probabilistic confidence models. In Association for the Advancement
of Artificial Intelligence, AAAI-07, 2007.
[127] A Jøsang. A logic for uncertain probabilities. In Int. J. Uncertain. Fuzziness
Knowl.-Based Syst, volume 9(3), pages 279–311, 2001.
[128] A Jøsang. The consensus operator for combining beliefs. In Artificial Intelligence,
volume 141(1/2), pages 157–170, 2002.
144
Bibliography
[129] A Jøsang and T Grandison. Conditional inference in subjective logic. In Proceed-
ings of the 6th International Conference on Information Fusion., 2003.
[130] A Jøsang and D McAnally. Multiplication and comultiplication of beliefs. In Int.
J. Approx. Reasoning, 38(1), volume 38(1), pages 19–51, 2005.
[131] A Jøsang. Probabilistic logic under uncertainty. In Proceedings of the thirteenth
Australasian symposium on Theory of computing, pages 101–110, 2007.
[132] A Jøsang. Conditional reasoning with subjective logic. In of Multiple-Valued Logic
and Soft Computing, volume 15(1), pages 5–38, 2008.
[133] C Bisdikian S Chakraborty, M B Srivastava and R Ganti. Localization in cogni-
tive radio systems in the presence of spatially obfuscated data. Technical report,
Technical Report TR-UCLANESL- 201205-01, NESL, 2012.
[134] Murat Sensoy, Geeth de Mel, Lance Kaplan, Thach Pham, and Timothy J Norman.
Tribe: Trust revision for information based on evidence. In Proceedings of 16th
International Conference on Information Fusion, pages 914–921, 2013.
[135] Jacob L Graham, David L Hall, and Jeffrey Rimland. A coin-inspired synthetic
dataset for qualitative evaluation of hard and soft fusion systems. In In 14th Int’l
Conf. on Information Fusion (FUSION 2011), Chicago, IL, USA, 2011.
[136] Shiqiang Wang, Guan-Hua Tu, Raghu Ganti, Ting He, Kin Leung, Howard Tripp,
Katy Warr, and Murtaza Zafer. Mobile micro-cloud: Application classifica-
tion, mapping, and deployment. In Proceedings of Annual Fall Meeting of ITA
(AMITA), 2013.
[137] Shanghai data set. http://crawdad.org/keyword-vehicular-network.htm/,
2012.
[138] Code for geoxacml based access control. https://www.usukitacs.com/node/
3018, 2015.
145
